Dogmas In Judaism, Specifically The Incorporeality of G-D

I was reading through "The Torah U~Madda Journal" from 1993 and I found a fascinating article written by Marc Shapiro. He was responding to an article written by Rabbi Yehuda Parnes in the inaugural issue (1989). Rabbi Parnes suggested that it is forbidden to study heresy, which he explains is "areas that spark and arouse ideas which are antithetical to the tenets of our faith." Rabbi Parnes then went on to clarify as to what he meant by "tenets of our faith" by stating "areas that may undermine the yod gimel ikkarei emunah (the Rambam's 13 principles of faith)." Marc Shapiro then goes on and systematically shows why these principles are not real dogmas of Judaism by revealing that there is much argument on the Rambam from other great Jewish thinkers with regards to these thirteen principles. Therefore, anyone who claims the thirteen principles as dogma are excluding many Rishonim and Achronim from Judaism. In essence, Shapiro proves that these thirteen principles should not be the litmus test for what is heresy.

The most interesting example of Shapiro's analysis is by the Rambam's third principle of faith, the incorporeality of G-D. Shapiro claims that "anthropomorphic views were widespread among both masses and scholars, especially among Ashkenazic Jews." I find this fascinating for several reasons. First, I will bring down a nearly exhaustive list of sources proving that many scholars did, in fact, hold of this view. I believe this is necessary because of all the lies and denials of certain historical facts that some in the orthodox Jewish world claim because of their unease with this truth. They would rather deny the existence of these opinions than deal with them intellectually. Therefore, I am stating all of the sources from Shapiro's research.

Here is the list:
1) Raavad Hil. Teshuva 3:7. This is the correct version of the gloss; see David Kaufman, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der Judischen Religonsphilosophie des Mittelalters (Gotha, 1877), 487-88. See also Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres (Cambridge, 1962), 282ff (There are more for this source, but I think these two should suffice.)
2) Ketav Tamim of R. Moses b. Hasdai Taku, a Tosafist.
3) Bernard Septimus, Hispano Jewish Culture in Transition (Cambridge, 1982) 79 writes, "It seems likely that the views of Moses b. Hasdai do approximate a significant body of Franco-German opinion." See also D. Kaufmann, op. cit., 484ff; Isaiah Sonne, 'A Scrutiny of the Charges of Forgery against Maimonides' 'Letter on Resurrection,'" Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 21 (1952): 110-16.
4) Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Frankfurt, 1853) 47, 91. Abraham ibn Daud reports masses of Jews believe G-D to be a material being.
5) Yedaiah Bedershi writes how it is well known that the belief in G-D's corporeality was spread throughout virtually all of Israel in "previous generations (i.e. before Maimonides was able to reverse matters.) She'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Lvov, 1811), #418 (p. 47b). 
6) R. David Abudarham testifies that Jews held this view in Abudarham ha-Shalem.
7) The anonymous author of Ma'amar Hasekhel testifies to this fact as well.
8) R. Isaac ben Yedaiah testifies to this fact as well. See M. Saperstein op. cit., 185-86
9) R. Moses of Salerno testifies to this fact as well. See J. L. Teicher, op. cit., 84-85
10) R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn shem Tov (The well known commentator on the guide.) testifies to this fact as well. Commentary to Maimonides' introduction to the Guide (p. 10a in the standard edition)
11) R. Moses Nahmanides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. A. Lichtenberg, op. cit., III, 9d; Kitvei Ramban, ed. Chavel (Jerusalem, 1963), I, 345.
12) R. David Kimhi speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. Lichtenberg, ibid., III, 3c.
13) R. Abraham Maimonides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. ibid., 16ff.
14) R. Solomon ben Meshullam da Piera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See the poems published by Hayyim Brody, Yedi'ot ha-Makhon le-Heker ha-Shirah ha-Ivrit 4 (1938): 102., ibid 34. See also ibid., 91 for another defense of the anthropomorphists and Ozar Nehmad 2 (1857): 85.
15) R. Samuel Sapurto speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 12. See also Sapurtos letter published in Ginze Nistarot 4 (1878): 44ff.
16) R. Shem Tov Falaquera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See his letter in A. Lichtenberg op. cit., III, 23 ff. The letter is anonymous, but there are reasons to assume it is Falaquera, see Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), VII, 474.
17) R. Isaac ben Latif speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See He-Haluz 7 (1865): 91-92.
18) R. Moses Alashkar speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. She'elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Alashkar (Jerusalem, 1988), #117 (p. 312).

Now, the reason I find this so intriguing is for the simple fact that I have never heard the thirteen principles of faith challenged so forcefully. It was only recently that I was finally made aware that many people disagreed with the Rambam in these matters. Furthermore, I had no idea there were so many sources for such a widespread belief in the corporeality of G-D. However, the idea that people would believe in G-D being corporeal makes perfect sense, especially with the caveat that most of these people were Ashkenazim.

I am a big believer in the idea that local cultures influenced Judaism everywhere it went. Clothes, types of food and other regional customs in Judaism are, in my mind, reflective of local customs. Jews were clearly influenced by which communities they moved into. Nowadays, we can still see how eastern European dress is still being worn by those people who refuse to accept this idea. Therefore, it is logical to think that Jews that were heavily influenced by Christian culture, the Ashkenazim, probably believed in a corporeal G-D just like their Christian neighbors. However, the Sefardim, who were surrounded by Muslims, most likely rejected the idea of a corporeal G-D because that idea is rejected by Muslim culture.

However, after Rambam came out with his wildly popular Mishna Torah, this immense work was able to stamp out almost all thought of a corporeal G-D. Rambam's influence was not confined to just the idea of G-D's corporeality, but to all halacha and Jewish thought, as can be seen today. Almost all orthodox Jews know the thirteen principles of faith, they are printed in almost every siddur. The Rambam was one of the main sources for the final laws of the Shulchan Orech, the main law book for orthodox Jews. The Rambam's influence is probably greater than that of any other Medieval commentator, but we must remember, that does not make any idea that he considered wrong heresy. I think Shapiro does an excellent job of explaining this idea.     

Why Shmuel Was Denied Semicha (Ordination)

I go to a Gemara Chaburah (group) on Shabbos and during one of the many discussions I found out something very interesting. Someone mentioned a very interesting point about Shmuel and why he was not given semicha. I asked for the source and the doctor who mentioned the idea was kind enough to share with me his sefer "Doros Ha'amoraim."

Translation:
Why was Shmuel not ordained?
This question has brought about different answers.
1) [Shmuel] was an expert in the calendar [for which months were full (30 days) and which months were not (29 days)]. Therefore, if he were ordained it is possible that the people of Bavel would follow after him with regards to when to bless the new month and when the holidays would fall and they would not rely on the institutions in Israel. Perhaps this is why they gave Shmuel the sharp nickname of Yarhinaah (referring to the moon).
2) Shmuel dealt with Mada (secular knowledge), outside knowledge, and foreign languages. He also attached himself to wise men from other nations. These things created a stumbling block in the road for him to get ordained. Even though he had good intentions this was a burden and pain to Rebbi [Yehuda Hanasi].

According to the first opinion I can understand why the Rabbis of Israel did not want to ordain Shmuel. They wanted to keep a center for Torah Judaism. If the Rabbis of Israel came up with one date for the holidays and Shmuel came up with another date, then there would be total chaos. Therefore, they needed to keep Shmuel from getting ordained in order to prevent this potential split within Rabbinical Judaism.

However, the second opinion sounds much more disturbing in my eyes. The reason they refused to give Shmuel ordination was because he was well versed in secular knowledge and associated with non-Jews? That is a reason not to ordain someone, because he knows everything in Torah and secular society? This seems like the Rabbis of Israel were making more of a power play than a just decision. They don't want people associating with non-Jews or learning secular knowledge so they refuse to ordain Shmuel. However, it seems like Shmuel would encourage these things and that is the sole reason they did't want to ordain him.

I prefer to believe the first opinion to be correct for the following inferences that we can draw. According to the first opinion the Rabbis did not ordain Shmuel because they realized Rabbinical Judaism must be united, whether in Israel or Bavel. There must be one law for everyone. Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur, etc needs to be on the same day for all Jews no matter where they are in the world. If Jews in Israel kept Rosh Hashana on Sept. 1st and the Jews in Babel kept Rosh Hashana on Sept. 10th, that disparity would cause major problems. That is a unity issue that seems, to me, a very legitimate concern.

However, to disregard someone from the leadership because he is well versed in secular subjects and associates with non-Jews seems ridiculous. If anything it would seem, to me, that associating with non-Jews and having secular knowledge as well as Torah knowledge would make a person MORE capable of being a leader. Shmuel felt that way and so did many Rishonim after him (Rambam, Ralbag, etc).

This is why I believe the first opinion to be correct and the second opinion to be wrong. However, even if the second opinion were true, we clearly have a Mesorah that learning secular subjects and associating with non-Jews is definitely acceptable..   

Meiri On Taamei Hamitzvos (Reasons for the Commandments) and Rationalist Judaism

There are some very important points that the Meiri brings down in his Sefer Hamidos (Book of Characteristics). The best way to discuss this is to translate the first paragraph on page 61 of his book where the Meiri discusses the reasons for Mitzvos (Commandments). I will interject when I feel it is appropriate. The Meiri says:

Fulfilling the Mitzvos (Commandments) with the intent that they are being performed to serve the creator is sufficient for the masses and the nation.

The Meiri is subtly telling us something very important. The lowest level of performing Mitzvos (commandments) is to fulfill them WHILE having in mind to serve THE CREATOR. I think this language was not callously chosen. I believe that the Meiri is telling us that the most basic reason for the Mitzvos that a person needs to understand in order for their performance to have any value is appreciation. G-D created us and, therefore, when He asks us to do something we do it because He asked. This is important because anyone who realizes that the Mitzvos, at the very least, exist to show appreciation will be more aware of what others do for him or her. This is the most basic character trait a person needs, the trait of appreciation, to be a good person.

The Meiri continues:
However, it is proper for individuals to try and understand all that is possible, according to their capabilities, [of what are the reason for the Mitzvos]. As it says in Psalms (119:66), "Teach me good reason and knowledge; for I have believed in Your Mitzvos (commandments)." What [Psalms] means is that even though I believe in Your Mitzvos and I fulfill all of the Torah, I request to know the reason and wisdom [behind] them. This is not in order to doubt the witnesses that have testified that these Mitzvos are true, because I already believe in them. Also, my belief (emunah) does not rely on the study of these things to the extent that if I found a good connection I would believe or if I found something I considered a lie I would deny them, because this is Kefira (Heresy) and a removal of the religion completely.   

I think the Meiri sums up rationalist Judaism very well here. Judaism is based on laws that were given by G-D. One can not follow Judaism if he or she does not believe this idea no matter what. Without this simple tenant of faith there is no Judaism to follow. Once a person accepts the idea that G-D gave the laws then one must follow these laws whether or not they understand them. However,  the Meiri is telling us that a person SHOULD strive to understand the laws, but not make their beliefs contingent on their understanding of the laws.

This is what, I believe, Rationalist Judaism is all about, understanding the laws, understanding why we do things. In the end of the day everyone, from the Rambam to the Maharal, agrees that Jews follow the laws, simply, because G-D said we should follow them. However, the disagreement comes when we discuss the understanding of the laws. Some say we should not strive to understand the Mitzvos because they are not capable of being understood properly, rather they are just decrees made by G-D that we must follow. The other side is that we should strive to understand the Mitzvos on the deepest level that we can so that we can learn what G-D wants from us. The difference between these two opinions is, in my mind, clear. In a situation where the law goes against what G-D actually wants from us then we would go against the law and follow G-D's will. The best example is Pikuach Nefesh (When a life is in Danger). The law says straight out that we can not violate Shabbos. However, the Rabbis learn out that a person is supposed to desecrate Shabbos in order to save a life. This would, seemingly, be a situation where we use the idea of Reasons for the Mitzvos to contradict a straight out law.

I know, this is said in the Gemara, but the idea still stands. Would the Tannaim or Amoraim that hold there are no reasons for the Mitzvos also say that Pikuach Nefesh does push off the sanctity of the Shabbos? This is something worth exploring, but I don't know enough yet to adequately conclude anything with authority. However, the Torah Temmimah quotes the source for this idea, that Pikuach Nefesh pushes off the sanctity of Shabbos, and it is an Amorah in Tractate Yoma (85b):

וחי ב הם. תנ יא, מנין לפקוח נ פש שדחה את השב ת , אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל, דכתיב
ושמרתם את חקתי ואת משפטי אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי ב ה ם , ולא שימות בהם
And live by them- We learned in a Braisa, from where do we know that Pikuach Nefesh (A life in danger) pushes off [the sanctity of] Shabbos? Says Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel (an Amora), it is written (Vayikra 18:5) And you shall guard my ordinances and laws that you shall do them and LIVE BY THEM and not die by them.

If there is no alternate understanding, why does only one Amora say it?

Where is the source in the Mishna/Gemara for this argument of whether there is a reason for the Mitzvos or not? It is found in Babba Metzia (115a) among other places:

MISHNAH. A MAN MAY NOT TAKE A PLEDGE FROM A WIDOW, WHETHER SHE BE RICH OR POOR, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, THOU SHALT NOT TAKE A WIDOW'S RAIMENT TO PLEDGE. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Whether a widow be rich or poor, no pledge may be taken from her: this is R. Judah's opinion. R. Simeon said: A wealthy widow is subject to distraint,but not a poor one, for you are bound to return [the pledge] to her, and you bring her into disreputeamong her neighbours. Now, shall we say that R. Judah does not interpret the reason of the Writ,whilst R. Simeon does?17 But we know their opinions to be the reverse. For we learnt: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, [that his heart turn not away]; R. Judah said: He may multiply [wives], providing that they do not turn his heart away. R. Simeon said: He may not take to wife even a single one who is likely to turn his heart away; what then is taught by the verse, Neither shall he multiply wives to himself? Even such as Abigail! — In truth, R. Judah does not Interpret the reason of Scripture; but here it is different, because Scripture itself states the reason: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, and his heart shall not turn away. Thus, why ‘shall he not multiply wives to himself’? So ‘that his heart turn not away.’ And R. Simeon [argues thus]: Let us consider. As a general rule, we interpret the Scriptural reason: then Scripture should have written, ‘Neither shall he multiply [etc.].’ whilst ‘and his heart shall not turn away’ is superfluous, for I would know myself
that the reason why he must not multiply is that his heart may not turn away. Why then is ‘shall not turn away’ [explicitly] stated? To teach that he must not marry even a single one who may turn his heart.

We see from here, as well as many other places, that Rebbe Shimon learns out that there are reasons for the Mitzvos whereas Rebbe Yehuda does not. However, according to the Rambam in the Moreh Nevuchim (The Guide for The Perplexed) in Part 3 Chapter 48 we Poskin (rule) like Rebbe Shimon. As he says:

When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase, "Thy mercy extendeth to young birds," it is the expression of the one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the other opinion [that the Laws have reasons].

This is, most likely, why we decide the Pekuach Nefesh is Docheh Shabbos (Life Endangerment pushes off the sanctity of Shabbos), because we follow the opinion that the laws have reasons. One of the basic reasons for the Mitzvos is in order that we, as Jews, observe them. If the Mitzvos lead to our death then we can not observe them, therefore, we desecrate the Sabbath in order to live another day and observe the Mitzvos.

Getting back to the topic of Rationalist Judaism, if we truly hold of the idea that the Mitzvos have reasons, then doesn't it follow that everything in Judaism, stemming from the fact that Judaism is solely based on the written and oral Torah, should have a reason? This is what Rationalist Judaism is based on, finding reasons and questioning ideas that are, seemingly based on faulty logic. For example, science has shown that it is highly likely that the world is older than 5771 years old. Is Judaism forced into the position that the world must only be 5771 or is that just some idea that cropped up in the past that some antiquated people cling to as if it were a religious dogma? If reason and understanding is desired in our religion, as the Meiri points out, why are there people who call any form of reason and understanding Kefirah (heresy)?

It bothers me that some people make a topic, like the age of the universe, into such a big deal when, in truth, it matters very little to the Jewish religion. If the universe is 13-15 billion years old does that mean G-D didn't create it? That G-D did not speak to the Jewish people at Mt. Sinai? That none of the prophets spoke to G-D? All this does is make the people who refuse to discuss these issues look foolish. Worse, it makes the pseudo-scientific explanations look idiotic. I dislike when people try to make their pseudoscience look like real science. Why am I so against it? Because I once fell for pseudoscience until someone actually took the time to explain to me why those pseudo-scientists were spewing nonsense. If one takes a logical approach then they can never go wrong.

The Meiri and the Rambam (my two favorite Rishonim) teach us a very valuable lesson with this whole reason for Mitzvos. True, one must follow the Torah whether they understand the reasons or not. However, we should always search for the true meaning. Why? Because, it is only through the true meaning that we will come to be better people and correct our character traits. It is only through understanding the deeper meaning of the Mitzvos that we can truly understand what it is that G-D wants from us. That does not come from closing our eyes and just doing what we are told, but rather it comes from opening our minds and ears and figuring out the deeper meanings of this complicated and intricate religion.

Think of it like this. A person who just performs the Mitzvos without understanding their deeper meanings is more likely to lie and cheat than someone who actually researches and understands the deeper meanings behind the Mitzvos. The former does not understand that lying and cheating in a way that is not explicitly forbidden in the Torah is still abhorrent to G-D. He figures there is a "loophole" for him to comfortably do these despicable atrocities in. However, the latter realizes that lying and cheating, whether explicitly stated is abhorrent to G-D and he or she will not allow themselves to take that evil path.

How Different Were the Rambam and the Maharal

The Rambam (Maimonides) is known as the Paradigm of rationalistic Judaism. Whenever someone wants to show how rational Judaism is they often find themselves quoting the Rambam. On the other hand, the Maharal is the champion of the non-rationalistic (mystic) approach to Judaism. One will often hear a Gemora, that sounds absurd, explained allegorically due to the Maharal's approach. Also, the fact that Maharal believed in Astrology, demons and other mystical creatures and devices, while the Rambam denied their reality, separates these two great thinkers. However, after reading the Rambam's "Introduction to the Chapter of Chelek" I see that these two Torah giants, that are on the opposite sides of the rational vs non-rational argument, had a very similar approach to understanding Aggadita in the Gemora.

First let's hear what Maharal says (found here):

Be'eir haGolah #4 (p 51), translation R' Mordechai Becher, posted to
V15n9 by RGSeif:

Now you will see that most of the words of the Sages were in the form of metaphor and the analogies of the wise... unless they state that a particular story is not a metaphor, it should be assumed that it is a metaphor. The matters of great depth were generally expressed by the Sages using metaphors, and should be understood as metaphors unless they are explicitly indicated to be taken literally. And therefore one should not be surprised to find matters in the words of the Sages that appear to be illogical and distant from the mind. (Berachot 61a:The evil inclination looks like a fly)

So the Maharal explains Aggadita Gemoras, as a general rule, as allegories and metaphors. This is what one would expect from a non-rationalist, because he is trying to show how the Sages were never wrong. Therefore, anything they say that can be misconstrued or misinterpreted as the Sages being wrong is changed into an allegory in order to show they had a deeper meaning and thereby they are saved the embarrassment of being proven inept. However, wouldn't we assume that a rationalistic approach would be to assume that the Sages made incorrect statements?

This does, in fact, seem to be the view of the Rambam and his son, Rav Avraham. From Rav Avraham's Essay on Aggadita (Found Here):

To begin with, let me point out that if a person puts forward a certain theory without offering proof, expecting people to accept it at face value just because they respect him, he is sadly mistaken; his approach flies in the face of both the Torah and common sense. It goes against common sense, because he wants people to believe something without evaluating and investigating whether it squares with the facts. And it runs counter to the Torah, because it goes against the truth and is unethical. The Torah [tells us not to curry favor with anyone], saying [to a judge], "Do not give special consideration to the poor, nor show respect to the great" (Leviticus 19:15). And it says also, "Do not give anyone special consideration when rendering judgment" (Deuteronomy 1:17). And there is no difference between a person who believes an idea without supporting evidence and one who trusts a person's statement simply because he respects him and holds that it must be true since it comes from a great scholar. This does not prove that the statement is true.
Accordingly, we are not required to endorse all the theories of the Sages of the Talmud on medicine, physics, and astronomy in every respect just because we know the authors to be outstanding personalities and eminent scholars in all facets of the Torah. Of course, when it comes to Torah knowledge, the scholarship of the Sages is unsurpassed, and it is their responsibility to teach it to us, as it says, "You must keep the Torah as they interpret it for you" (Deuteronomy 17:11), but this does not necessarily apply to all other branches of knowledge. You can see that even the Sages themselves when faced with an issue that could not be proven by debate and logical arguments, said, "I swear, that even if Joshua b. Nun had said it, I would not have obeyed him!" (Berachot 24b)3Which means, "I would not believe him although he was a prophet, since he cannot prove his point by the talmudical rules of logical argument."
Let me offer you one conclusive proof that no one will refute. It is this: We find that the Sages themselves said that the opinions expressed in the Gemara with regard to general medicine are not borne out, like for instance when the Gemara says that wearing a "preserving stone" is a safeguard against miscarriage, or other things mentioned in tractate Shabbat. They tested these remedies and found them not to have any therapeutic value.

 Also, the Rambam himself speaks of the Sage's ability to make mistakes in scientific matters. He says (The Guide for the perplexed 3:14 found here):

You must, however, not expect that everything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters should agree with observation, for mathematics were not fully developed in those days: and their statements were not based on the authority of the Prophets, but on the knowledge which they either themselves possessed or derived from contemporary men of science.

So we see that Rav Avraham and his father, the Rambam, admit that the Sages could err in non-Torah related areas. However, this does not mean that we are supposed to understand their Aggadita Gemoras (non-halachic) in a literal fashion. For Rav Avraham also says in his introduction (Essay on Aggadita):

It is important to understand that the homiletic expositions and stories in the Talmud have underlying meanings that are shrouded in secrecy, and most of the commentators did not even attempt to probe their deeper meaning.

.... If you follow my guidelines in understanding the aggadic teachings of the Sages, you will come to grasp their deeper meaning, and, as a result, you will not make light of them or deny that they are true. Neither will you fall into the trap of thinking that the miracles that happened to the Sages are as momentous as those that happened to Moses and Israel at the parting of the Red Sea, or as remarkable as the parting of the Jordan for Elisha and Elijah. Such misconceptions arise when you take the derash (i.e., homiletic interpretations) literally and accept only the surface meaning of the text. But there is abundant evidence to show that the aggadic tales and teachings, aside from their plain meaning, have profound hidden significance.

The Rambam also discusses this idea in a few places. First, the Rambam says later on in the same chapter of The Guide quoted above (3:14):

But I will not on that account denounce what they say correctly in accordance with real fact, as untrue or accidentally true. On the contrary, whenever the words of a person can be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully established facts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to do so.

The Rambam is pointing out here that in every instance that we CAN interpret the Sages to be in congruence with the facts, we should. This idea is even more explicitly discussed in the Rambam's introduction to Perek Chelek (The 10th chapter of Mishnayos Sanhedrin and Talmud Yerushalmi and the 11th chapter in Talmud bavli). The Rambam discusses three groups of people that interpret the Sages words on Aggadita (non-Halachic discussions):

What you need to know, with regard to matters pertaining to the words of the Sages (May they be remembered for blessings), is that there are three groups of people (who interpret their words).

1) The first group, and it is the majority of what I have seen [in the sense] that I have seen their books or I have heard about what they say from others, [is made up of people] that interpret the Sages based on their simple reading and they do not believe the sages have a hidden meaning in any way. [The people in this group believe] that the impossible things the Sages say are obligatory for existence. Indeed, these people [interpret the sages this way] because they do not understand the Sciences and they are far from understanding [deeper meanings]. There are none among them that are men of integrity that can realize this by themselves (that some of the words of the sages are similes and therefore the message is the main point and not the simple meaning) and there is no one that points this out to them. The [people of this first group] hold that the Sages, may they be remembered for blessings, with all their righteous and sweet words only intended what could be understood according to their (the people of this first group) knowledge, which is the simple (vulgar) reading. [They believe this] even though some [of the Sages words (understood according to the simple meaning)] lead to slander against the Sages and they (the words) appear to be far from intelligent [so much so that] if they were read and explained according to their simple and vulgar meaning to a regular person, even more so to a wise person, the [regular person or wise person] would be in wonderment of how [anyone could think this] and they would say, "How could it be that there is a man in the world that thinks like this?!?! Also, [how could it be] that anyone thinks this is an acceptable belief and even more so that it is a proper belief?"

This is the group (the First group) that has a lack in knowledge that troubles themselves with their foolishness because they honor and glorify the Sages, according to their(this First group) understanding, [but really] they denigrate the [Sages] without understanding them. By the life of G-D (A serious exclamation)! This group destroys the beauty of the Torah and darkens its radiance and they are assigning to the Torah of G-D the opposite of what it is intended to be. For G-D said regarding the Perfect Torah (Devarim 4:6), "[The nations of the world] shall hear all of these decrees and say 'Surely this is a wise and discerning people, a great nation!'" However, this group tells over the literal words (not according to the allegory and true meaning) of our Sages, may they be remembered for blessings, that when other nations hear these words they say, "Only a nation of fools and rascals that is a puny nation [would say this]."

The majority of the time this is what is occurring with the interpreters [from this group]: They are explaining and making known to the greater nation [ideas] which they do not know (causing them to distort these ideas of the Sages). Who would grant [the people from this group], since they do not know or understand, that they should be silent[, that would be Wise for them]. In the same manner that it says [in Iyov 13:5,] "Who would grant that you fall utterly silent; that would be a wise thing for you!" Or they should say, "We do not understand the intentions of the Sages in this case, and we do not know how to explain it." However, they think that they understand it and try to make known and explain it to the nation according to their weak mental [abilities]- they do not explain what the Sages actually said. They preach at the head of the nation [their understanding of] tractate Brachos and Perek Chelek and other things according to the literal understanding, word for word. (Translation and elucidation provided by me, E-man)

I will translate the rest later, but for our point I think it is clear what the Rambam is saying. We must understand the words of the Sages, when they seem contrary to the truth, in an allegorical and metaphorical way when possible. The Sages, in Aggadita, were trying to teach us deeper meanings and the simple reading of their words is worthless. Not just worthless, but detrimental! The Rambam insists that we understand the words of the Sages in a deeper way and not make them seem unintelligent.

This view of the Rambam seems to make him almost in the camp of the Maharal. Both believe that the words of the Sages have a deeper meaning and excluding that deeper meaning is an incorrect way to learn Aggadita. The only thing that separates the Rambam and Maharal is to what extent the Rabbis sayings were to be made into allegories. The Rambam and his son, as we have shown above, believe that the Sages were incorrect in believing in the power of astrology and other mystical types of things. However, the Maharal believes that astrology and other mystical things, like Sheidim, do actually exist.

Therefore, the Maharal and Rambam agree on most things in the Gemora, when the Sages say something that seems untenable, we must try to understand the deeper meaning in their words. Where the Maharal and Rambam seem to differ is, basically, their own views on certain laws of science. The Maharal believed in Mysticism and, therefore, did not need to make the Sages words into allegory only type of Gemoras, whereas, the Rambam would have to make these Gemoras into allegories or individual opinions of Sages.

However, whether you are a rationalist like the Rambam or a mystic like the Maharal, it seems like no one would condone a simple literalistic interpretation of the untenable Gemoras unless it is IMPOSSIBLE to explain otherwise. Only then is one to claim, according to the Rambam, that this Gemora is a Daas Yachid (individual opinion that we do not hold like). The Maharal says that the words of the Sages should be understood as metaphors "unless they state that a particular story is not a metaphor." Showing that there are practically no Aggadita Gemoras that one can assume are literal. The Rambam also says (In Perek Chelek while dealing with the third group, the right way to understand the Sages), "Everything the Sages say that are impossible we should understand them as speaking through the language of puzzles and parables."

However, there are some Gemora's that the Rambam finds impossible to explain as parables and is willing to agree that there are a few beliefs found in the Sages that are false. However, he explains that these beliefs are not communal beliefs by the Sages. When there are beliefs that the Sages have that contradict logic and reality AND they are impossible to relate through allegories or metaphors THEN the Rambam ascribes those beliefs to a minority opinion in the Sages. As the Rambam says in his letter on astrology (found here):

I know that you may search and find sayings of some individual sages in the Talmud and Midrashim whose words appear to maintain that at the moment of a man's birth, the stars will cause such and such to happen to him. Do not regard this as a difficulty, for it is not fitting for a man to abandon the prevailing law and raise once again the counterarguments and replies (that preceded its enactment). Similarly it is not proper to abandon matters of reason that have already been verified by proofs, shake loose of them, and depend on the words of a single one of the sages from whom possibly the matter was hidden. Or there may be an allusion in those words; or they may have been said with a view to the times and the business before him. (You surely know how many of the verses of the holy Law are not to be taken literally. Since it is known through proofs of reason that it is impossible for the thing to be literally so, the translator [of the Aramaic Targum] rendered it in a form that reason will abide. ) A man should never cast his reason behind him, for the eyes are set in front, not in back...

What we see from here is that the Rambam seems almost identical to the Maharal in his understanding of difficult statements by the Sages. It seems that whether you are a rationalist or a non-rationalist, the simple meanings of the Sages does not reveal a real difficulty in the Sages as a whole. As a whole, the Sages were never wrong, according to the Rambam and the Maharal. However, there were some Sages that, individually, were incorrect in their understanding of some sciences. This would also explain why the Rambam and his son seem to ascribe misinformation to the Sages. They mean that there are som INDIVIDUAL Sages that err and believe in the power of astrology and other mystical things.

As stated above, it seems like the Rambam and Maharal do not differ in HOW to read the Gemora. Rather they argue on scientific fact. The Maharal believes in mysticism and, therefore, believes the Sages also believed in mysticism and finds no reason to relate these teachings of the Sages as allegories. The Rambam disagrees about mysticism and, therefore, he DOES relate these statements of the Sages as allegories.

Rambam's View of Sheidim(demons) In the Gemora

(Some Updates and revisions have been added)
Over at Rationalist Judaism there was a very interesting discussion about Chazal's (the Rabbis of the Gemora) beliefs, specifically about Sheidim (demons), and whether the Rambam was representing what Chazal believed or whether he "argued" with them. Josh Waxman over on Parshablog took the Gemora that I brought over in the comments on Rationalist Judaism and argued with my interpretation of the Gemora. What I would like to do is show how the Rambam's approach to Sheidim (demons), Astrology and other magical things that are mentioned in the Gemora is consistent with at least some opinions in Chazal.

First, we must analyze what it is that the Rambam believes. I would like to suggest two different ideas that the Rambam is likely to use when confronting a Gemora that seems to be non-rational, aka it seems to be acknowledging the existence of magic, demons or astrology. The Rambam states in his famous letter on astrology that can be found here in translated form (By Isadore Twersky):

The summary of the matter is that our mind cannot grasp how the decrees of the Holy One, blessed be He, work upon human beings in this world and in the world to come. What we have said about this from the beginning is that the entire position of the star gazers is regarded as a falsehood by all men of science. I know that you may search and find sayings of some individual sages in the Talmud and Midrashim whose words appear to maintain that at the moment of a man's birth, the stars will cause such and such to happen to him. Do not regard this as a difficulty, for it is not fitting for a man to abandon the prevailing law and raise once again the counterarguments and replies (that preceded its enactment). Similarly it is not proper to abandon matters of reason that have already been verified by proofs, shake loose of them, and depend on the words of a single one of the sages from whom possibly the matter was hidden. Or there may be an allusion in those words; or they may have been said with a view to the times and the business before him. (You surely know how many of the verses of the holy Law are not to be taken literally. Since it is known through proofs of reason that it is impossible for the thing to be literally so, the translator [of the Aramaic Targum] rendered it in a form that reason will abide. ) A man should never cast his reason behind him, for the eyes are set in front, not in back...

The Rambam seems to be of the opinion that any Gemora that seems to understand that magic, astrology or demons (mystical demons) are real is a daas yachid (lone opinion) that was unaware of the truth in these matters, or perhaps there is another way to explain these Gemoras as not being a problem. This other reason is most clearly explained by the Rambam's son, Avraham ben HaRambam. He says in reference to aggadita (story, as opposed to halachic) gemoras (found here):

The second part of the stories consists of such stories as did not a[c]tually occur but were seen in dreams; they speak of them as real stories, because they believed that no thoughtful man would ever mistake them for real facts; as the one (Vol. I, 24.)We are taught (in a Baraitha) R. Ishmael said: “Once upon entering the holy of holies, to prepare incense, I noticed etc.,” and many other similar stories. And the same is true regarding certain stories in which are mentioned the visions of the prophets, how G-d spoke to them, and also the stories of demons. The thoughtless observer who, for the sake of believing, thinks that these things occurred exactly as stated though the facts are contrary to common sense, in doing so, is both foolish and ignorant of the laws of nature. (Introduction to the Agada, Abraham son of Moses Maimonides, translated by Rabbi S. H. Glick in the preface of Volume 1 of his translation of “En Jacob” page XIV).

These stories that go against logic are to be explained as allegories or dreams. Thereby, we have two different ways the Rambam can understand a Gemora, either it was written by a lone opinion (Daas Yachid) or it is meant as an allegory.

To further reinforce our knowledge that the Rambam did not believe in magic, astrology or mystical demons we must turn to the Mishna Torah in the Laws of Idol Worship (11:16):

All these matters [i.e. necromancy, enchantment, et cetera] are all matters of falsehood and deceit, and it was with these that the early idolaters made the other [non-idolatrous] gentiles deviate and follow them. It is not fitting for Jews, who are the cleverest of the clever, to use such nonsense, or even to think that they are of any use, for it is written, "Surely there is no enchantment in Jacob, or divination in Israel" (Bamidbar 23:23), and it is also written, "For these nations, whom you shall dispossess, listen to soothsayers and diviners; but as for you, the Lord your God has not permitted you to do so" (Devarim 18:14). Anyone who believes in these or similar things and privately thinks that they are true and wise, but that [we don't practice them because] the Torah forbade them, is a fool and lacks knowledge, and is in the category of women and children, who are lacking in knowledge. But those people who are wise and of a perfect mentality know very clearly that all these things that the Torah forbade are not wise, but are merely stuff and nonsense which those lacking in knowledge follow and because of which abandon the ways of truth. Because of this, when warning us against these nonsenses, the Torah says, "You shall be perfect with the Lord your God". (Devarim 18:13)

The Rambam makes a pretty intense stance against any type of mysticism. He believes they are all illusions and falsehoods with no power. Also, the Rambam believes this to be the position of the Torah and that of Chazal (the Sages). There are many answers that are needed for several Gemoras. However, I would like to focus solely on Sheidim for now. Perhaps at a later date I will deal with Gemoras on astrology, magic and other such things, but for now I would like to narrow the Explanation to Sheidim (demons) that are found in the Gemora.

In order to do this, it is imperative that we understand what the Rambam's view of Sheidim (demons) is so that we can explain it. Luckily, the Rambam talks about this in the Moreh Nevuchim (The Guide for the Perplexed 1:7):

As regards the words, "the form of Adam, and his likeness," we have already stated (ch. i.) their meaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not human in the true sense of the word, they had not "the form of man." With reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought to human perfection, it could rightly be said, "he (Adam) begat a son in his likeness, in his form." It is acknowledged that a man who does not possess this "form" (the nature of which has just been explained) is not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a creature has the power of causing harm and injury, a power which does not belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and judgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring perfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are used by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as though he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance. Such was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In reference to this subject the Midrash says: "During the 130 years when Adam was under rebuke he begat spirits," i.e., demons; when, however, he was again restored to divine favour "he begat in his likeness, in his form." This is the sense of the passage, "Adam lived one hundred and thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form" (Gen. v. 3).

The Rambam believes that Sheidim (demons) are regular human beings that are immoral and cause harm to others. This is an important tool for understanding the Gemoras that talk about sheidim (demons) according to the Rambam.

Before entering into the Gemoras let us just sum up what we know up to this point. The Rambam believes that all mystical things are falsehoods. Other than the belief in G-D which is a Mesorah from our forefathers who SAW Him, we trust our senses and scientific evidence above all else. This is not just the opinion of the Rambam, but of most of Chazal (the Sages) as well. If a Gemora seemingly contradicts this it is either allegorical, the opinion of a lone sage that was unaware of the falseness of mysticism, or the Gemora is not being properly understood. Now, let us continue onto the Gemoras.

I think it is most appropriate to bring the Gemorah that the Rambam is dealing with in "The Guide for the Perplexed." The Gemora is found in Eruvin 18b, it says:

R. Jeremiah b. Elazar further stated: In all those years during which Adam was under the ban he begot ghosts and male demons and female demons, for it is said in Scripture: And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years and begot a son in his own likeness, after his own image (Breishis 5:3), from which it follows that until that time he did not beget after his own image. An objection was raised: R. Meir said: Adam was a great saint. When he saw that through him death was ordained as a punishment he spent a hundred and thirty years in fasting, severed connection with his wife for a hundred and thirty years, and wore clothes of fig [leaves] on his body for a hundred and thirty years. (How then could he have begotten children?) — That statement (That Adam begot ghosts, male demons and female demons) was made in reference to the semen which he emitted accidentally.

There is an identical Yalkut Shemoni in Breishis 42 that replaces the name of R. Jeremiah b. Elazar with Rav Elazar ben Ezaria. Now, it would seem like there are two ways to understand this story. Either Rav Meir is coming to argue on Rav Jeremiah and Rav Elazar, or he is coming to explain them. If Rav Meir was coming to argue, then the Rambam makes a lot of sense, Rav Meir is just an opinion that is mistaken because he believed in magic and we do not hold of that. However, if he is coming to explain Rav Elazar and Rav Jeremiah then Rambam has to explain this as allegorical. The best way to explain it would, seemingly, be that Rav Meir is arguing on Rav Jeremiah and Rav Elazar ben Azariah. Rav Meir is holding that these Sheidim came from Adam's accidental semen emissions (non-natural) and Rav Elazar/R. Jeremiah are holding the "Sheidim" are a product of an actual pregnancy (natural). This seems likely because the Gemora brings in the word Meisavay which means Rav Meir is challenging them. (It would seem like Rav Elazar ben Azaria and Rav Jeremiah would hold that maybe Adam did separate for a time, but not necessarily 130 years, that is a bit excessive.)

Still, the Gemora says that Adam and Chava begot Sheidim (demons) even according to Rav Elazar and Rav Jeremiah, so how are we gonna explain that? We already did! The Rambam in "The Guide" that we quoted above says that Sheidim (demons) are real, however, they are not supernatural beings. These demons are just normal men who are wicked and cause harm to others. Therefore, we have a rationalistic approach to the Gemora that excludes magic and mysticism (like Rambam wanted) yet we have a perfectly logical and simple understanding of the Gemora.

Now, for the final idea that I would like to present. There are a series of statements made by Abaye in Chullin 105b that seem to indicate that he was originally taught that Sheidim (demons) do not exist, but then his Master taught him that really there were such a thing as demons. Here is one such example that will also help us with a later Gemora:

Abaye also said: At first I thought the reason why one does not sit under a drain pipe was that there was waste water there, but my Master has told me. It is because demons are to be found there. Certain carriers were once carrying a barrel of wine. Wishing to take a rest they put it down under a drain pipe, whereupon the barrel burst, so they came to Mar son of R. Ashi. He brought forth trumpets and exorcised the demon who now stood before him. Said he to the devil, ‘Why did you do such a thing?’ He replied. ‘What else could I do, seeing that they put it down on my ear’? The other [Mar son Of R. Ashi] retorted: ‘What business had you in a public place? It is you that are in the wrong, you must therefore pay for the damage’. Said the devil, ‘Will the Master give me a time wherein to pay’? A date was fixed. When the day arrived he defaulted. He came to court and [Mar b. R. Ashi] said to him, ‘Why did you not keep your time?’ He replied. ‘We have no right to take away anything that is tied up sealed, measured or counted; but only if we find something that has been abandoned’.

For some reason Abaye thought that Sheidim (demons) did not exist, but once his Master told him about them then his original thinking was out the door. Who was this Master? It was none other than his adoptive father Rabbah bar Nachmani. As Rashi tells us in Shabbos 22a (DH Kol Milay Dimar): This refers to Rabbah Bar Nachmani. So we see that Abaye only started believing in Sheidim(demons) after Rabbah bar Nachmani told him about it. There are several instances of this on the page in Chullin 105a, but I am just bringing in one example.

Let us note that Rav Yosef was the head of the academy at Pumedisa, where Abaye learned and he later became the head of the Academy after Rav Yosef. Rabbah bar Nachmani was Rav Yosef's famous bar plugta (debater). As noted in Sanhedrin 17b, they were both at the academy in Pumbedisa and were famous for being bar plugtas, always arguing. This is important to have in mind because we are about to show how Rabba bar Nachmani believed in mystical Sheidim (demons) and Rav Yosef can be understood to not believe in them. Therefore, Abaye was originally taught like Rav Yosef, but when he was done learning from Rav Yosef, Rabbah started teaching him about demons.

If we make this conjecture then we can explain the following two Gemoras in a very appropriate way according to the Rambam. There is a Gemora in Baba Kama that discuses an abandoned house that most commentaries explain to be talking about a Sheid (demon). It says (Baba Kama 21a) :

R. Sehorah slated that R. Huna quoting Rab had said: He who occupies his neighbour's premises without having any agreement with him is under no legal obligation to pay him rent, for Scripture says, Through emptiness(ושאיה) even the gate gets smitten.(Yishayahu 24:12) Mar, son of R. Ashi, remarked: I myself have seen such a thing and the damage was as great as though done by a goring ox (Better translation is- "I saw it and it was like a goring ox") and. R. Joseph said: Premises that are inhabited by tenants keep in a better condition. What however is the [practical] difference between them? — There is a difference between them in the case where the owner was using the premises for keeping there wood and straw.

This seems like a perfectly harmless Gemora, no mention of Sheidim (demons) at all. However, Rashi (and several other Rishonim) here and on page 97a explains that שאיה is the name of a Sheid (demon). So what is going on here? R. Sehorah is telling us that a person dwelling in a house keeps the demon Shaya away and Rav Yosef argues and says there are no demons, rather a person who lives in a house fixes the problems that arise. Also, Mar bar Rav Ashi says that he SAW this Sheid damaging and it was like a goring ox (the translation from Soncino has something to be desired). This makes perfect sense because, as we showed earlier, Mar bar Rav Ashi believes in Sheidim (demons) so much so that in Chullin 105b he was the one who exorcised a demon! So, it seems like we have Rav Sehorah and Mar bar Rav Ashi on the side that Sheidim exist and it is Sheidim that damage the house and on the other side we have Rav Yosef who, seemingly, does not believe in Sheidim and therefore concludes that the benefit here is that a person will fix the broken parts in a house.

So far, we have been able to use the Rambam's principles perfectly to explain these Gemoras. However, there is a Gemora in Pesachim 110a that appears to show that Rav Yosef believes in Sheidim (demons). It says there:

R. Joseph said: The demon Joseph told me [that] Ashmedai the king of the demons is appointed over all pairs.’ and a king is not designated a harmful spirit. Others explain it in the opposite sense: On the contrary, a king is quick-tempered [and] does whatever he wishes, for a king can break through a wall to make a pathway for himself and none may stay him.

Here, it appears to be saying that Rav Yosef is talking to a demon about demon issues. However, if we take a closer look, the Rambam tells us that sheidim (demons) are really just regular people that are wicked. So, perhaps this demon Joseph was just a wicked person. Also, the subject matter that they were discussing ended up being ambiguous, as seen by the contradiction of whether Ashmedai is a damaging spirit or not. Rav Yosef appears to be trying to show us that there is no clear answer about Sheidim (demons), adding to the idea that they are probably not really mystical.

This is in contrast to Rav Papa, who believes in mystical Sheidim (demons), who comes and argues with Rav Yosef. He says the very next word in the Gemora:

R. Papa said, Joseph the demon told me: For two we kill; for four we do not kill, [but] for four we harm [the drinker]. For two [we hurt] whether [they are drunk] unwittingly or deliberately; for four, only if it is deliberate, but not if it is unwitting. And if a man forgot himself and happened to go out, what is his remedy? Let him take his right-hand thumb in his left hand and his left-hand thumb in his right hand and say thus: ‘Ye [two thumbs] and I, surely that is three! But if he hears one saying, ‘Ye and I, surely that is four!’ let him retort to him, ‘Ye and I are surely five!’ And if he hears one saying, ‘Ye and I are six,’ let him retort to him, ‘Ye and I are seven. This once happened until a hundred and one , and the demon burst [with mortification].

The point of Rav Papa is to counter Rav Yosef's claim that demonology is ambiguous and show that everything is specific. Also, notice that in Rav Yosef's story this Joseph character is talking about some other demon, implying that he himself is not necessarily a demon, while in Rav Papa's story the Joseph character IS talking about himself as a demon. This is just another argument between a believer in mystical demons and someone who does not believe in mystical demons.

This is not an exhaustive list, but a mere peek into what explanations are possible. The Rambam is a very acceptable position and is not something that necessarily goes against Amoraim or Tannaim. Clearly, there is no reason to immediately claim that the Rambam goes against all of his predecessors. As I have said before, Aristotle, who did not believe in anything mystical, lived long before the Rambam, Amoraim and Tannaim. To claim that only mysticism existed in the times of Chazal (the Sages) is to deny plain and simple facts. True, there were probably people among the Sages that believed in mysticism, but there were probably Sages that did not.

The question here is what is the truth and what is the myth that crept in? When the Torah was given was there mystical Sheidim (demons) that had supernatural powers and Greek Hellenism effected some of the Sages and caused them to err? Or perhaps the opposite is true and the Persian/Babylonian Mysticism corrupted some of our Sages.

All we know for sure is that nowadays it seems like these things do not exist and that is all we can be certain of. However, the Rambam has definitely not corrupted the Mesorah in this situation.

Do you really feel qualified to make that kind of accusation against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Aron Leib Shteinman?

Over at Cross-Currents, Rabbi Dovid Landesman wrote an article on why he thought the supreme court's decision was dangerous for the religious people in Israel and how it could mean that a religious Jew can not be part of the government, aka the State of Israel. In all honesty, I think he makes some very valid points. However, the first paragraph really bothered me and it had NOTHING to do with his article. Rabbi Landesman said (bold part is the issue here),

Events in the last twenty-four hours have caused my inherent uncertainties about life in Israel to resurface. This afternoon I attended the mass demonstration [peaceful and orderly, thank God] in support of the parents from Emanuel who were sentenced to jail terms for contempt of court in refusing to re-enroll their daughters in the local Beis Yaakov as per the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court. My conflicts began as I made my way toward Rechov Yirmiyahu where the rally was to take place. I passed a young man wearing a knitted kippah, holding a placard that read “sinat chinam” (needless hatred). I asked him to whom he was referring and he answered, “the demonstrators.” The early afternoon sun was brutally hot, so it was critical that I try hard not to loose my cool. I calmly asked him, “Do you really feel qualified to make that kind of accusation against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Aron Leib Shteinman?” Noticing his perplexed demeanor, I walked away, wondering why he did not understand what I wanted from him.

So according to Rabbi Landesman, if you thought, or your Rabbi thought that this Immanuel issue highlighted the issue of discrimination, which Rabbi Landesman admits is rampant throughout the Charaidi world, you are going against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman and how is that possible?!?! Apparently, Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman do not just know Torah better than anyone else, but they understands discrimination better than anyone else.

However, that is not what makes this comment so absurd in my mind. Yes, people can argue that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are the final authority on anything that come out of their mouths. This is, in fact, why the whole Rabbi Slifkin controversy took place. However, ignoring that and even admitting that the Gedolim are infallible, Rabbi Landesman has a problem. He asks this "young man" are you qualified to say the opinion of Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman is Sinaat Chinam. However, Rav Landesman says in the very next paragraph,

"Permit me to share my feelings and fears with you. As a caveat, I am convinced by evidence that I have personally witnessed through the years that there is a great deal of prejudice within the Ashkenazi Torah world against Sefaradim."

This itself goes against Rav Elyashiv, as conveyed by his Gabbai:

"After that Rav Elyashiv's gabbai spoke, followed by Rav David Batzri, a sephardi mekubel. In his speech he said that there has never been any discrimination against Sephardim amongst Torah Observant Jews. All Torah Observant Jews learn the Rambam together with Tosfos, the Beis Yosef with the Rema, the Arizal with Baal HaTanya, and the Mishnah Brurah together with the Ben Ish Chai. He said that discrimination against Sephardim was introduced by the Secular Zionists when they took the yaldei teheran and cut off their peyot and forced upon them the gods of secularism." (Found here)

However, maybe there is an excuse for Rabbi Landesman, he just didn't know Rav Elyashiv held this way and would be willing to change his mind and admit Sephardim have never been discriminated against had he only known this was the opinion of Rav Elyashiv. That is a possibility.

Getting back to the deeper point, the belief that a Rav understands matters that have nothing to do with Gemorah knowledge better than anyone else. I was not raised to think that a Rav's word is similar to the word of G-D. I have been raised to follow the traditions of Judaism. Regular Jews should not be making up halacha, but following the traditions that have withstood the ages. I am a big believer in this idea that, although everyone should be involved with asking questions, learning Torah and coming up with ideas, before coming to any conclusions a Rav should be consulted. For example, a regular Jew that decides to research the Aniskakis worm controversy should do so. This person should come up with their own insights and ideas. However, the psak halacha should always be consulted with that person's Rabbi. Does he need to just ask and receive an answer? No. However, he should enter into a conversation with the Rabbi and express his views and ask the Rabbi if they are valid or not and the Rabbi should be able to answer the questions. Ultimately, the Rabbi decides the halacha within the parameters of the tradition.

However, in matters of science, where the Rabbi knows much less than some others, why would anyone consult the Rabbi? For example, I want to understand how gravity works, should I consult my Rabbi? Doesn't that idea sound ridiculous? So, the Rabbi is the last word on halacha, but what about other things? Should a person having psychological issues go to his or her Rabbi for help or should they go to a psychologist who is trained to help people with these disorders? Here, in the case of Emanuel, who is equipped to understand the situation best? Is it Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman? It could be that a Charaidi person better understands the situation best merely for the fact that there are more Charaidim living in Emanuel than anyone else. Maybe this young man came from Eilat and just heard the Charaidim are protesting and he decided to counter protest. However, it is possible that this young man research the case and its intricacies much more than anyone else and came to the conclusion that this is based on the discrimination that Rabbi Landesman ADMITS TO EXISTING in the Charaidi world. Therefore, by Rabbi Landesman's own admission, this young man "is qualified" to disagree with Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman.

Also, I would not say that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are showing Sinaat Chinam (baseless hatred) here. I believe that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinamn were not basing their views on the discrimination. I in no way think Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are pro the discrimination that exists throughout Israel against Sephardim. However, I think they were told the situation by someone who wanted them to be pro the rally. In order to do that it was probably presented as religious Jews being persecuted by the non-religious state. Therefore, I think the question of Rabbi Landesman, that the young man was calling Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman haters, does not make sense.

However, let's just say Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman, ch'v, were pro the discrimination against Sephardim. Is there any precedence for Rabbi's to err and make the wrong choices? Does anyone recall the burning of the Rambam's books? There were several great Rabbonim that took place in this horrific act. They were great scholars, but erred in how to deal with that situation. This is not my opinion, but many great Rabbis of that generation and subsequent generations admit to this mistake.

Nevertheless, I think that, as a religious Jew, it is an unfortunate thing that Israel is not governed by religious law. Do I think if the government was run by the Charaidim it would be better? No. I wish we had a righteous king that did not have any bias against fellow Jews and could govern, using the Torah, justly and fairly. Hopefully, the Moshiach will come soon and put an end to all this bickering.

Different Ways To Believe In Orthodox Judaism

There are many different ways for a Jew to believe in Judaism. However, remaining in the Orthodox version leaves us with two overall paths. I will refer to these two paths as the Rambam/Ralbag (World must be congruent with science always) and the Maharal path (World's science could change whenever since G-D is all powerful He can change anything). Both of these paths have their benefits and deficiencies. The Rambam/Ralbag path makes Judaism very comprehensible and allows the world to be attainable for a thinking person. However, it requires a less literal interpretation of the Bible. The Maharal's path is less comprehensible and removes all certainty from the nature of life. However, it allows for a literal meaning of the Bible.

These two paths are both widely used nowadays. However, scientists will laugh at the Maharal's approach. How can it be that we humans can not understand nature and predict its course? Well, the Maharal's path leads us to the following answer. You scientists are very haughty assuming that you know how the world works. You think that Gravity has always existed in its current state and that the properties of all chemicals have always been the same. How can you possibly know this? Do you have a time machine that tells you that for the past 4 billion years, according to you, the nature of the world was constant? Isn't that an assumption? The certainty that you give off is flawed because it is based on assumptions. I however believe that G-D controls nature in every way. He can change its course in an instant. In fact, there are points in the Bible that even say this. For example, after the flood in Noach's time the Bible says (Genesis 8:22), "While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease." This implies that G-D made nature cease, or at the very least change, during the time of the flood. There are more examples, but this is not an exhaustive list. Thus we see that the Maharal's path can explain why science today does not effect the modern Jew's faith that follows this path. Science does not truly contradict the Maharal's path since G-D controls all of nature, so any "proof" against the Bible that scientists can bring is inconsequential since it is all based on false assumptions.

In the Rambam/Ralbag path we assume that science is right with its assumptions. We buy into the idea that nature has always been constant. This allows for us to become convinced by the scientists and make us choose one of two options. The first option is to completely discard the Bible and our belief in G-D. This is why the Rambam/Ralbag path is so dangerous for orthodox Jews, because it leaves itself open for people to see a conflict and lose hope. The second option is what the Rambam and Ralbag actually do, reconcile the text with science. This is usually not very hard to do. However, it does require that there be a non-literal understanding of the text. This is exactly what the Rambam, in The Guide for the Perplexed, does and it is also what the Ralbag, in his commentary on the Bible, does. An example of some non-literal interpretation of the Bible comes from the idea of the Gemorah that the Torah (Bible) uses the language of man. For instance, the Ralbag explains that the Rain that the Bible refers to during the flood of Noach was not literally rain. The Ralbag explains that there was just so much water that it seemed like it was the opening of the gates of heaven. This is similar to when a man says it was raining cats and dogs. Man doesn't literally mean it was raining cats and dogs, rather it was just a heavy downpour. With these ideas in mind, it is clear to see that this approach of the Rambam/Ralbag can reconcile science with the Bible and Judaism.

****Update
Check out my post where the Maharal openly talks about these ideas here. I will be writing more posts on this subject after this post on the Maharal.

Rambam The Rationalist

Apparently there has been some confusion going around about whether Rambam was a mystic or a rationalist. So other than the numerous amounts of times that the Rambam uses scientific knowledge in The Guide for the Perplexed to prove things and says explicitly that his scientific knowledge was greater than that of the sages of the talmud I am going to bring some proofs, from the people that quote the Rambam himself, that prove he is a rationalist. I think quoting a third party's opinion that is not backed up by sources would be disingenuous. So here we go:

First off, here is a great article about this topic that I thought I posted a link to at freelance kiruv maniacs blog, but for some reason the right link did not appear. Here it is: http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beliefs/Issues/Science/History/Medieval/Maimonides.shtml. Here are some excerpts from the article that bring proofs to Rambam being a rationalist:

"As Isadore Twersky has shown, Maimonides was also not averse to introducing scientific knowledge into his formulations of Jewish law, not only 'to integrate science, to relate a scientific vocabulary and axiology to rabbinic law, but also to recognize its autonomy and not to superimpose it on the structure and fabric of the halakha [Jewish law].' (See Twersky, 'Aspects of Maimonidean Epistemology: Halakha and Science,' in Neusner et al., eds., From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism.)

Recognizing the legitimacy of knowledge outside Judaism is one thing; allowing it to contradict positions articulated by the rabbis is another. In one of the sciences, namely astronomy, Maimonides allowed the more recent knowledge of the scientists to supersede that of the rabbis.

He first acknowledged this possibility in commenting on a famous incident recorded in the Talmud (Pesahim 94b) of the rabbinic sages preferring the opinion of Gentile scholars on an astronomical matter (Guide of the Perplexed, 2:8)."

and the next part of the essay:

"Later, commenting on astronomical distances recorded in rabbinic literature, he was even more explicit: 'Do not ask of me to show that everything they [the rabbis] have said concerning astronomical matters conforms to the way things really are. For at that time mathematics was imperfect. They did not speak about this as transmitters of dicta of the prophets, but rather because in those times they were men of knowledge in these fields or because they had heard these dicta from the men of knowledge who lived in those times' (Guide of the Perplexed, 3:14)

He thus concluded that 'whenever it is possible to interpret the words of an individual [rabbi] in such a manner that they conform to a being whose existence has been demonstrated'--that is, that they conform to the scientific truth, as in the case of astronomical distances--it is fitting to do so. But if they cannot be so interpreted, rabbinic statements should be regarded as only individual opinions, not the halakhah, and therefore may be rejected (Ibid).

Maimonides' view that contemporary astronomical knowledge was superior to that found in the Talmud and should be accepted even when it contradicted the views of the rabbis was revolutionary. That he appears to limit its applicability to astronomy should be considered together with his epistemological stance vis-a-vis celestial physics and metaphysics."

Read the article, it is really good. Again, the link is listed above and is the correct link.


Also, at this link http://www.edah.org/shoftim.pdf Eric Grossman points out an interesting argument between the Rambam and the Ramban: He says,

"Rambam, according to the methodology he sets forth in the Guide II:25 looks to Reason to determine that magic cannot be true: if the Torah seems to suggest otherwise, we must be misreading scripture, for Torah cannot deny Truth. In response, Ramban does not deny Reason, but avers instead that reality trumps Reason: even if logic would suggest that augury cannot exist, experience tells us that it does. In the Ramban’s own words, “... we cannot deny what has been demonstrated before the eyes!” The argument between the sages is therefore not reason versus tradition or even rationalism verses mysticism, but rationalism versus empiricism: Do we trust our minds to deduce reality, or do we trust our senses to induce Truth?"

This argument clearly reveals that the Rambam looked to reason for answers. Clearly the work of a rationalist. If not, then why would he choose reason over all else?

There are more proofs, but why bring an exhaustive list. All I am trying to do is point people in the right direction. To reveal that Rambam is not a mystic and that he is, in fact, a rationalist.