Giving a Get (Document of Divorce) In Jewish Law

I saw this discussion over on daattorah.blogspot.com and I felt I needed to comment:

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 1:56 PM DT --
I realize it must be difficult to answer these all day, I should have been more brief and specific in order not to confuse. I read R' Dovid Feinstein's letter, it doesn't answer question -- a very simple question, is it halachically legitimate to use a get as leverage in a divorce proceeding. I.e., "I will not give you this get unless and until I get what I want." I did happen to read your brother's lengthy letter regarding the fact that ma'us u'lai is not a strong enough reason to "force" a get. Again, I refer to R' Sternbuch's teshuva that clearly indicated that the husband "should" give a get in that scenario. But, again, I've been lengthy...

Daas Torah November 7, 2013 at 2:08 PM
I haven't found any teshuva which says that it is not legitimate. Furthermore often the husband is simply trying to gain that which is his according to the halacha - do you consider that illegitimate also? Again the issue is whether it is halachically or morally wrong to use the get as leverage for what you think you deserve. The answer seems to be no. BTW this applies also to a wife refusing to accept a get which Rav Eliashiv doesn't seem to think is immoral

Daas TorahNovember 7, 2013 at 2:35 PM
There should be demands which are unacceptable - but I haven't seen any discussion of what constitutes an unacceptable demand.

Disappointed in HNNovember 7, 2013 at 3:04 PM My personal feeling, which seems to have some support from halacha, is that any husband who sits down with his to'ein and says ok, let's talk division of assets and custody and when I'm satisfied I'll give her a get, is a pretty bad guy...

---End of discussion---

Now, I think the point that Disappointed makes is a very important one. Can or should a Get ever be used as leverage for a man to receive what he wants, especially when halacha says he should receive it, but the woman won't let him have it? I am clearly no expert, but I have learned Maseches Gittin and hilchos Gittin, so I do feel like I can share my opinion.

The idea that one can use a Get as leverage is clearly a perversion of Judaism, plain and simple. The only time a man can withhold a Get is if he believes the marriage can be saved and he wants to remain married to the woman. Otherwise, halacha dictates that a Get must be given.

For example, if a woman cheats on her husband and there are not two witnesses to convict her, but the husband saw her cheating or knows from some other source, he must give her a Get. Now, one might think he is allowed to withhold a Get in this situation to cause her to suffer like he has because of her cheating, but the Gemara is clear that he must divorce her, aka give her a Get. Once a man is no longer going to live with his wife as man and wife he is supposed to, according to halacha, give her a Get. In a situation where he knows she cheated he is forbidden to live with her as husband and wife and must, therefore, give her a Get.

The question here is not whether we can force him or not and if that forced Get would be kosher or not. That is a technical and ridiculous question. The fact of the matter is, if someone is withholding a Get after a civil divorce where it is clear they will never live as husband and wife again that person is not following halacha. It is as if they are eating non-kosher, desecrating shabbos, having illicit relations, etc... Why do I compare it to the three big sins? Well, these cases where a man is withholding a Get become very public. Therefore, this is a pubic sin, not to mention a Chilul Hashem. We know that if a person is holding a gun to your head in public and says eat that cheeseburger, the Rambam is clear that one must give up his or her life and not eat that cheeseburger. Why? Because we know the reason the gun holder is doing that is specifically to cause the Jew to desecrate the commandments in front of an audience. Here too, the husband is desecrating G-D's name in public. He is transgressing more than just being "bitul an aaseh" (Not doing a positive commandment), but he is causing pain to the woman.

Even if you want to claim that the woman caused him pain, that does not make it ok for the man to cause pain to the woman. There is no revenge claus in the Torah, I am sorry, but there is not. Even if the woman was horrible to the man, the Get is not something that should or even can be used by the husband, according to Jewish law. Only a wicked or misguided person would use a Get as leverage.

Recently, someone wrote a post about withholding a Get if the woman makes false claims against the husband in order to receive full custody of the child. This is a classic case of two wrongs do not make a right. Just because the woman is clearly evil does not mean the man should demean and degrade himself to go down to her level. She obviously does not fear G-D or care about His commandments. However, a G-D fearing man needs to follow halacha and do what is right. One must have faith in G-D and His laws. Should I cheat in business because everyone else is doing it? Should I lie because I will then get what I want? Should I kill because then I will receive benefit? If you answered no to these questions why would you withhold a Get? If you answered yes to these questions you are not really an orthodox Jew, so do what you want.

Follow Up Talk With The Argument Rabbi

After reading all of the comments on the previous post I decided to approach the Rabbi and actually ask him why he said it was assur to do hataras nedarim on the night before Rosh Hashana. I know, this is a very novel idea and most people just like to assume what people think, me being one of those people.

Unfortunately for this Rabbi, his logic was EXACTLY what I thought it was. He told me that you can not make a Bais Din at night. This got me all excited because I had printed out copies of the Shulchan Orech, Tur, Rambam and the Gemora in Nida (Thank You Josh Waxman). I then responded to him that he should take a look at these Maarei Makomos and left. Obviously, all of this was done with the utmost respect and I did not really get outwardly excited.

The next time I saw this Rabbi he returned the Maarei Makomos, but he was not done, he still needed to defend his position. I mean, if you had told a room full of people that it was assur to do something and your psak was contradicted by the Gemara, Rambam, Tur and the Shulchan Orech with no support in sight what would you do? Just correct your opinion?

He responded to me that the Maarei Makomos do seem to say like me. However, it could be that erev Rosh Hashana is different and the Bais din is like a real bais din. He did not say what Rabbi Josh Waxman thought he would say, which was: "Here is the however, however: my guess is that it is not motivated *entirely* by thinking that the night is invalid for hataras nedarim. This source is that night *in general* is valid for hatarat nedarim. Rather, some part of the motivation might be thinking that the night is not *really* considered erev rosh hashanah. Just as a bechor fasts on erev Pesach, but not during the night preceding. This is then no different than saying it, day or night, one week before. That would work, but would not be in accordance with the minhag to do it particularly on erev rosh hashanah." This would have been a valid argument (even though I argue against it in the comments on the previous post). However, he said something that seems, to me, to be ridiculous. Why on earth would someone think that ANY hataras nedarim would be a real bais din? Maybe you could argue that the minhag is not like that, but to say that hataras nedarim for erev Rosh Hashana is supposed to be a real bais din is far out there.

I responded to him that his idea is nice and good (because I was being respectful, in truth the idea made no sense to me), but I have never seen it in any minhag book or halachic sefer. He told me he would look it up and get back to me. If that ever happens I will let you know, but I don't think this Rabbi is going to admit this, or any mistake any time soon.


I hope everyone had a meaningful Rosh Hashana and has a great year because of their meaningful davening.

Another Great Argument Some Rabbi Had With Me In Shul

The case has been, for the past couple years, that I have school Erev Rosh Hashana. Unfortunately, this usually means I can not make a minyan in the morning, thus Hataras Nedarim (Nullifying vows) has always been a scramble. Fortunately, last year one of my friends was kind enough to show me in the Shulchan Orech where it says that one is ALLOWED to say Hataras Nedarim at night. Thus, after I say selichos, I am allowed to say Hataras Nedarim and I get rid of this annoying headache of worrying about finding three people for hataras nedarim.

In walks the GENIUSES. Every year there is always someone who says you are not allowed to say hataras nedarim at night. Every single year without fail. Even though, every single year these people are SHOWN the Shulchan Orech where it says one is allowed to do hataras nedarim AT NIGHT. Here is the Shulchan Orech (Yoreh Deiah 228:3)

Translation: How is the nullification said? He says to him three times, "It is allowed to you, or permitted to you or forgiven to you." Even if [the bais din] is standing, relatives, IT IS AT NIGHT, if it is shabbos and even if he could have asked yesterday, but it has to be necessary for shabbos. For example, he made a promise that he would not eat or he would not do [the commandment] of rejoicing on shabbos. However, issues (excommunications) of the congregation we are accustomed to permit even though they are not for the needs of shabbos.

So it seems like our friends don't know Shulchan Orech very well, but are willing to voice their opinions. Is it not amazing that this happens every single year, since before I came to this shul. Incredible how stubborn some people can be.

I am going to do something different this year though. I think I am going to post the Shulchan Orech page on the shul bulletin board. What do you think, too much?

The reason I want to is because this Rabbi was able to convince a few of my friends not to say it tonight. However, they are in the same boat I was last year and this year. They are going to school and do not have time to go to minyan because they are in dental school. They are going to have to worry about how they are going to do hataras nedarim. This is why i am so upset. This Rabbi basically messed them over. Oh well, I hope they are able to find three people at some point and don't have to worry about it too much.

I hope everyone has a great Rosh Hashana and a Kesiva Vichasima Tova (even the Rabbi that keeps doing this, because deep down I really love all Jews).

Rambam- Yisodei Hatorah Perek 5 Halacha 9- A "Deathly Ill" Man After Seeing a Woman

מי שנתן עיניו באשה וחלה ונטה למות ואמרו הרופאים אין לו רפואה עד שתבעל לו. ימות ואל תבעל לו אפילו היתה פנויה. ואפילו לדבר עמה מאחורי הגדר אין מורין לו בכך וימות ולא יורו לדבר עמה מאחורי הגדר שלא יהו בנות ישראל הפקר ויבואו בדברים אלו לפרוץ בעריות: 

Someone that sees a woman and becomes sick and is on the verge of death and the doctors say, "There is no cure for him except to have relations [with this woman that he saw]," he should die and not have relations with this woman even if she is unmarried. We don't even allow him to speak with her from behind a partition, rather he should die and we should not allow him to speak with her from behind a partition because it should not be that the daughters of Israel will be "loose" (harlot) and they will become, through these things, promiscuous in the city.    

Obviously, this law has no connection to modern day. Why? Because there is no doctor, a real doctor, that would prescribe relations with a specific woman as a cure to a DEATHLY illness. There is just no way this would be a plausible situation that would occur today with modern medicine. However, there are a few ideas the Rambam brings up that CAN relate to us nowadays.

The first thing the Rambam says here is that the DOCTOR says this guy needs a specific cure. If there was no worry about the Jewish girls being treated as harlots then the Rambam would have said we listen to the doctor. This shows us that the word of the doctor, in a life threatening situation, can override halacha in almost every case. As we have shown before, if the doctor tells you to do something that will save your life you do it (unless it is a violation of one of the three big sins: illicit relations, killing and idol worship). Rambam gave so much authority to doctors, it is absolutely amazing.

The second idea here is a little bit more hidden. Rambam reveals that a Jewish girl being modest is so important that we would prefer that the man die rather than force the girl to discard her modesty, or do we? It seems to me that the logic behind the Rambam (or the Gemora) is that if we allowed anyone who was "deathly ill" to have relations with the woman that he desires, there are going to be a lot of "deathly ill" people and thereby the daughters of Israel would become harlots. Therefore, the Rambam's idea here protects women from sinister men that would try to abuse them. That is why the Rambam does not even allow the man to speak with them, because the Rambam is weary of those that are "deathly ill."

The Shrinking Brain, Yeridos Hadoros (Dumbing Down Through the Generations), and Aggressiveness

Over Shabbos I saw this great article in Discovery Magazine (September 2010 Issue). It was "The Incredible Shrinking Brain" written by Kathleen McAuliffe. I was absolutely shocked by the consensus of scientists, the human brain has been shrinking for the past 10,000-20,000 years (From 1500 cc to 1350 cc, the size of a tennis ball). That seems to be counter to evolution and the idea that man has been getting smarter. However, as with all things in life, there are differing opinions as to what this means. (Just for clarity, the article says that the human brain grew bigger and bigger over the past 2 million years. Only recently has it begun to shrunk. This is not a counter evolution post.)

The first opinion brought down in the article is the "Dumbing Down theory." David Geary, a cognitive scientist of the University of Missouri said, "The best explanation for the decline in our brain size is the idiocracy theory." He is referring to a film made by Mike Judge in 2006 where the story line is that "Private Joe Bauers, the definition of 'average American', is selected by the Pentagon to be the guinea pig for a top-secret hibernation program. Forgotten, he awakes 500 years in the future. He discovers a society so incredibly dumbed-down that he's easily the most intelligent person alive." Geary and a colleague of his, Drew bailey, conducted experiments to back up this idea, but I won't bore you with the details.

The next idea is the polar opposite, that this brain shrinkage means we are getting smarter (which seems counter intuitive to me). This idea is present by the Anthropologist named Hawks. He performed research similar to Geary and Bailey and came up with the same exact data. In fact, he shows a large change between the Bronze Age and Medieval times. However, he interprets the data completely differently. Bailey and Geary just focus on the size decrease and say that it shows we have decreased our intelligence based on size. However, Hawks says that the decrease in size is in order to make the brain more efficient. A brain that is smaller, but gets the most output for the least amount of energy is the best possible brain and this is how our brains have changed.

There is a third school of thought that does not even relate this change to intelligence, but rather aggressiveness. According to a primatologist at Harvard University, Richard Wrangham, the same thing that has happened to domesticated animals has happened to humans. Domesticated animals have a 10%-15% reduction in brain volume compared to their wild progenitors. Wrangham says that this same trend has happened in humans. The easiest explanation is that, as Wrangham says, "Over the last 100,000 years, language became sufficiently sophisticated that when you had some bully who was a repeat offender, people got together and said 'We've got to do something about Joe (the bully).' And they would make a calm deliberate decision to kill Joe or expel him from the group." This would lead to natural selection weeding out aggressive traits and favoring those that are more calm and amicable. (He goes into a whole explanation as to why a less aggressive brain is smaller, if you want to read the whole science behind it get the magazine.)

Another shocking realization in this article comes at the end, the human brain has started to increase in size again. This finding was discovered by Richard Jantz, an anthropologist of the University of Tennessee. Hawks says this finding is most probably due to nutrition, since food today is much more abundant. Jantz and other scientists say that, based on their research (IQ tests), it seems like the brain size does correlate with intelligence.

Christopher Stringer, a paleontologist and expert on human origins at the Natural History Museum in London says the closing statement for the article, "It's perfectly plausible our modern brain is smarter in some ways, dumber in others and more docile overall."

I found this article absolutely fascinating for several reasons. Obviously, I think science is remarkable and the new information scientists of every field discover has a "Wow" factor for me. However, it is not every day that I come across an article that helps me understand ideas in Judaism in a new light. People always claim Yeridos Hadoros (Dumbing Down of the Generations) means that people get dumber and dumber as the years go by. At first, anyone who thinks evolution is probable (most people that think science makes sense) would write this off and say that evolution completely contradicts this. However, this article shows the EXACT OPPOSITE. Well, depending on which opinion we are going to give the most credence. However, the opinion that seems to make the most sense to me is that of Christopher Stringer, the last statement in the article. A shrinking brain can mean so many different things and it seems like a combination of all three changes (less intelligent in some areas, more intelligent in others and more docile) seems to be the most reasonable.

In light of this, it makes sense to say that Yeridos Hadoros could be that we have become less intelligent in certain areas and that is why halacha can not be argued on. However, hashkafa and science found in the ancient texts are not obligatory for this very reason (unless they are explicitly stated by G-D). An example as to why halacha would not be allowed to change, but hashkafa could is that halacha is based on memory. One must remember what Moshe said on Sinai and apply that ruling to a case. Hashkafa, on the other hand, is completely based on abstract thinking (Metaphysics is clearly abstract thinking. The beginning of the Universe and so on.) Perhaps we have been getting smarter in abstract thinking, but our memories are not as good (I mean, Einstein and others).

Also, the docile idea, we were more aggressive as a species in the past. Maybe this is why laws have changed in the way that they have. Also, perhaps this is why there are commandments in the Torah, from 3500 years ago, that make some people uncomfortable today (like killing Amalek). Back then it was necessary for the survival of a group to destroy their enemies, because that is how humans survived. However, today many groups (not all) are much more civilized and docile. The Torah was given 3500 years ago and needed to be able to relate to all times, especially at the time it was given. G-D knew that Amalek would not exist in the future, so maybe that is why He commanded them to be wiped out back then, because what was human nature back then is not what human nature is today (as shown in this article, the brain is smaller and more docile).

I don't know, but these are all possibilities. Only G-D really knows why everything is and how things have progressed. All we can do is guess and see if we are right.

Rambam- Yisodei Hatorah Perek 5 Halacha 8- When and How One is Allowed To Use Forbidden Things

במה דברים אמורים שאין מתרפאין בשאר איסורים אלא במקום סכנה. בזמן שהן דרך הנאתן כגון שמאכילין את החולה שקצים ורמשים או חמץ בפסח או שמאכילין אותו ביוה"כ. אבל שלא דרך הנאתן כגון שעושין לו רטיה או מלוגמא מחמץ או מערלה. או שמשקין אותו דברים שיש בהן מר מעורב עם אסורי מאכל שהרי אין בהן הנאה לחיך הרי זה מותר ואפילו שלא במקום סכנה. חוץ מכלאי הכרם ובשר בחלב שהן אסורים אפילו שלא דרך הנאתן. לפיכך אין מתרפאין מהן אפילו שלא דרך הנאתן אלא במקום סכנה: 

What case are we dealing with that a person can only be healed with any forbidden thing (other than the big three sins) when there is life endangerment? This is only speaking about a case where the forbidden object is used in a way that one can derive pleasure from it. For example, a sick person is allowed to eat creepy and crawly things, anything leavened (bread) on Passover, or even food on Yom Kippur in a manner that one can derive pleasure from this food. (A better example to understand today is that a person would be allowed to eat shrimp in a normal fashion, if it had medicinal qualities, if they were dangerously ill.) However, if the forbidden object is used in a way that one can not derive benefit from it, for instance, that this forbidden object is made into a bandage, an emollient of Chametz (leaven) or Orla (forbidden fruit that the tree is not 3 or 4 years old depending on the situation), or the sick person drinks something bitter combined with this forbidden object and there is no benefit from the forbidden object, this is permitted even if the person is not dangerously sick. This is true by everything except Klai hakerem (mixing species: planting two seeds of different species together is forbidden and called klai hakerem) and milk mixed with meat, because these things are forbidden even if they are used in a manner that one can not derive benefit from them. Therefore, one may not use these things (Klai hakerem and milk mixed with meat) even in an non-beneficial way unless they are dangerously ill. 

I find it so interesting that almost all forbidden things are only forbidden to be used if there is a benefit that can be derived from them. What can we learn from this? To me, it seems like the idea is that G-D put us (Jews) in this world for two reasons, to follow the laws of G-D and to benefit from this world. G-D originally put Adam into this world to benefit and the only thing he was not allowed to do was eat from the tree of knowledge. G-D only gave him one stipulation that allowed him to enjoy everything else, but Adam sinned. However, now that we, the Jews, have received the Torah, there are a lot more stipulations. Why is this? There is a saying at the end of every chapter or so in the Mishna in Avos (Ethics of Our Fathers) that says, "Rebbe Chananya ben Akashya says, 'The Holy One, blessed be He, desired to cause Israel to merit, therefore, He increased for them the Torah and Mitzvos (commandments) as it says (in Isaiah 42:21), G-D desired for the sake of his (Israel's) righteousness, to make the Torah great and glorious.'" This statement clearly tells us why there are so many stipulations, because it allows us to merit.

However, what is this merit? Some might say that the Torah and Mitzvos only benefit a Jew in the world to come. This is NOT the position of the Rambam. He says (In The Guide 3:27), "The general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of the soul, and the well-being of the body." Clearly, the Rambam believes that the Torah and Mitzvos were given in order that man can benefit in this world and the next world. The Rambam, later in The Guide (3:33) elaborates to tell us that:

IT is also the object of the perfect Law to make man reject, despise, and reduce his desires as much as is in his power. He should only give way to them when absolutely necessary. It is well known that it is intemperance in eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse that people mostly rave and indulge in; and these very things counteract the ulterior perfection of man, impede at the same time the development of his first perfection, and generally disturb the social order of the country and the economy of the family. For by following entirely the guidance of lust, in the manner of fools, man loses his intellectual energy, injures his body, and perishes before his natural time; sighs and cares multiply; there is an increase of envy, hatred, and warfare for the purpose of taking what another possesses. The cause of all this is the circumstance that the ignorant considers physical enjoyment as an object to be sought for its own sake. God in His wisdom has therefore given us such commandments as would counteract that object, and prevent us altogether from directing our attention to it, and has debarred us from everything that leads only to excessive desire and lust. This is an important thing included in the objects of our Law.

This idea seems to be present in this law here in the Mishna Torah as well. The Rambam tells us that G-D forbids pleasures that lead us astray. The laws of the Torah are there to guide us to the proper path of life. Not only so that we can merit the world to come, but also so we can enhance our enjoyment and life in this world. They help us curb hatred, lust (like cheating on spouses) and other despicable acts. This is why, when there is no benefit derived from these forbidden things, they are allowed, because if there is no pleasure or benefit, one will not come to perform these forbidden acts, or consume these forbidden objects. However, Klai Hakerem and milk mixed with meat are two things that their PREPARATION are forbidden and that is why even if there is no benefit or pleasure from them while eating them, they are still forbidden. However, a deathly ill person overrides all other commandments except the big three sins.

Does Rav Moshe Feinstein Think Women Can Be Rabbis

On another blog someone told me that Rav Moshe goes against the Rambam and believes that women can be Rabbis. I decided to see for myself whether this was true or false. Based on this shiur that was given by Aryeh and Dov Frimer, it seems like Rav Moshe does not hold this way. However, let us look at the pertinent sources in Iggros Moshe (rav Moshe's responsa).

The first source makes it seem like Rav Moshe might hold against the Rambam. Found here (Yoreh Deiah chelek 2 siman 44):

אבל יש לדון בזה מצד
אחר, דהנה הרמב"ם בפ"א ממלכים ה"ה כתב וכן
כל משימות שבישראל אין ממנים בהם אלא איש,
ואף שלא ידוע לי בעניי מקום לדבריו דבספרי
שציין הכ"מ והרדב"ז ומ-ע לא הוזכר אלא מלך ולא
מלכה אבל רין כל משימות שלא יהיו נשים לא
הוזכר שם, וצריך לומר דהוא סברת עצמו כמו
שדרשינן לכל משימות שלא יהיו אלא מקרב אחיך
ביבמות דף מ"ה, דרשינן נמי כל הדינים שבפרשה
שנאמר על מלך גם לכל משימות שהוא גם לזה
שנאמר בספרי מלך ולא מלכה שה"ה לכל משימות
שלא ממנים אשה.


(Not a word for word translation) Rav Moshe says that it’s not clear to him what the source of the Rambam is for forbidding not only a malka but also a parnesset(any position of authority).  Rambam may have analogized from a non-Jew to women, but that isn’t clear. [We now know that there is an alternate reading of the Sifrei, but that’s not our reading.]   (From here)

So, this Rav Moshe seems to be saying that the Rambam's psak is based on his own logic. Some might want to read that as saying that Rav Moshe would not hold like the Rambam. This is especially true because of the next thing that Rav Moshe says:

ולכן לצורך
גדול בשביל חיות האלמנה ובניה היתומים יש לסמוך
על החולקים על הרמב"ם ולמנותה תחת בעלה
להשגחה.

(Not an exact translation) Then Rav Moshe goes on to note that the Rambam is not the only view, and demonstrates that there are a whole series of Rishonim who disagree with the Rambam and are lenient on parnesset. And then he says that bi-she’at ha-dehak – in a crisis situation, where we are dealing with a woman’s livelihood, certainly these other opinions could be relied on so that she could continue to be a mashgihat kashrut. In other words, he maintains that the Rambam is a pillar of Halakha, and we would generally prefer to be stringent and rule like the Rambam. However, since this is a dire situation, and there are major authorities- including, Ramban, Rashbah, Ran, and Rabbeinu Tam – who disagree with the Rambam, we can rely on these other sources to give us the flexibility to allow this woman to be a mashgihat kashrut. (From here)

So it seems like Rav Moshe is allowing for a woman to hold a position of authority against the Rambam. This would seem to indicate that Rav Moshe is open to the idea of women taking on leadership roles. (However, he clearly states this would only be allowed in a dire situation. I am still unsure why people would quote Rav Moshe's opinion here to say women should be in leadership positions where a religious man IS capable of doing the same thing.)

However, after this seemingly positive attitude of Rav Moshe for women in leadership roles, there is a turn against them having such roles. In the next part of the same responsa he says:

האסור כי הלא עיקר
האחריות שהקונים סומכים הוא על הרב ונחשבת
היא רק כעושה מלאכת הרב ברברים שיכולה לעשות
שנחשבת לגבי הרב רק כפועל בעלמא שאפשר לו
גם להעמיד אשה כיון שהיא נאמנת כלעיל

(Not an exact translation) But then Rav Moshe suggests what he believes is a better idea. We will ask some Rabbi to be the the rav ha-makhsir – that is, the one who will assume the ultimate authority for the Kashrut will be a male, while the almana will be the mashgiha and do the actual supervision work. The rav ha-makhshir is the person or the organization who assumes ultimate responsibility for the hekhsher, and the mashgiah is the employee who’s on the site doing the actual supervision. (For example, the OU is the boss – the supervising kashrut organization ultimately responsible; everyone else who works for them, including women, who supervise all the time for the OU, are the mashgihim.) Rav Moshe indicates that if we do it that way, then even the Rambam would agree, because she’s now working for the rav ha-makhshir, and not for the ba’al ha-bayit.(From here)

There is even a responsa of Rav Moshe's that goes further and straight out says that women are not even allowed to be shul presidents. He states in the very next siman (Yoreh Deiah chelek 2 siman 45) 

הנה מש"כ כתר"ה שמצד תשובתי בזה שהקשתי
על הרמב"ם שפוסל נשים אף לכל משימות שלא
ידוע לי בעניי מקור לדבריו, וגם שמשמע לי שלא
כו"ע סברי כן יוצא מכשול..........

ולשמא ימנו
אשה להבתי כנסיות שבמדינתנו אמעריקא נמי לא
שייך שיוצא מזה מכשיל, דהבתי כנסי.ת והמוסדות
שמתנהגים ע"פ דרך התורה לא יעשו בלא הוראת
רב מובהק וממילא סגי לזה גם שיטת הרמכ"ם שלא
למנות אשה, ולאלו שסרו מדרך התורה הרי גם אם
הוא איסור ברור ומפורש שבתורה לא ישגיחו ע-ז
ואיז אנו אחראין עליהם. וממילא נמצא שליכא שום
מכשול ח"ו מברור ההלכה שכתבתי שלא כו"ע מודו
להרמב"ם

(Not a full translation)Regarding women as shul presidents, most shuls have rabbis. The rabbis are fully aware that the Rambam is against it, so that it’s not a default position. Therefore, they will not allow women to be president of the shul. (From here)

I would just like to add that anyone who can understand this last quote from Rav Moshe can see that he thought it was 100% against the Torah to have women as presidents of shuls. He goes so far to say that anyone who makes a woman president clearly does not care to follow halacha.

Based on this siman in Iggros Moshe I think it is impossible to claim that Rav Moshe would allow a female Rabbi. He doesn't even allow a female to be president of a shul! How could one assume that he would allow a woman to be a Rabbi?

This does not mean there are not other poskim that allow female rabbis. If one wishes to see the whole argument I would suggest reading the article that I link to for the translations of Rav Moshe's responsa. I was just disturbed that someone would say Rav Moshe argues on the Rambam and would hold female Rabbis are allowed. That is clearly not the truth.

Rambam-Yesodei Hatorah Perek 5 halacha 7- Why The Big Three Sins Can't Be Transgressed Even to Save A Life

ומנין שאפילו במקום סכנת נפשות אין עוברין על אחת משלש עבירות אלו שנאמר ואהבת את ה' אלהיך בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך ובכל מאודך אפילו הוא נוטל את נפשך והריגת נפש מישראל לרפאות נפש אחרת או להציל אדם מיד אנס. דבר שהדעת נוטה לו הוא שאין מאבדין נפש מפני נפש. ועריות הוקשו לנפשות שנאמר כי כאשר יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש כן הדבר הזה:


From where do we know that even in a life threatening situation [a Jew is not allowed] to transgress any of the three big sins? [The reason is because] it says (Devarim 6:5) "And you shall love Hashem, your G-D, with all of your heart, all of your soul and all of your possessions" even if He takes your soul. [That is good for Idol worship, but how do we know that we are not allowed] to kill a Jew to save the soul of another Jew or to save a man from the hand of the one forcing him [to kill]? This is something that logic dictates, one can not destroy one soul to save another. Also, illicit relations is connected to murder [and, therefore, one can not commit illicit relations in order to save their life or the life of another] because it says (Devarim 22:26) "For as when a man rises against his neighbor, and kills him, even so is this matter."

The Rambam only bases one of the three big sins, Idol Worship, on a verse. The prohibition for the other two big sins is based solely on logic: murder (because that is logical) and illicit relations because it is connected to of murder through a verse. This seems contradictory to the basis of the big three sins. If these are the only sins that are to be "special" and we are not allowed to transgress them for any reason, shouldn't they all be explicitly stated in a verse and not just implicitly extracted or completely based on logic?

Every other sin in the Torah can and must be transgressed when faced with a life or death situation. This is why Rav Moshe Feinstien would get upset with doctors who hesitated to violate shabbos in the hospital (found here). Pikuach Nefesh (A life in danger) trumps everything other than these three big sins. It stands to reason that, therefore, these three sins be explicitly prohibited or so logical that even the most simple person can understand why they must not be transgressed.

I think that it is extremely logical for the three big sins to be excluded from the rule of "A life in danger trumps everything" in the way that they are for the following reason. The first law the Rambam talks about is Idol worship. This requires a verse because it involves the direct connection between man and G-D. If a person decides to worship idols he or she is severing that direct connection. Since this is a direct connection between a person and G-D, the Torah must come and tell us that one must die rather than sever this connection, because it deals with a direct relationship between man and G-D. Murder is the opposite extreme, it deals solely with the relationship between man and man, therefore, it must be through man's logic that he or she realizes that one life is not greater than another. Finally, illicit relations is a combination between logic and a verse because it combines the relationship with man and the relationship with G-D. How? Relations is what leads to child birth and everyone knows the famous Midrashim that talk about the three way partnership that exists for when a baby is created: Man, woman and G-D. Therefore, the verse must be combined with the logic of man in order for this rule to stand.

Rambam-Yesodei Hatorah Chapter 5 halacha 6- Saving a Deathly Ill Person By Transgressing the Commandments

כענין שאמרו באונסין כך אמרו בחלאים. כיצד מי שחלה ונטה למות ואמרו הרופאים שרפואתו בדבר פלוני מאיסורין שבתורה עושין. ומתרפאין בכל איסורין שבתורה במקום סכנה חוץ מעבודת כוכבים וגילוי עריות ושפיכת דמים שאפילו במקום סכנה אין מתרפאין בהן. ואם עבר ונתרפא עונשין אותו בית דין עונש הראוי לו: 

Similarly to that which we said by a case of being forced to do something (i.e. someone is holding a gun to your head and telling you to do something) so too [the same laws apply] by sick people. How so? Someone who is sick and on the verge of death and the doctors tell him [or her] that he [or she] can be cured with some object that is forbidden by the Torah, they can use it (i.e. pig will cure a disease, then the sick person can eat pig). [In fact,] a person can be cured using anything that is forbidden by the Torah in a life threatening case except for Idol Worship, illicit relations or killing, for even in a life threatening situation you can not use these things as a cure. If the sick person transgresses and cures himself [or herself with any of these things] the court punishes him [or her] with whatever the punishment is supposed to be [for transgressing this law].  

The idea in this Rambam is to show that in the case of an illness that is bringing someone to death and the cure is a forbidden object is basically a situation where the person is being forced to use that cure that is forbidden by the Torah. It is as if someone is holding a gun to your head and saying eat the non-kosher food or I will kill you. Therefore, the person is allowed to eat the non-kosher food, because he or she is being forced.

However, there is one big difference between this case and the case where someone is actually forcing you to transgress the law (Law 4 in this chapter), the case of transgressing one of the "Big Three" commandments. If a person has a gun held to his or her head and they are told to perform Idol Worship, illicit relations or to kill someone, if they transgress they are not punished. However, in the case of a sick person they are punished if they transgress one of these three commandments. What is the difference?

The difference has nothing to do with the persons situation. For all intents and purposes, these situations are identical. The difference comes in when we are playing the blame game. Who can we blame for the transgression in these cases. In the situation where someone is holding a gun to a Jew's head then, when they transgress the law, they are considered to be doing it against their will. As the Rambam says in fourth halacha,

"Even so, since he or she is forced to transgress he or she is not given lashes and it doesn't even need to mentioned that Beis Din (the court of law) doesn't kill him or her even if he or she is forced to kill against his or her will. The reason for this (that it doesn't have to be stated that he or she is not killed by the court of law) is because a person is only flogged or killed if the person transgresses willingly, with witnesses and a warning." 

However, in our case of a sick person, how can we say it is against their will? Whose will is it if not the sick person's? In the case where someone has a gun to your head, then you are performing the will of the person with the gun. In the case of a sick person there is only one will, the will of the sick person. One can't say that the bacteria eating away at his life has a will (nor did anyone before the 20th century know of any bacteria that could have been blamed). Therefore, if a dying person chooses to transgress one of the "Big Three" commandments in order to save his or her life, as long as there was warning, that person is liable to punishment from the courts.

Practically speaking, there is no cure, to my knowledge, that would require a person to transgress one of the "Big Three" commandments that would have any medical benefits, let alone be capable of saving a person's life. So, in the end of the day, if a person is dying, anything and everything that has proven medical benefits should be done to save the life of a dying person.

Rambam- Yesodei Hatorah Perek 5 Halacha 5- You Can't Forcibly Hand Over One to Save Many

נשים שאמרו להם עובדי כוכבים תנו לנו אחת מכן ונטמא אותה ואם לאו נטמא את כולכן יטמאו כולן ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל. וכן אם אמרו להם עובדי כוכבים תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגנו ואם לאו נהרוג כולכם. יהרגו כולם ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל. ואם יחדוהו להם ואמרו תנו לנו פלוני או נהרוג את כולכם. אם היה מחוייב מיתה כשבע בן בכרי יתנו אותו להם. ואין מורין להם כן לכתחלה. ואם אינו חייב מיתה יהרגו כולן ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל:


[In a case where] there is a group of Jewish women and Idol Worshipers say to them, "Give us one of you and we will make her impure (aka rape her), but if not then we will make you all impure" then these women should all become impure and they should not hand over a single Jewish soul. So too, if Idol worshipers would say [to a group of Jews], "Give us one of you and we will kill him/her, but if not we will kill all of you" everyone should be killed and not a single Jewish soul should be handed over. If they (the Idol Worshipers) singled out a specific person and said give so and so to us or we will kill all of you, then [what should be done depends on this person]. If this person is deserving of the death penalty like Sheva ben Bichri (See Shmuel 2 chapter 20: he rebelled against King David) then you can give him/her over, but don't teach this to them (the people making the decision) as a first option. If this singled out person is not deserving of the death penalty then everyone should be killed and not a single Jewish soul should be handed over. 

This Rambam brings up the idea of "Who says your blood is redder than his/her blood" found throughout Judaic literature. Indeed, the Rambam is telling us that there is no situation where it is desirable to hand over any Jew, no matter what their status, to be mistreated by Idol Worshipers. For, the Rambam tells us that if someone is liable for the death penalty, even that person should not be handed over (although they are allowed to hand that person over). So we see that no matter what the situation a person should never consider their life more valuable than the person's next to them. All Jews are equal in the value of their lives.

I think this law teaches us the true meaning of comradery. Every Jew is responsible for the well being of every other Jew. This is what the phrase of כל ישראל ערבין זה לזה means (All of Israel is guarantors for each other; see Rashi Vayikra 26:37) It is not just that we must try to eradicate sin from amongst our nation, but also that we must protect one another like brothers and sisters.

It is important to remember that the Rambam is talking about handing over a person to unjust and barbaric people where the person being handed over will be abused and mistreated. However, this law does not apply to handing over a person to just non-Jews that follow the Noahide laws. The Rambam specifically says Idol Worshipers because of their base nature and unjust characteristics. However, if the just laws of a non-Jewish nation would require a punishment of a Jew living in that nation then this whole discussion does not even come up because it falls under the precept of "The Law of The Land" (found in several Gemoras, one being Baba Kama 113a).

Rambam- Yisodei Hatorah Perek 5 Halacha 4- What Happens If You Do Not Sacrifice Your Life When It is Required

כל מי שנאמר בו יעבור ואל יהרג ונהרג ולא עבר הרי זה מתחייב בנפשו. וכל מי שנאמר בו יהרג ואל יעבור ונהרג ולא עבר הרי זה קידש את השם. ואם היה בעשרה מישראל הרי זה קידש את השם ברבים כדניאל חנניה מישאל ועזריה ורבי עקיבא וחביריו. ואלו הן הרוגי מלכות שאין מעלה על מעלתן. ועליהן נאמר כי עליך הורגנו כל היום נחשבנו כצאן טבחה. ועליהם נאמר אספו לי חסידי כורתי בריתי עלי זבח. וכל מי שנאמר בו יהרג ואל יעבור ועבר ולא נהרג הרי זה מחלל את השם. ואם היה בעשרה מישראל הרי זה חילל את השם ברבים ובטל מצות עשה שהיא קידוש השם ועבר על מצות לא תעשה שהיא חלול השם. ואעפ"כ מפני שעבר באונס אין מלקין אותו ואין צריך לומר שאין ממיתין אותו בית דין אפילו הרג באונס. שאין מלקין וממיתין אלא לעובר ברצונו ובעדים והתראה שנאמר בנותן מזרעו למולך ונתתי אני את פני באיש ההוא מפי השמועה למדו ההוא לא אנוס ולא שוגג ולא מוטעה. ומה אם עבודת כוכבים שהיא חמורה מן הכל העובד אותה באונס אינו חייב כרת ואין צריך לומר מיתת בית דין. קל וחומר לשאר מצות האמורות בתורה. ובעריות הוא אומר ולנערה לא תעשה דבר. אבל אם יכול למלט נפשו ולברוח מתחת יד המלך הרשע ואינו עושה הנה הוא ככלב שב על קיאו. והוא נקרא עובד עבודת כוכבים במזיד והוא נטרד מן העולם הבא ויורד למדרגה התחתונה של גיהנם:

In any situation where [the law is] that one should transgress and not die, if [a Jew] dies and does not transgress he or she is deserving of the death penalty. In any situation that [the law says] one should die and not transgress and the person dies and does not transgress, this is a sanctification of the holy name. If there are 10 Jews present then this is a sanctification of the holy name in public like [it was sanctified by] Daniel, Hananiel, Mishael, Azariah, and Rebbe Akiva and his companions. [His companions] are the 10 people killed by kings [the Romans] that there are none higher than them. About them the verse says(Psalms 44:23), "Because for your sake we are killed all the time, we are considered as sheep for slaughter." It also says (Ibid 50:5), "Gather my devout ones unto me, sealers of My covenant through sacrifice."

Every situation that [the law states] one should die and not transgress and he or she transgresses and does not die, this is a desecration of the holy name (G-D). If this occurs in front of ten Jews then this is a desecration of the holy name in public, as well as a bittul (loss of opportunity) to do the positive commandment of a sanctification of the holy name and it is a transgression of a negative commandment of desecration of the holy name. Even so, since he or she is forced to transgress he or she is not given lashes and it doesn't even need to mentioned that Beis Din (the court of law) doesn't kill him or her even if he or she is forced to kill against his or her will. The reason for this (that it doesn't have to be stated that he or she is not killed by the court of law) is because a person is only flogged or killed if the person transgresses willingly, with witnesses and a warning. For it says in regards to someone who gives his offspring to [the idol] Molech (Vayikra 20:6), "I shall concentrate my attention upon that person." From a teaching (tradition) it was taught that this verse refers [to a case] that was not forced, or due to negligence, or due to a mistake. Just like idol worship, that is the most severe [transgression], that has someone forced to worship it, that person is not punished with Kares (cut off from the nation) and we don't even need to mention that person [is not] put to death. How much more so to other commandments that are stated in the Torah [that we need not mention that someone who transgresses them they are not punished].

Concerning illicit relations, it says (Devarim 22:26) "And to the young girl you shall do nothing, [for she did not commit a capital sin]."

This law is mainly a summary of the previous laws, but it is very important because it tells us that someone who does not sacrifice their life, when it is required, they can not be punished. Even though the Torah seems to demand that someone sacrifice their life in certain situations, there is no punishment if this is not done. In essence, sacrificing one's life is commendable, but not enforceable.

I think this is an important idea, because how can anyone be EXPECTED to give up their life. If this was truly demanded I think many people would fail in this requirement. However, throughout the generations MANY Jews did give up their lives and fulfilled a great sanctification of the holy name. If they had not, nothing would have happened to them, but they did it anyway. This reveals such an amazing Jewish spirit that really impresses a valuable lesson, the Jewish religion is greater than any one man. The people have an amazing passion for the religion and have an amazing love for G-D.

Does Jewish Mother=Jewish Child? Not According to Everyone!

Everyone "knows" that you are Jewish if your mother is Jewish. That is what we are always told. However, in the Gemorah in Kiddushin on 75b there is an argument among the Rishonim (Rabbis from 1000-1500 approximately) if this is true. Some of the Rishonim actually present the opinion that you are not Jewish if your father is a gentile and your mother is a Jew. Let us take a look at this now.

First, we must understand two opinions in the Gemorah, These are the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehoshua. On 70a it says:

Now he [the Tanna of our Mishnah]holds that if a non-Jew or a slave has intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the child is a mamzer. That is well on the view that the child is a mamzer; but on the view that it is legitimate[kasher].....

Rabbi Akiva is the opinion that holds the child is a mamzer (child born from an illicit relationship) and can not marry a regular Jew. This is seen in several places, but just to show a source here is Rabbi Akiva's statement on 75b:

R. Akiba, who said: If a non-Jew or a slave has intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the child is a mamzer.

So, what is the reason that a child born from this relationship, a non-Jew or slave with a Jewess, is a mamzer according to Rabbi Akiva? This is because of the Mishna in Yevamos 49a:

WHO IS DEEMED TO BE A MAMZER (a child born from an illicit relationship)? [THE OFFSPRING OF A UNION WITH]ANY CONSANGUINEOUS RELATIVE WITH WHOM COHABITATION IS FORBIDDEN (aka that leads to any punishment not just death or the soul being cut off);THIS IS THE RULING OF R. AKIBA.

Therefore, if a non-Jew cohabits with a Jewess, that is a forbidden relationship and the child is a mamzer. However, Rabbi Yehoshua says in the same Mishna that only a relationship that leads to the death penalty, like a Jew sleeping with a married Jewish woman that is not his wife, is the child a mamzer. These are the two opinions that matter for our case.

Now, let us read the Gemorah inside on 75a-75b in Kiddushin:

It was taught: And thus did R. Eleazar say: A male Samaritan may not marry a female Samaritan. What is the reason? — Said R. Joseph: He, the male Samaritan, was treated as a proselyte after ten generations. For it was taught: A proselyte, until ten generations, may marry a mamzereth (Female born from an illicit relationship); thereafter he is forbidden [to marry] a mamzereth. Others state: [He is permitted] until the name of Gentile has completely fallen away from him.

Said Abaye to him: How is this comparable! There, the case that a proselyte can marry a female mamzereth, it is a proselyte of ancient [stock] and a recent mamzereth, so it will be said: He is an Israelite marrying a mamzereth (which is not allowed), whereas here they are both alike (they are both Samaritans and thus have the same status and should be able to marry one another)?

— But when R. Dimi came, he said: R. Eleazar agrees with R. Ishmael, and R. Ishmael agrees with R. Akiba. [Thus:] R. Eleazar agrees with R. Ishmael, who maintained: Samaritans are proselytes [through fear] of lions (meaning their status as proselytes are questionable). And R. Ishmael agrees with R. Akiba, who said: If a non-Jew or a slave has intercourse with the daughter of an Israelite, the child is mamzer. (Therefore, Samaritans can not marry one another because they are safeik mamzers, aka we don't know if they are mamzers, kosher Jews, or non-Jews. If one is a kosher Jew and the other is a mamzer or non-Jew then that marriage is not allowed, therefore we do not allow the union.)

This seems like a good answer as to why Rebbe Elazar says Samaritans can not marry one another. However, Tosfos asks a question on this that is shocking. Tosofs says on Kiddushin 75b (DH Virebbe Yishmael):

Why do we need to say that Rebbe Elazar is holding like Rebbe Akiva that a non-Jew or a slave that has relations with a Jewess then the child is a mamzer? [Rebbe Elazar] can hold that in that situation the child is kosher [like Rebbe Yehoshua] and the problem is that we do not want a Jewess marrying a non-Jew. Why do we need the problem to be that we don;t want her to marry a non-Jew AND the child would be a mamzer (Isn't one problem enough)?

Tosfos answers:

Perhaps we can answer and say that if [Rebbe Elazar] holds the child is kosher then he also has to hold that the child takes the status of the non-Jew, THE FATHER, and this is like that which we said before on 67b, the rules of who the child follows, and we don't have to worry about a Jewess marrying a non-Jew [because the child is kosher]. Therefore, he holds the child is a mamzer and thereby the child's status is being determined through the mother and we are also now concerned that the woman should not marry a non-Jew (Basically, you can't have the problem of the woman marrying the non-Jew without having the problem of the child being a mamzer).

Before we take a step back and realize how amazing this idea is there is some clarification that is needed. Some of you might have noticed that this idea does not make sense. How could the child be KOSHER if he is going after the status of the father, the father is a NON-JEW? That would make the child a non-Jew not someone who is kosher.

The Maharsha commenting on this Tosfos (75b Virebbe Yishmael) answers this question by bringing in a Piskei Tosfos that clarifies Tosfos' meaning. When Tosfos says that the child is kosher, he means that the child is a kosher non-Jew. If the child wants to convert to Judaism he will not be a mamzer. The Maharsha goes on to explain Tosfos as not holding like this as a second option and leaves Rashi (who says like Tosfos) as a Tzarich Iyun (needs looking into), but Rav Elyashiv in his Ha'aros on 75b tells us that Rashi and Tosfos do, in fact, hold that the child would be a non-Jew (that the child follows the father's status).

So we see here it was not always so simple to say that if your mother was/is Jewish then you are a Jew. However, the way most opinions hold is that we go after the status of the mother in an illicit relationship. This would include, according to most opinions, a Jewess with a non-Jew as well. I just wanted to show that there are opinions out there that do argue. I thought is was fascinating because we always think it is a simple matter and, in truth, it is complicated and based on Gemorah, Rishonim and Achronim. All of which are part of Torah Shebaal Peh.

Jewish Laws: The Categories

I enjoy thinking about the origins of Judaism, how it has evolved and the current mentality of the religion. It is amazing to see how much Judaism has been effected by other cultures and how Judaism has shaped those cultures around it. However, when one does this type of research it opens the door for many questions. Namely, how is the current state of our religion, orthodox Judaism, the heir to the original form of Judaism. How can we claim that this is the proper path for us to be following? Many people claim that the Pharisees perverted the religion and others say the more modern Rabbis have completely distorted the way of worshiping G-D. So, why should we believe that "halachic" Judaism is the proper way? Are these laws really from G-D?

One must realize that many of the laws that we follow, like a man wearing a head covering, is completely made up by the Rabbis without any source in the Torah. It is a custom that was accepted by the Jewish people, but was not a command from G-D. Why then do we follow these types of laws without fail?

There are also laws that are stated explicitly in the Torah, like no kindling a fire on Shabbos. These are clear commands directly from G-D that require no interpretation. It is obvious why these commands must be followed, they are from G-D!

A third category of laws are those that are derived from the Torah by the Rabbis. Meaning, they were directly from G-D, but they were oral traditions that G-D told to the Jewish people. A good example of this are the prohibitions on shabbos, namely the majority of the thirty nine melachos (39 Jobs that were done in the temple or mishkan). The Torah says that one can not do melacha, work, on shabbos, but never defines what work it is talking about. The Rabbis tell us that through the oral tradition G-D made known to us what melacha He was speaking of.

These are the three types of halachas that we have: directly from G-D that can be understood straight from the Torah; from G-D that was transmitted orally and the Rabbis tell us the oral tradition; and laws that are completely made up by the Rabbis without any input from G-D.

Everyone who believes the Torah was given by G-D should agree that anything commanded straight in the Torah should be followed because it is the direct words of G-D. Anyone who does not can not reasonably claim that they, either, follow judaism or believe that G-D gave the Torah. That means that on shabbos, anyone who believes G-D gave the Torah and they want to follow Judaism can not light a fire. There is no differentiating betweek any type of actual fire, because G-D says do not kindle a fire. Anyone kindling a fire is not following Judaism, doesn't believe G-D gave the Torah or they realize they are sinning.

The next two categories deal with the Rabbis interpretations and their own laws. These two ideas are less clear cut with regard to what the halacha is in actuality. Whose interpretation do we follow as being the words of G-D? There are many arguments within the Gemorah itself and even after that there are many doubts. Wy should the Jewish people follow anyones interpretation? How are we to know that it is authentic? Also, if it is not authentic, then are we actually going against G-D's will?

To explain this, one needs to look at the verse in parshas Shoftim (Devarim 17:11) that says "According to the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do; thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee, to the right hand, nor to the left."

This verse tells us that G-D expects us to listen to our leaders. However, how far does this go? Does it give them a right to interpret the Torah only? Does it give them the right to add on safeguards to the Torah's law? Does it give them the power to make any law they decide without any real foundation in the Torah? What are the parameters of this law?

Hopefully, since this post is getting a little long, I will discuss the different ideas of how far the Rabbis can go and how far they have gone in the past with regard to their authority at a later post.