Sunday, December 1, 2013

Rambam Yesodei HaTorah Chapter 8 Halacha 2- Why There Was No Need For Moshe To Provide Miracles For People To Believe Him

נמצאו אלו ששולח להן הם העדים על נבואתו שהיא אמת ואינו צריך לעשות להן אות אחר. שהם והוא עדים בדבר כשני עדים שראו דבר אחד ביחד שכל אחד מהן עד לחבירו שהוא אומר אמת ואין אחד מהן צריך להביא ראיה לחבירו. כך משה רבינו כל ישראל עדים לו אחר מעמד הר סיני ואינו צריך לעשות להם אות. וזהו שאמר לו הקב"ה בתחילת נבואתו בעת שנתן לו האותות לעשותן במצרים ואמר לו ושמעו לקולך. ידע משה רבינו שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבבו דופי ומהרהר ומחשב והיה נשמט מלילך ואמר והן לא יאמינו לי. עד שהודיעו הקב"ה שאלו האותות אינן אלא עד שיצאו ממצרים ואחר שיצאו ויעמדו על ההר הזה יסתלק הרהור שמהרהרין אחריך שאני נותן לך כאן אות שידעו שאני שלחתיך באמת מתחילה ולא ישאר בלבם הרהור. והוא שהכתוב אומר וזה לך האות כי אנכי שלחתיך בהוציאך את העם ממצרים תעבדון את האלהים על ההר הזה. נמצאת אומר שכל נביא שיעמוד אחר משה רבינו אין אנו מאמינים בו מפני האות לבדו כדי שנאמר אם יעשה אות נשמע לו לכל מה שיאמר. אלא מפני המצוה שצוה משה בתורה ואמר אם נתן אות אליו תשמעון. כמו שצונו לחתוך הדבר על פי שנים עדים ואע"פ שאין אנו יודעין אם העידו אמת אם שקר. כך מצוה לשמוע מזה הנביא אע"פ שאין אנו יודעים אם האות אמת או בכישוף ולט:

We find that [the Jewish people] that [Moshe] was sent to, they were witnesses to his prophecy that it was truth and[, thus, Moshe] did not need to perform another sign for them. For [the Jewish people and Moshe] were witnesses [for his prophecy] similar to two witnesses that see an occurrence together, that both of them are witnesses that the other is speaking the truth and neither of them have to bring proof to each other. Therefore, with regards to Moshe our teacher, all of the Jewish people were witnesses for him after the events of Mt. Sinai and he did not need to perform a sign for them. 

[This idea is backed up by the conversation between G-D and Moshe by the burning bush, specifically] this that G-D said to [Moshe] at the beginning of his prophecy, at the time [G-D] was giving [Moshe] the signs that he was to perform in Egypt: And G-D said (Shemos 3:18), "They will listen to your voice." Moshe, our teacher, knew that one who believes because of a sign has fault, suspicion and suspect in his heart. [Therefore, Moshe tried to] abandon [the idea] of going and he said (Shemos 4:1), "They will not believe me." 

[Moshe pursued this course] until G-D made it known [by telling Moshe,] that these signs will only last until the [Jewish people] left Egypt. [However,] after [the Jewish people] will leave and they will stand at this mountain (Mt. Sinai) I (G-D) will remove the suspicion that they suspected after you (Moshe) for I will give you a sign here that it will be known that I sent you, in truth, from the beginning and there will not remain in their hearts any suspicion. This is what the verse [means] when it says (3:12), "This will be for you a sign that I sent you, when you take out the [Jewish] nation from Egypt you will worship G-D on this mountain."     


[The only sign that removes all doubts is that the Jewish people saw G-D speak to Moshe with their own eyes, therefore,] you will find the statement that every prophet that arose (or will arise) after Moshe, our teacher, we do not believe in him (or her) solely because of the sign [he or she performs. The reason for this is] because it would be said that if he (or she) performs a sign then we will listen to him (or her) for everything that he (or she) says. However, [the reason we believe this prophet is] because of the commandment that Moshe commanded in the Torah and said (Devarim 18:15), If a sign is given, "to him you shall listen." 


[This can be] compared to the commandment that we make a judgement by the word of two witnesses, even though we do not know if their testimony is true or false. Similarly, it is a commandment to listen to this prophet [that has a sign] even though we do not know if it is a true sign or magic and trickery." 


The Rambam here is trying to clarify his position as to how valid prophecy is and how it can be utilized. In this halacha, the Rambam is setting up the reason as to why no prophet could ever come to nullify or permanently alter the prophecy of Moshe. His point, although subtle, is that the only prophecy that can be determined to be true by others is the prophecy of Moshe. All other prophets can be lying. This is why all future prophets depend upon Moshe's prophecy and can not contradict his prophecy. This is how the Rambam can immediately brush off any claims of the Muslims or Christians.

I find the Rambam's point of view refreshing for several reasons. Mainly, the Rambam does not believe in mysticism and this idea shines through in this chapter of his Mishna Torah. The idea that one should be suspicious of anything that can not be seen with your own eyes is lacking in most circles. Only in the scientific community, and even then it is not constant, are people only swayed by empirical and reproducible evidence. An argument from authority without any tangible evidence is, according to the Rambam, inherently flawed. The sole reason that we believe Judaism is the correct religion is, simply put, because of the witnessed events at Mount Sinai. Without that single event, according to the Rambam, we would not be obligated to follow Judaism or even believe in G-D.

This point can not be over stated or overemphasized. People who claim to have prophecy or special powers and do not even produce a sign are certainly to be ignored. For, even if they had a sign we can not be sure they are telling the truth. With this as a foundation for Judaism, I think, people would stop making arguments from authority and be more open to intelligent discussions.    

Friday, November 15, 2013

Giving a Get (Document of Divorce) In Jewish Law

I saw this discussion over on daattorah.blogspot.com and I felt I needed to comment:

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 1:56 PM DT --
I realize it must be difficult to answer these all day, I should have been more brief and specific in order not to confuse. I read R' Dovid Feinstein's letter, it doesn't answer question -- a very simple question, is it halachically legitimate to use a get as leverage in a divorce proceeding. I.e., "I will not give you this get unless and until I get what I want." I did happen to read your brother's lengthy letter regarding the fact that ma'us u'lai is not a strong enough reason to "force" a get. Again, I refer to R' Sternbuch's teshuva that clearly indicated that the husband "should" give a get in that scenario. But, again, I've been lengthy...

Daas Torah November 7, 2013 at 2:08 PM
I haven't found any teshuva which says that it is not legitimate. Furthermore often the husband is simply trying to gain that which is his according to the halacha - do you consider that illegitimate also? Again the issue is whether it is halachically or morally wrong to use the get as leverage for what you think you deserve. The answer seems to be no. BTW this applies also to a wife refusing to accept a get which Rav Eliashiv doesn't seem to think is immoral

Daas TorahNovember 7, 2013 at 2:35 PM
There should be demands which are unacceptable - but I haven't seen any discussion of what constitutes an unacceptable demand.

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 3:04 PM
My personal feeling, which seems to have some support from halacha, is that any husband who sits down with his to'ein and says ok, let's talk division of assets and custody and when I'm satisfied I'll give her a get, is a pretty bad guy...

---End of discussion---

Now, I think the point that Disappointed makes is a very important one. Can or should a Get ever be used as leverage for a man to receive what he wants, especially when halacha says he should receive it, but the woman won't let him have it? I am clearly no expert, but I have learned Maseches Gittin and hilchos Gittin, so I do feel like I can share my opinion.

The idea that one can use a Get as leverage is clearly a perversion of Judaism, plain and simple. The only time a man can withhold a Get is if he believes the marriage can be saved and he wants to remain married to the woman. Otherwise, halacha dictates that a Get must be given.

For example, if a woman cheats on her husband and there are not two witnesses to convict her, but the husband saw her cheating or knows from some other source, he must give her a Get. Now, one might think he is allowed to withhold a Get in this situation to cause her to suffer like he has because of her cheating, but the Gemara is clear that he must divorce her, aka give her a Get. Once a man is no longer going to live with his wife as man and wife he is supposed to, according to halacha, give her a Get. In a situation where he knows she cheated he is forbidden to live with her as husband and wife and must, therefore, give her a Get.

The question here is not whether we can force him or not and if that forced Get would be kosher or not. That is a technical and ridiculous question. The fact of the matter is, if someone is withholding a Get after a civil divorce where it is clear they will never live as husband and wife again that person is not following halacha. It is as if they are eating non-kosher, desecrating shabbos, having illicit relations, etc... Why do I compare it to the three big sins? Well, these cases where a man is withholding a Get become very public. Therefore, this is a pubic sin, not to mention a Chilul Hashem. We know that if a person is holding a gun to your head in public and says eat that cheeseburger, the Rambam is clear that one must give up his or her life and not eat that cheeseburger. Why? Because we know the reason the gun holder is doing that is specifically to cause the Jew to desecrate the commandments in front of an audience. Here too, the husband is desecrating G-D's name in public. He is transgressing more than just being "bitul an aaseh" (Not doing a positive commandment), but he is causing pain to the woman.

Even if you want to claim that the woman caused him pain, that does not make it ok for the man to cause pain to the woman. There is no revenge claus in the Torah, I am sorry, but there is not. Even if the woman was horrible to the man, the Get is not something that should or even can be used by the husband, according to Jewish law. Only a wicked or misguided person would use a Get as leverage.

Recently, someone wrote a post about withholding a Get if the woman makes false claims against the husband in order to receive full custody of the child. This is a classic case of two wrongs do not make a right. Just because the woman is clearly evil does not mean the man should demean and degrade himself to go down to her level. She obviously does not fear G-D or care about His commandments. However, a G-D fearing man needs to follow halacha and do what is right. One must have faith in G-D and His laws. Should I cheat in business because everyone else is doing it? Should I lie because I will then get what I want? Should I kill because then I will receive benefit? If you answered no to these questions why would you withhold a Get? If you answered yes to these questions you are not really an orthodox Jew, so do what you want.

Monday, October 14, 2013

Rambam-Yisodei HaTorah-Perek 8 Halacha 1: The Basis For Jewish Belief

משה רבינו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות שעשה. שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבו דופי שאפשר שיעשה האות בלט וכשוף. אלא כל האותות שעשה משה במדבר לפי הצורך עשאם. לא להביא ראיה על הנבואה. היה צריך להשקיע את המצריים קרע את הים והצלילן בתוכו. צרכנו למזון הוריד לנו את המן. צמאו בקע להן את האבן. כפרו בו עדת קרח בלעה אותן הארץ. וכן שאר כל האותות. ובמה האמינו בו במעמד הר סיני שעינינו ראו ולא זר ואזנינו שמעו ולא אחר האש והקולות והלפידים והוא נגש אל הערפל והקול מדבר אליו ואנו שומעים משה משה לך אמור להן כך וכך. וכן הוא אומר פנים בפנים דבר ה' עמכם. ונאמר לא את אבותינו כרת ה' את הברית הזאת. ומנין שמעמד הר סיני לבדו היא הראיה לנבואתו שהיא אמת שאין בו דופי שנאמר הנה אנכי בא אליך בעב הענן בעבור ישמע העם בדברי עמך וגם בך יאמינו לעולם. מכלל שקודם דבר זה לא האמינו בו נאמנות שהיא עומדת לעולם אלא נאמנות שיש אחריה הרהור ומחשבה:

The Jews did not believe in Moshe, our teacher, because of the signs he performed. For one who believes [in anything] because of signs has a blemish in his heart since it is possible that a sign was done through trickery and magic (and this person's faith is reliant on a fallacy). Rather, all the signs that Moshe performed in the desert were done out of necessity. [They were] not done to bring proof [as to the validity] of his prophecy. It was necessary to drown the Egyptians, so the sea was split and they were dunked in it. We (the Jews) needed sustenance so the manna was brought down [from the sky] for us. They (the Jews) were thirsty so the stone was split [and water came forth] for them. The congregation of Korach rebelled against [Moshe] so the earth swallowed them. And so too by all the other signs (miracles). 


What is the reason we believe in [Moshe's prophecies? Because of] the events at Mt. Sinai that our eyes saw them and not a strangers [eyes] and our ears heard them and not another's [ears. These events were] the fire, the sounds (thunder, voices?), the lightning, and then [Moshe] approached the fog and the voice [of G-D] spoke to him and we heard "Moshe, Moshe, go and say to them such and such." And so he said, "Face to face G-D spoke with you." And so it says (devarim 5:3), "G-D did not make this covenant with our fathers."


From where [do we know] that the events at Mt. Sinai, in and of themselves, are a proof to [Moshe's] prophecy that [we should believe] it has no faults? For it says (Exodus 19:9), "Behold, I am coming to you in the thick cloud in order that the nation will hear when I speak to you and also that they will believe in you forever." This implies that before this [event, the Jewish people] did not have a belief in [Moshe] that would last forever, rather it was a belief that was speculation and apprehension.             


This idea that the Rambam brings down is of critical importance. Signs, wonders and miracles are completely WORTHLESS when it comes to having a belief in anything. Jesus stood on water, the Baal Shem Tov flew across the world, and so on. These "miracles" have nothing to do with a JEWISH belief in G-D. The ONLY reason a Jew should believe in G-D is because of eyewitness proof. Just like I know my parents exist because I am an eyewitness, or I know president Obama exists because other people have told me he does and I see him on television. This is the Jewish belief in G-D, it is not some she said he said confusion, it is based on actually witnessed events. 

This is the basis for the Rambam's belief in G-D, that this event at Mt. Sinai actually happened. It isn't something that occurred in a dream or was verified through "miracles," it was based on an event in reality that can be substantiated. 

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Autopsies In Halacha

Since I am a pathology resident, I do a fair amount of autopsies (50 are required to graduate). Therefore, it was incumbent upon me as an orthodox Jew to look into the legal challenges with this subject. I have become accustomed to ask my questions to Rabbi Tendler, but since I was reading through the Nishmat Avraham and I found this paragraph I thought I would share:

and here are the sources:
The previous pages of the Nishmat Avraham go through why it is forbidden to perform an autopsy on a deceased Jew. He quotes one opinion that it is allowed for learning medicine, but firmly brushes that opinion aside and says it is irrelevant since most opinions say it is forbidden. He goes on to say how even if the person himself, let alone his family, requests an autopsy or donates the body to science since they do not have ownership over their body their words are meaningless and an autopsy may not be performed.

The only time an autopsy may be performed is when it will somehow save a life. (Most, if not all, autopsies are not done to save lives.)

The reason I find this specific paragraph intriguing is because the law in the Shulchan Orech (Yoreh Deah 349:1) which all of this is derived from equates a Jewish corpse and a non-Jewish corpse. Why then are there so many special rules by a Jewish corpse, but a non-Jewish corpse can so easily be used?

I have not looked through all of the sources since I am limited with my referencing materials. However, using Hebrewbooks.org I was able to find a good Shulchan Orech, Yoreh Deah that had many commentaries. There, I was able to find the Pischei Teshuva on this halacha (Yoreh Deah 349:1) which gives a foundation to the seemingly lenient opinion by non-Jews, but the much stricter opinion by Jews. It says that the prohibition that one may not benefit from a Jewish corpse is biblical, but not benefiting from a non-Jewish corpse is only rabbinically prohibited.

This actually helps explain HOW one could be allowed to perform an autopsy on a non-Jewish corpse when there is minimal reason and a Jewish corpse would need a maximal amount of reason, but I still need to understand WHY it should be that one is biblically prohibited and one is only rabbinically prohibited. I hope to translate one or both of Rav Moshe Feinstein's Responsa on this subject in the coming days.   

Sunday, July 28, 2013

Dogmas In Judaism, Specifically The Incorporeality of G-D

I was reading through "The Torah U~Madda Journal" from 1993 and I found a fascinating article written by Marc Shapiro. He was responding to an article written by Rabbi Yehuda Parnes in the inaugural issue (1989). Rabbi Parnes suggested that it is forbidden to study heresy, which he explains is "areas that spark and arouse ideas which are antithetical to the tenets of our faith." Rabbi Parnes then went on to clarify as to what he meant by "tenets of our faith" by stating "areas that may undermine the yod gimel ikkarei emunah (the Rambam's 13 principles of faith)." Marc Shapiro then goes on and systematically shows why these principles are not real dogmas of Judaism by revealing that there is much argument on the Rambam from other great Jewish thinkers with regards to these thirteen principles. Therefore, anyone who claims the thirteen principles as dogma are excluding many Rishonim and Achronim from Judaism. In essence, Shapiro proves that these thirteen principles should not be the litmus test for what is heresy.

The most interesting example of Shapiro's analysis is by the Rambam's third principle of faith, the incorporeality of G-D. Shapiro claims that "anthropomorphic views were widespread among both masses and scholars, especially among Ashkenazic Jews." I find this fascinating for several reasons. First, I will bring down a nearly exhaustive list of sources proving that many scholars did, in fact, hold of this view. I believe this is necessary because of all the lies and denials of certain historical facts that some in the orthodox Jewish world claim because of their unease with this truth. They would rather deny the existence of these opinions than deal with them intellectually. Therefore, I am stating all of the sources from Shapiro's research.

Here is the list:
1) Raavad Hil. Teshuva 3:7. This is the correct version of the gloss; see David Kaufman, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der Judischen Religonsphilosophie des Mittelalters (Gotha, 1877), 487-88. See also Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquieres (Cambridge, 1962), 282ff (There are more for this source, but I think these two should suffice.)
2) Ketav Tamim of R. Moses b. Hasdai Taku, a Tosafist.
3) Bernard Septimus, Hispano Jewish Culture in Transition (Cambridge, 1982) 79 writes, "It seems likely that the views of Moses b. Hasdai do approximate a significant body of Franco-German opinion." See also D. Kaufmann, op. cit., 484ff; Isaiah Sonne, 'A Scrutiny of the Charges of Forgery against Maimonides' 'Letter on Resurrection,'" Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 21 (1952): 110-16.
4) Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah (Frankfurt, 1853) 47, 91. Abraham ibn Daud reports masses of Jews believe G-D to be a material being.
5) Yedaiah Bedershi writes how it is well known that the belief in G-D's corporeality was spread throughout virtually all of Israel in "previous generations (i.e. before Maimonides was able to reverse matters.) She'elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba (Lvov, 1811), #418 (p. 47b). 
6) R. David Abudarham testifies that Jews held this view in Abudarham ha-Shalem.
7) The anonymous author of Ma'amar Hasekhel testifies to this fact as well.
8) R. Isaac ben Yedaiah testifies to this fact as well. See M. Saperstein op. cit., 185-86
9) R. Moses of Salerno testifies to this fact as well. See J. L. Teicher, op. cit., 84-85
10) R. Shem Tov ben Joseph ibn shem Tov (The well known commentator on the guide.) testifies to this fact as well. Commentary to Maimonides' introduction to the Guide (p. 10a in the standard edition)
11) R. Moses Nahmanides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. A. Lichtenberg, op. cit., III, 9d; Kitvei Ramban, ed. Chavel (Jerusalem, 1963), I, 345.
12) R. David Kimhi speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. Lichtenberg, ibid., III, 3c.
13) R. Abraham Maimonides speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. ibid., 16ff.
14) R. Solomon ben Meshullam da Piera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See the poems published by Hayyim Brody, Yedi'ot ha-Makhon le-Heker ha-Shirah ha-Ivrit 4 (1938): 102., ibid 34. See also ibid., 91 for another defense of the anthropomorphists and Ozar Nehmad 2 (1857): 85.
15) R. Samuel Sapurto speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See Kerem Hemed 5 (1841): 12. See also Sapurtos letter published in Ginze Nistarot 4 (1878): 44ff.
16) R. Shem Tov Falaquera speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See his letter in A. Lichtenberg op. cit., III, 23 ff. The letter is anonymous, but there are reasons to assume it is Falaquera, see Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden (Leipzig, 1863), VII, 474.
17) R. Isaac ben Latif speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. See He-Haluz 7 (1865): 91-92.
18) R. Moses Alashkar speaks about anthropomorphism being accepted by scholars. She'elot u-Teshuvot Maharam Alashkar (Jerusalem, 1988), #117 (p. 312).

Now, the reason I find this so intriguing is for the simple fact that I have never heard the thirteen principles of faith challenged so forcefully. It was only recently that I was finally made aware that many people disagreed with the Rambam in these matters. Furthermore, I had no idea there were so many sources for such a widespread belief in the corporeality of G-D. However, the idea that people would believe in G-D being corporeal makes perfect sense, especially with the caveat that most of these people were Ashkenazim.

I am a big believer in the idea that local cultures influenced Judaism everywhere it went. Clothes, types of food and other regional customs in Judaism are, in my mind, reflective of local customs. Jews were clearly influenced by which communities they moved into. Nowadays, we can still see how eastern European dress is still being worn by those people who refuse to accept this idea. Therefore, it is logical to think that Jews that were heavily influenced by Christian culture, the Ashkenazim, probably believed in a corporeal G-D just like their Christian neighbors. However, the Sefardim, who were surrounded by Muslims, most likely rejected the idea of a corporeal G-D because that idea is rejected by Muslim culture.

However, after Rambam came out with his wildly popular Mishna Torah, this immense work was able to stamp out almost all thought of a corporeal G-D. Rambam's influence was not confined to just the idea of G-D's corporeality, but to all halacha and Jewish thought, as can be seen today. Almost all orthodox Jews know the thirteen principles of faith, they are printed in almost every siddur. The Rambam was one of the main sources for the final laws of the Shulchan Orech, the main law book for orthodox Jews. The Rambam's influence is probably greater than that of any other Medieval commentator, but we must remember, that does not make any idea that he considered wrong heresy. I think Shapiro does an excellent job of explaining this idea.     

Sunday, July 21, 2013

Residency

So, I have not been posting for a good reason, I started residency this month. I am in a program that has an official "Shomer Shabbos" spot. I don't know how it happened (yes I do, lots of effort and hard work) but I never had to work on shabbos in medical school and now I will not have to work on shabbos in residency. That is pretty awesome. I like to think that I am just one of those people that G-D is intervening for (according to the Rambam), but then I would have to consider myself a super righteous person and that is probably not true.

Hopefully, after I get settled in my role, I will have some time to learn and post more, but right now it is hard enough keeping up with the weekly parsha. So, until we meet again I have much on this blog that anyone can view that I think is interesting. In fact, sometimes I parooz through this blog and, even though I am the author, I learn something new and interesting.

Sunday, June 23, 2013

Guest Post- Heroic Deeds of Irena Sendler

Yad Vashem was established in 1953 by the Israel's Remembrance Authority as the body that would represent the Israeli government and Jewish people in ensuring that the Holocaust would be remembered and the victims memorialized. In addition to creating exhibits which graphically depict the events of the Holocaust years Yad Vashem researches, documents and presents a wide body of information to the public which ensures that the world will never forget the suffering of the Jews during WWII.

As part of their work Yad VaShem honors Righteous Gentiles who, at great peril to their own lives and the lives of their families, helped Jews escape from the Nazi dragnet. Yad VaShem has honored tens of thousands of individuals, some who helped individual Jews who were fleeing for their lives and others who helped tens, sometimes hundreds of Jews.

Very few of the honored Righteous Gentiles were responsible for helping thousands of Jews during this era but in 1965 Yad VaShem honored one such woman, Irena Sendler, who was estimated to have saved over 3000 Jewish lives. Sendler's story was almost buried in history after Yad VaShem honored her but in 1999 a group of non-Jewish highschool students revived her story and created a project about her efforts.

Irena Sendler was a young social worker when the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939. She was an early member of the Zagota underground which specialized in helping Jews escape the Nazis and she worked with her Zagota comrades to find hiding places for Jews, forge documents and identify Church and government officials who were ready to assist Zagota in their mission.

In 1941 Sendler obtained false documents that identified her as a nurse and enabled her to enter the Warsaw ghetto with food and medicine. What she saw there convinced her that the Nazis intended to murder all of the ghetto's Jews and she began to smuggle street orphans out of the ghetto, hiding them under tram seats and leading them out through sewer pipes and other hidden passages.
  
Sendler also went door to door to convince parents that the only chance that their children had to survive would be if they allowed her to take the children to the other side of the wall. This was traumatic for Sendler who later described the scenes. "I talked the mothers out of their children" she said of the heartwrenching scenes which she experienced, day after day, as she led children away from their families. "Those scenes over whether to give a child away were heart-rending. Sometimes, they wouldn't give me the child. Their first question was, 'What guarantee is there that the child will live?' I said, 'None. I don't even know if I will get out of the ghetto alive today."

All in all Sendler and her Zagota comrades were able to smuggle over 2500 children out of the ghetto, often sedating them and hiding them in toolboxes, bags, luggage and even under garbage carts and barking dogs to distract the Germans as they crossed over from the ghetto.  When the children arrived in the "safe" area of Warsaw the Zagota members took them to new hiding places in convents, orphanages and in sympathetic Polish homes.

Throughout the rescue operation Sendler recorded the names of the children on tissue paper which she stuffed into glass jars that were hidden in her garden. She hoped to be able to reunite the children with their families after the war or, if not, with their Jewish community.

In October of 1943 Sendler was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to the notorious Pawiak prison. The Germans tortured her and broke both of her legs but Sendler never revealed any information about the whereabouts of the children that she had rescued. She was sentenced to be executed but a last-minute bribe by her Zagota friends secured her release and Sendler lived out the rest of the war in hiding.

Sendler died at age 102 but before she died the students from Kansas met with her and interviewed her. The resulting project, Life in a Jar funded by the LMFF, became a website, a book and a performance that has been viewed by thousands of people in audiences throughout the world.

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Is One Allowed To Learn In Kollel As A Career?

Over on Rationalist Judaism, Rabbi Slifkin seems to point out that it is actually frowned upon by most Rishonim (Medieval Rabbis) to learn in Kollel as a career (See Here). The reason for this discussion is because of all the poverty found in the Charaidi world because they believe they can only sit and learn all day. They believe that the only proper path for an orthodox Jew is to learn in Kollel, or be a teacher in Yeshiva. 

I would like to point out that there actually is something in the Midrash Tanchuma that seems to allow, or encourage, learning in Kollel (Quoted in Rashi on Breishis 49:13). The Midrash says (Parshas Vayechi:11),
זבולן לחוף ימים
קדם זבולן ליששכר.
Zevulun [will dwell] on the sea coast: 
Zevulun [is mentioned] before Yissachar (even though Yissachar is older)
ולמה?
שזבולן עוסק בפרקמטיא ויששכר עוסק בתורה, עשו שותפות ביניהם, שיהא פרקמטיא של זבולן ליששכר, שכן משה ברכן, שמח זבולן בצאתך ויששכר באהליך (דברים לג).
שמח זבולן בצאתך לפרקמטיא, משום דיששכר באהליך עוסק בתורה.
Why?
[Because,] Zevulun dealt with commerce and Yissachar dealt with Torah. They made a partnership between themselves, that the commerce of Zevulun [would support] Yissachar. [This can be seen in] the blessing of Moshe (Devarim 33:18), "Rejoice, O Zevulun, in your going forth, and Yissachar, in your tents." [Meaning,] rejoice, O Zevulun in your going out to [deal with] commerce because Yissachar is in your tents dealing with Torah.  

למה?

עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה (משלי י), לפיכך הקדים זבולן ליששכר, שאלמלא זבולן, לא עסק יששכר בתורה, ומתוך שנתייחד יששכר בתורה ולא עסק בפרקמטיא, ולא היה לו עמל בדבר אחר, לפיכך כתוב בו: מבני יששכר יודעי בינה לעתים (ד"ה א יב).
Why [should Zevulun be happy that Yissachar is dealing with Torah]?
"It is a tree of life for those who grasp it." (Mishlei 3:18, the hebrew reference is incorrect) Therefore, Zevulun is [mentioned] before Yissachar, because if it was not for Zevulun, Yissachar would not be able to deal with Torah. Since Yissachar was able to focus on Torah and not deal with commerce, and he did not have to bother with anything else, therefore it writes by him (Chronicles 1 12:32), "And of the sons of Yissachar, those who had an understanding of the times[, to know what Israel should do; their chiefs were two hundred, and all their brethren obeyed their word.]" 

This Medrash seems to be very clear that Yissachar was learning all day because Zevulun was supporting him. In fact, Rashi (ibid) is even clearer,
Zebulun will dwell on the coast of the seas: Heb. חוֹף. His land will be on the seacoast. חוֹף is as the Targum renders: סְפַר, marche in Old French, borderland. He will constantly frequent the harbor of the ships, in the place of the port, where the ships bring merchandise, for Zebulun would engage in commerce and provide food for the tribe of Issachar, and they (the tribe of Issachar) would engage in [the study of] Torah. That is [the meaning of] what Moses said,“Rejoice, O Zebulun, in your going forth, and Issachar, in your tents” (Deut. 33:18) Zebulun would go forth [to engage] in commerce, and Issachar would engage in [the study of] Torah in tents. — [From Tanchuma Vayechi 11] לחוף ימים: על חוף ימים תהיה ארצו. חוף כתרגומו ספר, מרק"א בלע"ז [גבול], והוא יהיה מצוי תדיר על חוף אניות, במקום הנמל, שאניות מביאות שם פרקמטיא, שהיה זבולן עוסק בפרקמטיא, וממציא מזון לשבט יששכר והם עוסקים בתורה, הוא שאמר משה (דברים לג יח) שמח זבולן בצאתך ויששכר באהליך, זבולן יוצא בפרקמטיא ויששכר עוסק בתורה באהלים:
Rashi says, explicitly, that Zevulun was providing the sustenance (translated as food by Chabad.org) of Yissachar in order that Yissachar could learn Torah. That is the very definition of Kollel.

Also, the Medrash points out that because their entire tribe was devoted to Torah study, they were able to produce 200 wise men that were able to guide the nation. It took an entire tribe studying Torah in order to produce 200 wise men! This shows that this Zevulun-Yissachar bond is the best way to create Torah leaders that can guide the community.

Additionally, there is a Gemara in Sotah (21a) that seems to imply this type of Yissachar-Zevulun relationship is acceptable. The Gemara there states,
What means He would utterly be contemned(Shir HaShirim 8:7)?— ‘Ulla said: Not like Simeon the brother of Azariah nor like R. Johanan of the Prince's house but like Hillel and Shebna. When R. Dimi came he related that Hillel and Shebna were brothers; Hillel engaged in [study of] Torah and Shebna was occupied in business. Eventually [Shebna] said to him, ‘Come, let us become partners and divide [the profits]’. A Bath Kol issued forth and proclaimed (Shir HaShirim 8:7). If a man would give all the substance of his house etc.
This seems like an enigmatic piece of Gemara, but it is clearly talking about partnerships between one person learning Torah and another person supporting the learner. In fact, Rashi comes to give a little insight on why Azariah and R. Johanan are mention. He states (ibid),
He (Referring to Shimon the brother of Azariah) is a Tanna in the first Mishna in Tractate Zevachim. He learned Torah on account of his brother (Azariah) who dealt with commerce in order that they should split the merit of Shimon's learning, therefore he is called the brother of Azariah. So too Rabbi Yochanan learned on account of the Prince (Rabbi Yehuda Hanasi), for [the Prince] supported [Rabbi Yochanan.]  
According to Rashi, this Gemara is pointing out that if two people go into a partnership where the other person is knowingly supporting them, then it is fine. If one person is committed to learning and the other person is committed to supporting them, this is considered appropriate. However, in the case of Hillel this was inappropriate, why?

The Eitz Yosef on the Ein Yaakov on this Gemara (Ein Yaakov Sotah 21a) tells us an important difference between Rav Shimon the brother of Azariah, Rabbi Yochanan and Hillel. By Rav Shimon and Rabbi Yochanan, the scholars were only able to learn full time because of their prior arrangements. Neither one would have learned full time had they not had these prior arrangements that they would be supported (note: not throught charity). However, Hillel was already learning full time, he was just in adverse poverty (note again: did not take charity). (My interjection) This can be seen from the Gemara in Yoma (35b),
Hillel the Elder that every day he used to work and earn one tropaik, half of which he would give to the guard at the House of Learning, the other half being spent for his food and for that of his family. One day he found nothing to earn and the guard at the House of Learning would not permit him to enter. He climbed up and sat upon the window, to hear the words of the living God from the mouth of Shemayah and Abtalion — They say, that day was the eve of Sabbath in the winter solstice and snow fell down upon him from heaven. When the dawn rose, Shemayah said to Abtalion: Brother Abtalion, on every day this house is light and to-day it is dark, is it perhaps a cloudy day. They looked up and saw the figure of a man in the window. They went up and found him covered by three cubits of snow. They removed him, bathed andanointed him and placed him opposite the fire and they said: This man deserves that the Sabbath be profaned on his behalf.
(Back to the Eitz Yosef) Therefore, when a rich person came to Hillel and offered to support him full time in order that they split the profits (money and reward in the next world), this was inappropriate.  
These sources seem like irrefutable evidence that Kollel (or more accurately, learning while someone else is supporting) is something that has been around since before the first Temple and even after the second temple. Also, this is how the leaders of the Jewish people were trained. 

However, there are some very important differences between the Zevulun-Yissachar bond, these cases reported in the Gemara, and the current Kollel system. First off, the Medrash's point is to show us that Zevulun is the greater partner because he supports Yissacher, that is why he is mentioned first in the Torah. Second, Yissachar and these Rabbis are not being supported by charity, he has made a partnership with Zevulun and the Rabbis made partnerships with their supporters. This is important because, as the Rambam says in the Laws of Torah Study (3:10),
Anyone who comes to the conclusion that he should involve himself in Torah study without doing work and derive his livelihood from charity, desecrates [God's] name, dishonors the Torah, extinguishes the light of faith, brings evil upon himself, and forfeits the life of the world to come, for it is forbidden to derive benefit from the words of Torah in this world.
Our Sages declared: "Whoever benefits from the words of Torah forfeits his life in the world." Also, they commanded and declared: "Do not make them a crown to magnify oneself, nor an axe to chop with." Also, they commanded and declared: "Love work and despise Rabbinic positions." All Torah that is not accompanied by work will eventually be negated and lead to sin. Ultimately, such a person will steal from others.
The current Kollel system seems to violate the words of the Rambam. Most of the Kollels seem to accept government welfare, which is charity and many other forms of charity (having someone going around collecting for a Kollel, especially when they say Tzedaka). (We can define government welfare as charity because only those who earn less than what the government considers liveable, or people who lie to the government and say they earn less, get it.)

Nevertheless, because of this Zevulun-Yissachar bond and the cases in the Gemara we can see that some Kollels are, indeed, permissible. First off, community Kollels found in the United States are perfectly acceptable for two reasons; 1) Most of the people learning in the Kollel often act as teachers, 2) If they are not teaching anything they are still not accepting charity because the town pays for the Kollel to be there the same way Zevulun supported Yissacher and the people supported the Rabbis. Secondly, a person who has a family member that is willing to support them while they are learning seems to fit in the Zevulun-Yissachar category as well.

The conclusion that I have reached is simple. Kollels that demand other people pay for them after the fact, take government money, or encourage their participants to take welfare seem foolish. That has no basis in the history of the Jewish people. Some Rishonim have allowed people to learn and be supported by charity, but I, personally, do not find their arguments grounded in anything but the "they will starve if you don't" logic. The proper way for a Kollel is, as stated, either be like one of the community Kollels that provide fantastic resources, or have someone make a Zevulun-Yissachar relationship, as seen in the Medrash and Gemara, and avoid charity all together. In these ways, it seems to me, Kollel would be allowed as a career.

Thursday, May 23, 2013

The Purpose Of The Cloud Of Glory Directing The Jewish People Where And When To Encamp

Reading through this week's Parsha, Behaaloscha, I could not help but notice something that bothered me. The verses say (Bamidbar 9:17-18),
17. and according to the cloud's departure from over the Tent, and afterwards, the children of Israel would travel, and in the place where the cloud settled, there the children of Israel would encamp. יז. וּלְפִי הֵעָלוֹת הֶעָנָן מֵעַל הָאֹהֶל וְאַחֲרֵי כֵן יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבִמְקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכָּן שָׁם הֶעָנָן שָׁם יַחֲנוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל:
18. At the bidding of the Lord, the children of Israel traveled, and at the bidding of the Lord, they encamped. As long as the cloud hovered above the Mishkan, they encamped. יח. עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יִסְעוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יַחֲנוּ כָּל יְמֵי אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁכֹּן הֶעָנָן עַל הַמִּשְׁכָּן יַחֲנוּ:
This seem to be saying that G-D communicated His will directly to the people through the Cloud of Glory. When the cloud left the Mishkan that is when the Jews would break camp and start to travel, following the Cloud until it settled somewhere. That seems innocent enough, what is the difficulty?

Well, the Cloud's departure and settling to inform the people when to travel and settle should be wholly unnecessary. This would be appropriate if there was no Moshe that could speak directly to G-D. However, Moshe spoke directly to G-D, so why could he not just tell the people when to break camp and travel? Was he not the "King" of the Jewish people at this time? Did he no longer speak with G-D "face to face?"

We can begin to understand this idea through the last verse of this (ibid 23) chapter. It says,
23. At the Lord's bidding they would encamp, and at the Lord's bidding they would travel; they kept the charge of the Lord by the word of the Lord through Moses. כג. עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יַחֲנוּ וְעַל פִּי יְהֹוָה יִסָּעוּ אֶת מִשְׁמֶרֶת יְהֹוָה שָׁמָרוּ עַל פִּי יְהֹוָה בְּיַד משֶׁה:
Somehow, the Cloud leaving and settling was an indication to travel or encamp, but these things were only done through Moshe. As Rashi tells us (ibid 18),
At the bidding of the Lord…traveled: We learned in the [Baraitha] Melecheth HaMishkan [ch. 13]: When the Israelites traveled, the cloud would fold and spread itself over the tribe of Judah like a beam. They blew a tekiah (long blast), a teruah (series of short blasts), and another tekiah , but it (the Cloud) did not move on until Moses declared, “Rise up, O Lord” (10:35), and then the banner of the camp of Judah would travel. This [appears] in the Sifrei (84). על פי ה' יסעו: שנינו במלאכת המשכן, כיון שהיו ישראל נוסעים היה עמוד הענן מתקפל ונמשך על גבי בני יהודה כמין קורה, תקעו והריעו ותקעו ולא היה מהלך עד שמשה אומר קומה ה', ונסע דגל מחנה יהודה, זו בספרי:

and at the bidding of the Lord they encamped: As soon as the Israelites encamped, the pillar of cloud would mushroom upward and spread itself over the tribe of Judah like a canopy. It would not depart until Moses declared, “Return O Lord, to the myriads of Israel’s thousands” (10:36). This is what is meant by,“according to the Lord’s word, through Moses” (verse 23). - [Melecheth HaMishkan ch. 13]
ועל פי ה' יחנו: כיון שהיו ישראל חונים, עמוד הענן מתמר ועולה ונמשך על גבי בני יהודה כמין סוכה, ולא היה נפרש עד שמשה אומר שובה ה' רבבות אלפי ישראל, הוי אומר על פי ה' וביד משה:
Therefore, we see that Moshe was still in charge of when to depart and when to encamp, as seen in chapter ten. The Cloud only departed and it only rested according to what Moshe said. However, why was it necessary for the Cloud to depart when G-D wanted the Jews to travel and for it to stay when He wanted them to encamp? Why was this extra sign necessary? Why was just telling Moshe where and when to camp and Moshe conveying that to the people insufficient?

I think the answer to this question can be seen with the stories that follow about the Jewish people's complaints. These numerous complaints in the desert can be seen starting here (Bamidbar 11:1),
1. The people were looking to complain, and it was evil in the ears of the Lord. The Lord heard and His anger flared, and a fire from the Lord burned among them, consuming the extremes of the camp. א. וַיְהִי הָעָם כְּמִתְאֹנְנִים רַע בְּאָזְנֵי יְהֹוָה וַיִּשְׁמַע יְהֹוָה וַיִּחַר אַפּוֹ וַתִּבְעַר בָּם אֵשׁ יְהֹוָה וַתֹּאכַל בִּקְצֵה הַמַּחֲנֶה:
This was just the first of many. For the verses show, in chapter 11, that the Jews had so many complaints to the point that Moshe cried out (ibid 11),
11. Moses said to the Lord, "Why have You treated Your servant so badly? Why have I not found favor in Your eyes that You place the burden of this entire people upon me? יא. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל יְהֹוָה לָמָה הֲרֵעֹתָ לְעַבְדֶּךָ וְלָמָּה לֹא מָצָתִי חסר א' חֵן בְּעֵינֶיךָ לָשׂוּם אֶת מַשָּׂא כָּל הָעָם הַזֶּה עָלָי:
These complaints were so severe that in next week's Parsha, Shelach, we have the story of the spies. This, of course, leads to the people rejecting the thought of trying to conquer the land of Israel. In turn, the rebellion of Korach ensues. Therefore, we see a bad situation turning worse until it turns into an open rebellion.

However, the nature of Korach's rebellion shows us that the doubts and complaints of the Jewish people did not rest with G-D, but with Moshe. As it says (Bamidbar 16:3),
3. They assembled against Moses and Aaron, and said to them, "You take too much upon yourselves, for the entire congregation are all holy, and the Lord is in their midst. So why do you raise yourselves above the Lord's assembly?" ג. וַיִּקָּהֲלוּ עַל משֶׁה וְעַל אַהֲרֹן וַיֹּאמְרוּ אֲלֵהֶם רַב לָכֶם כִּי כָל הָעֵדָה כֻּלָּם קְדשִׁים וּבְתוֹכָם יְהֹוָה וּמַדּוּעַ תִּתְנַשְּׂאוּ עַל קְהַל יְהֹוָה:
The reason for these complaints against Moshe is that Dasan and Aviram (maybe Korach as well) did not believe that Moshe was sent by G-D. This can be seen in the Dvar Torah that I wrote on Parshas Korach (found here). If this is the case, that there were still people that believed Moshe was doing somethings on his own, I believe there is a simple answer as to why the Cloud of Glory departing and resting by the word of Moshe was necessary and it did not suffice for G-D just to tell Moshe when to leave and when to camp.

The verse in Parsha Ki Sisa (Shemos 32:9) states,
9. And the Lord said to Moses: "I have seen this people and behold! they are a stiff necked people. ט. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה רָאִיתִי אֶת הָעָם הַזֶּה וְהִנֵּה עַם קְשֵׁה עֹרֶף הוּא:
and Rashi explains that this means (from Chabad.org),
stiff-necked: Heb. קְשֵׁה-עֹרֶף. [This is a description of stubbornness, meaning] they turned the hardness of the backs of their necks toward those who reproved them, and they refused to listen. קשה ערף: מחזרין קשי ערפם לנגד מוכיחיהם, וממאנים לשמוע:
The Jewish people are cynical and it is very hard for them to be convinced of the truth of something. It takes excessive amounts of proof to sway them to believe in something. However, once they believe in something it is nearly impossible to strip them of this belief. Nowadays, we look back and we see all of the Jews that gave up their lives simply because they would not convert or renounce their faith. They were stubborn in their belief in G-D because once the Jews, as a people, believe in something it is nearly impossible to expunge that belief from them.

(As a side point, I believe that this idea might have been emphasized in order to counteract people who say "people of ancient times were gullible and would believe anything." This idea counteracts that notion and shows that, at least the Jews of old, were cynical and would not just believe anything.)

This idea can be applied to the Jews in the desert as well. However, instead of being stubborn in their belief of G-D, as we see today, they were stubborn and cynical against a belief in G-D, originally. In fact, that is how G-D is referring to their stubbornness in Shemos (32:9). However, even once they were convinced of G-D's existence, they were cynical of Moshe's unwavering obedience to G-D's commands. With this in mind, I think it is fairly obvious as to why G-D felt it was necessary to have the Cloud of Glory signal, through Moshe, when the Jews should break camp and when they should encamp in different places.

The Jewish people continuously saw miracles, starting with the plagues in Egypt and culminating with the events at Mount Sinai. However, it was only on Mount Sinai that G-D spoke directly to the Jewish people and they believed, without a shadow of a doubt, in G-D's existence. Also, the only reason the people believed Moshe was sent by G-D was, simply put, because G-D told them so. Even so, G-D did not say anything about whether everything Moshe did was because G-D commanded it.

So, now that the Jews had already witnessed the events at Mount Sinai, they knew there was an all powerful G-D performing these deeds. Still, they were unsure of which commands came from G-D and which came from Moshe. Did Moshe have autonomy in certain respects or was G-D commanding everything? To solve this problem G-D made it that the Cloud of Glory, seen by everyone, would follow the word of Moshe. This symbolized that everything Moshe did was in accordance with the will of G-D. Moshe did not do anything without being commanded to do so by G-D. Every instance of breaking camp and setting up camp was only because G-D willed it.

This is also why Korach's rebellion was so devastating to Moshe. They claimed that Moshe was going against the will of G-D. This infuriated Moshe to no end because Moshe never did anything for himself, he only did things according to the will of G-D. That is why he exclaimed (Bamidbar 16:28),
28. Moses said, "With this you shall know that the Lord sent me to do all these deeds, for I did not devise them myself.   כח. וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה בְּזֹאת תֵּדְעוּן כִּי יְהֹוָה שְׁלָחַנִי לַעֲשׂוֹת אֵת כָּל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הָאֵלֶּה כִּי לֹא מִלִּבִּי:
This idea can also help us understand a puzzling incident, Moshe hitting the rock, that happens later in Parshas Chukas. When G-D commands Moshe to perform a miracle that will supply the Jewish people with water He says (Bamidbar 20:8),
8. "Take the staff and assemble the congregation, you and your brother Aaron, and speak to the rock in their presence so that it will give forth its water. You shall bring forth water for them from the rock and give the congregation and their livestock to drink." ח. קַח אֶת הַמַּטֶּה וְהַקְהֵל אֶת הָעֵדָה אַתָּה וְאַהֲרֹן אָחִיךָ וְדִבַּרְתֶּם אֶל הַסֶּלַע לְעֵינֵיהֶם וְנָתַן מֵימָיו וְהוֹצֵאתָ לָהֶם מַיִם מִן הַסֶּלַע וְהִשְׁקִיתָ אֶת הָעֵדָה
However, when Moshe actually performs the Miracle he hits the rock instead of speaking to it (ibid 11),
11. Moses raised his hand and struck the rock with his staff twice, when an abundance of water gushed forth, and the congregation and their livestock drank. יא. וַיָּרֶם משֶׁה אֶת יָדוֹ וַיַּךְ אֶת הַסֶּלַע בְּמַטֵּהוּ פַּעֲמָיִם וַיֵּצְאוּ מַיִם רַבִּים וַתֵּשְׁתְּ הָעֵדָה וּבְעִירָם:
This striking of the rock leads G-D to punish Moshe (ibid 12),
12. The Lord said to Moses and Aaron, "Since you did not have faith in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this assembly to the Land which I have given them. יב. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל משֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן יַעַן לֹא הֶאֱמַנְתֶּם בִּי לְהַקְדִּישֵׁנִי לְעֵינֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לָכֵן לֹא תָבִיאוּ אֶת הַקָּהָל הַזֶּה אֶל הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר נָתַתִּי לָהֶם:
Why such a harsh punishment for such a seemingly minor transgression? We see that G-D invested so much in Moshe. To the point that the people believed that everything Moshe did was according to the will of G-D. However, in this instance Moshe did something that was not according to the will of G-D. Therefore, G-D used this incident as a reason to tell Moshe that he could not enter the land. G-D had done everything He could in order to show the people that everything Moshe did was in accordance with G-D's will and Moshe went ahead and did something against the will of G-D. That was an extremely severe sin and it could have shaken the very foundations of faith for the Jewish people. G-D needed the people to be led into the land by someone who could make mistakes that were not directly associated with G-D.

Moshe gave us a foundation for our faith in G-D. The Jewish people, eventually, associated everything he did with the will of G-D. This required G-D to perform many actions through Moshe. However, once Moshe erred and showed that he was capable of doing something that was not in accordance with the will of G-D, it was realized that a different leader was needed to take the Jewish people to the next level, a new leader was needed to enter the land of Israel.

Returning to the original question, the Cloud of Glory was necessary because it was a continuous reminder to the Jewish people that Moshe was the direct messenger of G-D. Faith is an important thing, in order to instill faith in the "stiffnecked" people G-D needed to continuously reinforce the idea that He was communicating to them through Moshe. The Cloud of Glory was used for this purpose. In this way, Moshe was able to write the Torah and the Jewish people would believe that it was all straight from the mouth of G-D.   

Friday, May 17, 2013

Rav Moshe Feinstein: Can A Jew Have Plastic Surgery

The Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein in Choshen Mishpat 2:66 (In Volume 7 of Igros Moshe) can be found in the original Hebrew version Here. The following is my translation with my comments.

66. Is a Young Woman Permitted To Beautify Herself Through The Use Of Surgery Which Causes a Wound To Her Body?

Rav Moshe's Responsa:
It was asked of me if, in order to get married, a young woman can beautify herself through a doctor using surgery which causes an injury to her body. Is it permitted with regards to the prohibition of "Injuring Oneself?"

It is [found] in Tosfos, Babba Kama 91b heading Rather [this Tanna], that there is a prohibition to injure oneself even in a necessary situation. For example, [the case in the Mishna on 90b (found here) of it being forbidden for] a woman to uncover her hair in order to place an isar (some amount) equivalent of oil on her head for a benefit (she was damaging herself, by uncovering her hair, for a benefit, but it was still deemed impermissible). If so, even here (by having plastic surgery in order to get married) which is considered a great need, apparently it would be forbidden because it is a stretch to [try] and separate between a small need (this case quoted from the Mishna) and a great need (our case of a woman wanting to get married) as long as we can not find an explanation [of the difference] (between a great need and a small need).

However, we can ask a question on this [understanding of Tosfos] from the conclusion that this Tanna is Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe. This Tanna holds that a Nazarite is a sinner because he causes himself grief [due to] wine and there is a fortiori argument (kal vichomer in the Gemara found here) for the one that causes grief to himself with an injury (that he is also a sinner). [However,] it is clear that logic dictates if he (the Nazarite) had a monetary benefit or another type of benefit when he is causing himself grief by not drinking wine, this would not be forbidden. If this is so, then it also holds true by one who injures himself, which we learn from a fortiori argument [from the Nazarite,] that it should not be forbidden when there is a need (to cause the injury) for monetary gain or some other need. [Therefore,] how can Tosfos write that even if it is necessary (for some benefit) it is forbidden to injure yourself?

[To understand Tosfos] we need to say that [the case of] holding back from drinking wine for any beneficial reason is not considered to be causing grief since the beneficial gain (from not drinking the wine) is greater than the grief it causes. For, [if he were to] drink then he would not gain [anything] and this would cause even more grief [than not drinking in the first place] because he would lose [whatever beneficial] gain he would have attained if he did not drink the wine. [This means] all of the grief that occurs from withholding from drinking wine is only from the aspect of his desire to [drink wine] (meaning, a person only experiences suffering from withholding wine because he desires to drink it). [However,] by us he has a [greater] desire to [attain this beneficial] gain [he gets from not drinking] (Therefore, we see this guy is actually not suffering at the end of the day). However, injuring himself causes actual grief (physical, materialized injury) that is not from the aspect of [one's personal] desires, it is not interchangeable with the grief of not [attaining a beneficial] gain that is only [considered grief] from the aspect of a person's desire to profit. [In a situation] that a person wants to injure himself in order to profit, that he has a great desire to attain monetary gain and therefore is willing to suffer grief, this is [still] forbidden.

Furthermore, according to the [final] law we do not hold like Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe and, nevertheless, the Rambam decides in the beginning of Chapter 5 of Injuries (Chovel) that it is forbidden to injure oneself, like it is stated in the GRA Yoreh De'ah Siman 236 Seif Katan 6. If this is so (that the GRA is right about the Rambam holding that injuring oneself is forbidden) he is learning it from somewhere else (and not Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe) that it is [forbidden] in every situation, even when there is a need.

However, in any case, if it is necessary according to Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe  to say that when it is needed [to injure yourself] it is permitted, that would be a proof that everyone holds [when it is needed then it is permitted] because we don't find anyone who argues [on Rabbi Elzarar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe.] Also, concerning the Mishna that is dealing even with [a case of] there being a need and Rabbi Akiva says it is still forbidden the Gemara brings it from Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe saying that even according to Rabbi Elazar Hakafar in the name of Rebbe it is forbidden to injure yourself even when there is a need (This reveals that, according to everyone, injuring yourself is forbidden even if there is a need). Therefore, it is necessary to say like I answered (Basically, that an actual injury to yourself is not allowed even if done for some type of gain, but a denial of a desire that causes you non-physical pain would be allowed).

Still, the Rambam writes in the beginning of chapter 5 of Injuries (Chovel) with regards to the prohibition of hitting an upright Jew, this [prohibition] is for hitting in the way of strife. According to another version it is referring to [hitting] in a derogatory fashion, see there (English, Hebrew). If so (that the injury is prohibited if it is done in the way of strife or degradation), with our situation (plastic surgery) that the injury is to beautify and there is no [injury] in the way of strife or degradation then the prohibition is not relevant. [Furhtermore,] if injuring a friend is only [prohibited] when done in the way of strife or a derogatory fashion then also with self inflicted injuries it is not forbidden when done to beautify because that [also] is not done in the way of strife or in a derogatory fashion.

This idea that my friend Rav Tuvia Goldstein SHLITA [learned] from the language of "And not just the injury itself, but all who injure upright Jews in the way of strife transgresses a negative commandment" that the condition of "the way of strife (that the Rambam says)" is only with regards to the blow and not the injury, does not make sense. For, whether it is [referring] to the injury or the blow, it is all learned from the one verse of (Devarim 25:3), "Do not add." This implies that, according to the Rambam, the adding of lashes is considered the way of strife and degradation and from this [verse] you are not able to learn about the blows that are not given in the way of strife or degradation. If so (that our logic is correct), then the injury is specifically included in the way of strife or degradation and this condition of "the way of strife" also applies to the injury (not just the blow) because it is irrelevant to try and separate a teaching in one verse (meaning, it is not the correct thing to do to separate the injury and the blow which are both learned from one verse).      
 
A proof to the Rambam's opinion can be brought from that which was said in Babba Kama there (91b, translation in Soncino), "R. Hisda, whenever he had to walk between thorns and thistles used to lift up his garments Saying that whereas for the body [if injured] nature will produce a healing, for garments [if torn] nature could bring up no cure." If every injury is liable (forbidden to be done) how was it permissible for him (Rav Chisda) to go between the thorns and thistles without clothing [protecting his feet]? This would [definitely] cause an injury to himself and would be a transgression of the prohibition of causing an injury to oneself even though it was not his intention, but it is a pesik Reisha (sure thing that it is going to injure him) since it is a stretch to say it was done in a way that it was not a pesik Reisha (not a sure thing to injure him). Therefore, we need to say that the prohibition of injuring only applies if it is done in the way of strife and since [Rav Chisda] needed to walk [through the thorns and thistles] this is not considered the way of strife and there is no prohibition [for what Rav Chisda did.]

We need to say that there are [situations] of need that are prohibited when they are done with the intention to cause grief. For example, someone who tears [their clothes] because of a dead person that it (this tearing) causes extra grief [in addition to] his grief over the deceased and he wants to destroy [something] (this is not allowed). However, according to this, with [regards to the issue of] injuring oneself,  it should also be prohibited for a person to scratch [themselves] because of the deceased. For, the desire and need is to cause [more] grief from this [scratching] and this is done in the way of strife and degradation which is prohibited even if there is a need, because the desire to have [added] grief is considered a need to him (the one mourning over the deceased). [The reason this is prohibited is because] the Torah prohibited injuring yourself in any way [that was done within the boundaries of strife and degradation.]

[However,] we can ask from this [law] of scratching because of the deceased that it required a different verse [to prohibit] it (Vayikra 19:28). [This seems to imply] that scratching because of another distressing factor, like a house that collapsed, or a boat that sank in the sea, there [seems to be] no prohibition, like that which is seen in the Gemara in Makkos 20b. It is difficult to suggest that [the verse that says you can not scratch yourself because of the deceased] is an extra prohibition and the exception to this prohibition is that of when the house collapses [and it is permissible to scratch yourself. However, this] is only an exception to that verse, but it is still prohibited because of the law of injuring yourself. [The reason it is difficult to claim this] is because Tosfos says in Sanhedrin 68a, with regards to the incident where Rabbi Akiva struck himself until blood flowed down upon the earth [after] the death of Rabbi Eliezer (See Gemara in English here) says, "There [is no prohibition of] scratching oneself [here] because he did it because of Torah [learning], like [Rabbi Akiva exclaimed, "I have a many coins] but no money changer to accept them" (Meaning, I have many questions on Torah, but no one to answer them). (Tosfos seems to be saying that one is allowed to scratch themselves if they are scratching themselves for a reason other than grieving specifically for the deceased. In Rabbi Akiva's case, he scratched himself because of all the Torah learning he would miss out on and that seems to be allowed without any prohibitions.)

However, we can still ask because of the [prohibition of] injuring oneself [it should be forbidden (to cause yourself extra grief through scratching). In fact,] Rabbi Akiva in the Mishna (Babba Kama 90b) holds that it is forbidden to injure yourself. And it is difficult to say (to give an answer to our question of it should still be prohibited under the law injuring yourself) that this (that one may scratch himself for any reason other than causing himself grief over the deceased) is like Rabbi Akiva of the Braisa (91a) and not like Rava that holds according to Rabbi Akiva of the Braisa it [really] is forbidden to injure [oneself (just like the Mishna),] because then we could ask from the Braisa in Sanhedrin (68a, where Rabbi Akiva actually injures himself).

[Furthermore,] we can't say that scratching is considered giving honor to the deceased by [showing that one is] especially grief stricken because of him (or her) to the point that a person scratches and causes groups [of scratches] in their flesh and, therefore, this [would not be] considered the way of strife (thereby it would not be forbidden). [The reason is,] even for honoring the deceased [in this way,] this is considered the way of strife and degradation since the honor of the grief and degradation is because of [the deceased.]

We need to say [the reason this scratching is not prohibited under the law of injuring yourself is] that he is silencing his grief with this [scratching and it] is like that which is said in Gemara Shabbos 105b. Rashi explains the phrase in the Mishna (there) about he who tears in anger according to Rav Avin who says it is a reparation, for it calms him down because he forgets his anger (this guy that is angry and tears something is soothed because the ripping makes him forget his anger). So too, when someone injures themselves it [helps] him forget and silences his grief and anger that he has from the deceased. Therefore, this is not considered the way of strife and degradation, [therefore,] the aspect of the prohibition of injuring himself is not present. Only because of another prohibition, that of scratching because of the deceased [is present. However, scratching oneself] because of his collapsed house or boat that sank is not prohibited and, therefore, Rabbi Akiva's [case] was permitted because his grief was over the Torah [learning and the scratching was] to quiet his grief.

I saw in the Orech La'ner in Yevamos at the bottom of 13b this question (about Rabbi Akiva saying it is prohibited to injure yourself, yet we see Rabbi Akiva injured himself) and his answer was [if you scratch yourself] because of honoring the Torah it is permitted, just like there is no [prohibition of] waste when mutilating [an animal] for a royal funeral (This is a transgression of wasting the animal, but since it is for the honor of royalty it is allowed because of the honor given).  [However,] this does not appear to be correct at all because there is no honor for the Torah with this (scratching yourself). [In fact,] the Torah despises this kind of "honor." [Also,] in Tosfos it does not mention the word honor, rather [Tosfos explains that] he was grief stricken over the Torah [that he would miss out on] when it says "I do not have a money changer." Furthermore, this is found in the Shach in Yoreh De'ah Siman 180 Seif katan 10.

Additionally, the answer that [Rabbi Akiva scratched himself] unintentionally and did not expect blood to come out with his blow, just like the [story] of Rava in Gemara Shabbos 88a, "While the finger[s] of his hand were under his feet [and he ground them down, so that his fingers spurted blood,]" this is [also] not right at all. Over there[, by Rava,] his fingers were placed in a way that it was not a blow. Also, the grief (or pain) was minimal because the legs just happened to be [in a position] that crushed [the fingers] and he did not [even] think about it, that is why it is relevant to say that it was unintentional. However, where [Rabbi Akiva] hit himself with the intention to cause himself grief (pain) it should definitely enter his mind that [the blow could cause] blood to come out, so how is it relevant to consider that [Rabbi Akiva hit himself] without intention?

Also, we can not answer like that which the Bais Yosef holds in Yoreh De'ah there (Siman 180) that if it is a different grief (other than a deceased person) it is permitted [to scratch yourself] (The reason this answer can not be accepted, in my opinion, is because it does not answer the question. First of all, why is a scratching other than for a deceased person allowed from the aspect of injuring yourself? Second, why is injuring yourself on account of the deceased not prohibited under the laws of injuring yourself? Why does it need a separate verse?). So too, the Ramah holds this there (Siman 180 Seif Katan 6). Rather, we need to say as I have explained.

See the Shita Mikubetzet in Babba Kama 91b in the name of the Ramah that says that this [case] of Rav Chisda teaches us that a man is allowed to injure himself and we rule like him since he is a later [authority.] However, he asks on the Rambam why he says [injuring himself] is prohibited. But, [the Rambam] is as I have written that he only holds [injuring yourself] is prohibited if it is done in the way of strife.

However, it appears that we can ask from Sanhedrin 84b that Rav would not permit his son to extract a thorn [from his flesh, since in drawing it out he would make a slight wound. And the Gemara] asks, if so (that this is prohibited because it makes a wound) then it applies by other [people] as well (even if they are not a son). However, this injury is not done in the way of strife and degradation since his intention is to extract the thorn and there is no prohibition of "do not add" (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes). Also, this is not similar to a son [causing an injury to] his father which [the son is then liable] to [die by] strangling even if the wound is not in the way of strife or degradation, where the only exception is for healing (the son is not put to death if he causes an injury to the father while trying to heal, but he is put to death in other situations even if the injury was not caused in the way of strife or degradation).

And we need to say that there is a fear (in the case of Rav and there is a good question from this Gemara) that perhaps [the son] will injure [the father] more than what is considered the way of healing, like is found in the Nimukei Yosef in the name of the Ramban (19a on the pages of the Rif). The intention is that this (act of healing by the son for the father) should be done in a way that [the son] is able to be careful that he does not injure [the father] more than necessary. But, if he can not be appropriately careful because of the bother and this injury is larger [than necessary] it is considered [to be done] in the way of strife and degradation since it (the injury) was not needed for healing. [Also,] this warning, for a man is always considered forewarned, is like he did not think about the prohibition (for a son to injure a father) due to his laziness to [heed] the warning. Therefore, we find that he transgressed the prohibition of injuring through negligence. [Hence,] this is a good question (what we originally asked, that it should apply by other people as well) and it should be prohibited [for everyone] if there is this concern with a son to his father (that the son pulling out the thorn may damage his father more than necessary).        

In fact, from the [idea] that the Gemara explains, that it is permitted to let blood from a friend, and we ask if it is permitted for a son to [let blood] from his father, this is a proof that the prohibition to injure, that we learn from (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes) "do not add," is specifically in the way of strife and degradation and not when an injury occurs during healing. However, with regard to injuring your father, that it simply says (Exodus 21:15) "Strike," there is room to say that even in the case of healing [the son] will be liable [for punishment] when there is no danger, for the law of saving a life pushes off [this law (but when there is no danger, healing does not push off any laws).] If so (that you are allowed to let blood from anyone and there is no prohibition of injuring because it is not in the way of strife and degradation), you can learn from this that also in a case that is not for healing, if the injury is in a way that is for his (the person receiving the injury's) good and it is not in the way of strife and degradation it is permitted, like the Rambam holds.

[Therefore,] we are forced to say that this question of it should also be forbidden for another (not just a son to a father) when removing a thorn is because there is a warning from injuring more than what is necessary [and if an injury does occur then it] is considered the way of strife and degradation, like I have answered.         
Additionally, there is a proof from the story in Sanhedrin 89b of where Micah says to his friend, "Please, smite me," that the one who refused to smite [Micah] was punished by being stricken by a lion. The Gemara asks, "From where did he (the one who refused to smite Micah) know he should be punished?" The Gemara answers, "Where  [the prophet is] well established (as a prophet) it is different" (Even though Micah did not give a sign that he was a prophet, since he was an established prophet, this "friend" should have listened to him. See the Gemara there for a better understanding). [The Gemara] needs to prove this [idea] from Avraham at Mount Moriah and Eliyahu at Mount Carmel (that they were listened to even though they had not performed signs because they were established prophets) and [the Gemara] does not prove [its point] from this [case of Micah] itself. If you don't say this (that Micah is an established prophet and, therefore, you believe he is speaking the word of G-D) it would be forbidden to listen to him (Micah) because of the prohibition of (Devarim 25:3, with regard to lashes) "Do not add." We see that from the aspect of the prohibition of "do not add" it was permitted [for the "friend" to hit Micah] since [Micah] said to him that it was the word of G-D that he should be hit and that [makes it] not the way of strife and degradation.

[Furthermore,] even if [Micah] was not yet established as a prophet and it was not permitted to trust him to transgress a prohibition, nevertheless, since he did not say that he should be hit because he wanted to injure himself, but rather because it was the word of G-D, and he believed this was [the word of G-D], in no way is this considered the way of strife and degradation. Also, [this friend of Micah was] permitted to believe [Micah] since he is a great and wise man and it would be appropriate for him to receive prophecy. [This is true since] even if there is no obligation to believe [a prophet] until he performs a sign and wonder, like the Rambam says at the end of Chapter 7 of Yisodei HaTorah. Nevertheless, [the Rambam holds] it is permitted to believe him when he is fit for prophecy since if the truth is like his words, then there is no prohibition at all. (Therefore, since the injury would not be in the way of strife or degradation it is allowed)

[Plus,] you can not push off the prohibition (of injuring) from the aspect that it is a command of a prophet because he is only permitted to be believed [to give a command] if he gives a sign or is an established prophet. However, if the prohibition of injuring applied in every situation (even if the injury would not be in the way of strife and degradation) and it was only because of the commandment of the prophet (that Micah was telling the friend to hit him), he would be obligated to transgress the prohibition of injuring and [the Gemara] would have proved this idea that a prophet who is established is different and does not need a sign from this case [of Micah] itself (and it would not have needed to bring Avraham or Eliyahu to prove this idea). If this is so (this explanation of the Gemara in 89b), then it would be a proof to the Rambam (that the prohibition of injuring only applies when it is done in the way of strife and degradation).

Accordingly, it appears from this [reasoning] that it is permitted for a young girl to beautify herself even if it is through causing an injury [to herself] since [the injury] is not done in the way of strife and degradation, but rather the opposite, [it is done] for her benefit.

See Sanhedrin 84b that Rav Masna says a son is allowed to let blood for his father because of the verse (Vayikra 19:18), " Love your neighbor like yourself," and Rashi explains Jews are warned not to do things to their friends that they do not want done to themselves. It is obvious that the intention is not for a person who does not care to do something to himself that he can then do that [action] to his friend, rather anything that is not for his [neighbors] benefit [is no allowed.] For example, a person who wants to cause himself affliction or injuries, this is definitely forbidden to do to your friend even according to the one that holds injuring yourself is permitted. Not only with regards to injuries [does this idea apply,] but even by a man that does not care about his shame. [This is] not only to uphold the Mishna in Avos Chapter 4 Mishna 4 that says, "Rabbi Levitas, a man of Yavneh, said be extremely humble," see over there the Rambam's commentary on the Mishna with the occurrence with "that" righteous [person.]

Rather, even if it is a person's nature not to care that it is forbidden for him to mock his friend, on the contrary he is obligated to honor his friend, and [he does not care that] it is a great sin to whiten the face of your friend (embarrass your friend) from the prohibition of "you shall not bear a sin on his account" (Rashi says this means "[in the course of your rebuking your fellow,] do not embarrass him in public"). [and] if [the embarrassment] occurs in public the punishment is [the one who embarrasses] loses his share in the World-to-Come, like is explained in the Rambam in Chapter 6 of De'ot halacha 8 (Hebrew here) that the prohibition to embarrass a [fellow] Jew is even in private and [the Rambam] does not mention a difference to say that a humble person (who does not mind being embarrassed) is permitted to embarrass other people. If this [reasoning is correct then] also a man that wants to torture himself with afflictions and injuries, it is forbidden for him to afflict and injure his friend.

However, the intention of Rashi (in Sanhedrin 84b) that an injury like this, that is for benefit, like blood letting, that every man wants and desires to do this to themselves from the aspect of a person's love for themselves, it is not relevant to forbid him from doing this [beneficial] action to his friend and you do not need a verse to allow this [action.] Consequently, even for his father that the explanation does not say the liability for striking him is specifically when it is done in the way of strife and degradation and there is no verse to exempt healing, still it is impossible to forbid [this beneficial action of causing an injury] when it is for the good of the father, like the [case of] blood letting to heal even if there is no fear of danger or loss of life.

It is logical to say that even Rav Dimi bar Chinina (Sanhedrin 84b) that requires a verse to permit blood letting to heal his father and he makes a connection between injuring a man to injuring an animal, he is only referring to injuring his father [that requires a verse] that perhaps there is a loss of fear that comes with the injury and this levity occurs even when blood letting for healing purposes (but no verse is necessary to allow a person to heal a friend). Also, perhaps a verse is necessary if the father does not want an injury, even though it is for healing purposes, that [the son] is also exempt and permitted to do this like the law states in the Minchas Chinuch commandment 48 (the son is exempt from injuring his father against his will if it is for the purpose of healing). [Over there,] he holds that this is not known from "Love your neighbor as yourself" because we find a minority of people that do not want to be caused pain with an injury, even if they know this will heal them, in a case that there is no danger. Therefore, there is room [to claim] that we need to go according to the will of this [type] of person, even though he is from the minority, and we need a verse that connects [injuring a man] to injuring an animal that it is exempt when it is for the sake of healing even if it is against the will of the owners. Since [the healer] did not cause damage in [the animal], on the contrary he increased its worth, and it is not relevant to be liable to give anything for increasing value to a man even if it was against the will [of the owner,] so too it writes by injuring a man, dealing with his father, if it is to heal him [the healer] is exempt even if it is against [the] will [of the father. However,] Rav Masna holds (Sanhedrin 84b) that the verse is not needed because it is logical to follow after the majority of people [and not worry about the minority.] 

[On the other hand] perhaps Rav Masna argues on this and holds that letting blood for the father against his will is forbidden when there is no danger and [Rav Masna] is not like the Minchas Chinuch. So too, it is possible that the Rambam decides [this way], according to what he writes in the 5th chapter of the laws of Mamrim halacha 7 (Hebrew here), that "If, however, there is no one else there capable of doing this but him and they are suffering, he may let blood or amputate according to the license that they grant him." This language implies that without the "license" of the father it would be forbidden for the son to let blood for [his father] for healing purposes because he (Rambam) decides [the law is] in accordance with Rav Masna.

The Minchas Chinuch takes this language of the Rambam and learns that  his language is not specific. However, it is possible that it is specific and [Rambam holds] that it is forbidden to [heal your father] by force because he (the Rambam) is holding there is an argument with this between Rav Masna and Rav Dimi bar Chanina and [the Rambam] decides like Rav Masna. In any situation, the verse that Rav Dimi bar Chanina requires [is only for] one injuring his father [for healing,] but blood letting for a friend [in order] to heal him, that it is permitted even when it is not necessary, does not require a verse according to the Rambam. For, when [the injury is done] not in the way of strife and degradation (like an injury to heal) there is no prohibition. [Therefore,] even if we do not hold like the Rambam in this case since it (the injury inflicted for healing) is for his benefit, it is permitted in its simple understanding without a separate verse, [because it is included in] "Love your neighbor like you love yourself" that Rav Masna says.

But, perhaps what I wrote in the second explanation that Rav Dimi bar Chanina needs a verse for [a situation of] injuring his father against his will, perhaps he also needs a verse for injuring a friend for healing against his will. And, we know this from an "all the more so" [situation] that since injuring his father is permitted through a connection (to another verse), all the more so [injuring] his friend should be permitted. If we say that Rav Masna argues and [holds] that it is forbidden [to injure] his father against his will [in order to heal him,] perhaps he also holds that it is forbidden [to injure] his friend against his will [in order to heal him.] This requires further looking into. According to the law of the Minchas Chinuch it is obvious to him that it is permitted to [injure] his father [against his will for the purpose of healing him] and all the more so with [regards to] his friend.

However, if it is the will of his friend [to be injured in order to be healed] then everyone holds that it is permitted even without a verse. Also, even if we do not hold like the Rambam and we say that it is forbidden to injure in any way (not just specifically in the way of strife or degradation) since [this injuring] is for his benefit and according to his will [it is permitted] from the verse of "Love your neighbor as yourself."

If this is so, then by a young woman that wants to beautify herself, that it is for her benefit and according to her will, we can simply permit it even if we do not hold like the Rambam in his innovation that [injuring someone is only forbidden if done] in the way of strife and degradation.

There is a further slight proof that can be brought from Bechoros 45a that we learned if [the kohain] had something extra [on his body] and he cut it off, if it was forbidden to cut it off then the Mishna should have added in [the phrase] even though it is not permitted, like we learn in the first Mishna of the first (found here) and second chapter (found here) over there (in Bechoros) by someone who sells the [embryo of ] his donkey and [the embryo of] his cow to a non-Jew that we learn [the phrase] even though it is not permitted. [However,] here we do not say this, which implies that it is permitted [for the kohain to cut off extra parts of the body.] It is a stretch to say that these Mishnas argue on Rabbi Akiva of the Mishna in Babba Kama (90b) and hold that [really] a man can injure himself, for the Mishna does not bring this [case from Bechoros] according to the Tanna that argues [on Rabbi Akiva.] Rather, we need to say that since it (this cutting off an extra appendage) is for beautification [of the kohain] and is, therefore, for his benefit and he wants this, there is no prohibition of injuring involved.

From this there is a real proof for our case, that even more so by a young girl that good looks are very necessary and good for her, much more so than a man, for it is seen in Kesubos 59b, Rav Chiyya taught, "A wife [should be taken] mainly for the sake of her beauty." That it is certainly considered for her benefit [to have surgery to improve her looks] and it is permitted to be injured in order to beautify herself.  
End of Rav Moshe's Responsa

I would just like to add that, for a man, this Responsa seems to say that he is allowed to have plastic surgery as well. The main reason I believe this is because of his last point with the Kohanim cutting off extra appendages. For a further look into this idea, see Rav Moshe's Responsa on a man caring about his appearance (found here).