Daf Yomi Idea Berachos 8a: Giving up on those who need something different

The Gemara on page 8a states (from here):

וְאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַמֵּי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא: לְעוֹלָם יָדוּר אָדָם בִּמְקוֹם רַבּוֹ, שֶׁכָּל זְמַן שֶׁשִּׁמְעִי בֶּן גֵּרָא קַיָּים, לֹא נָשָׂא שְׁלֹמֹה אֶת בַּת פַּרְעֹה.
And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: One should always live in the place where his teacher lives; thereby he will avoid sin. For as long as Shimi ben Gera, who according to tradition was a great Torah scholar and teacher of Solomon (see Gittin 59a), was alive, Solomon did not marry Pharaoh’s daughter. Immediately after the Bible relates the death of Shimi (I Kings, end of ch. 2), Solomon’s marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter is recorded (beginning of ch. 3).
וְהָתַנְיָא אַל יָדוּר!
The Gemara raises an objection: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that one should not live where his teacher lives?
לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דִּכְיִיף לֵיהּ, הָא, דְּלָא כְּיִיף לֵיהּ.
The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This, which says that one should live where his teacher lives, is referring to a case where he is acquiescent to his teacher and will heed his teaching and instruction. While this baraita, which says that one should not live where his teacher lives, is referring to a case where he is not acquiescent to him and that will lead them to quarrel.

The question to this teaching of the Gemara that should be obvious is; who cares if they quarrel? If following one's teacher is the right thing to do, you should live by them no matter what. Even if you will quarrel with your teacher, you are still being exposed to the correct guidance. One might even argue that it is more important for a quarrelsome person to live near their teacher!

To this inherent question Rashi offers a seemingly simple answer:

If he will acquiesce to his teacher's guidance, to accept his rebuke, then [the student] should live by the teacher. However, if he will not [listen to the rebuke or guidance of his teacher,] he should live far away from his teacher and thereby perform inappropriate deeds through negligence instead of deliberately.

This statement of Rashi actually has a very profound attitude attached to it that, I believe, is often missed and I personally disagree with.

Rashi's statement on the surface seems to make a lot of sense. If you are someone who will not listen to your Rabbi, then you should remove yourself from purposefully causing pain to your teacher and sinning against his words and guidance. However, on a deeper examination of this approach, one will see how superficial and dismissive this understanding of the Gemara can be.

As a disclaimer, I am not arguing with Rashi, but based on my superficial understanding of his explanation of the Gemara, and how most people read this Gemara, I think a deeper discussion is warranted.

I find this explanation of the Gemara truly disheartening. If a student disagrees with his or her teacher (or is too lazy to follow their guidance), that student should remove themselves from their teacher and any further teaching/constructive criticism the teacher may offer in the future?!?! And, the explanation given as to why this is a good idea is so the student should only not be listening to their teacher through negligence instead of an outright contrarian attitude.

Who does this help? We are basically saying that a member of the Jewish people who has, essentially, lost their desire to follow the Torah in the way their teacher has guided them should just go somewhere else and do the wrong thing and leave everyone else alone. But, its ok because they will only be doing the wrong thing because they forgot what they were taught (and are negligent). That seems much better than being close to a possible source of guidance who they will fight against.

This is a defeatist attitude and means Rashi is telling us that when someone argues and doesn't want to listen, you write them off as a lost soul. Do not engage with them, they will never discuss or come back once lost. It is over and better they just be negligent instead of belligerent.

This is how I understand this Rashi and it bothers me.

My understanding of the Gemara is different than what Rashi explains. See, Rashi gives us two choices, either you listen to your teacher and follow the rules, or you don't and you are transgressing the laws deliberately. However, there is another option. When the Braaisa says you should not live near your teacher and the Gemara says this is in a situation where you will not listen to him, why can't the Gemara mean that you should go find a different teacher that you will listen to?

In fact, the Gemara brings up the case of Shlomo hamelech (King Solomon) as an example for why you should live near your teacher. Shlomo did not marry the princess of Egypt as long as his teacher was alive. Why? Because it was the wrong thing to do and it eventually led him to pursue bad deeds, as the scripture tells us (Kings 1 Chapter 11):

King Shlomo loved many foreign women in addition to Pharaoh's daughter – Moabite, Ammonite, Edomite, Phoenician and Hittite women from the nations of which God had said to the Children of Israel, “Do not join them and they should not join you, lest they divert your heart away to follow their gods.” Such Shlomo clung to and loved. He had seven hundred royal wives and three hundred concubines; and his wives turned his heart astray. In his old age, his wives caused his heart to stray after other gods, and he was not wholeheartedly devoted to God as his father David had been. 

This shows us that having a guide, such as a teacher, helps prevent a person from pursuing actions that will be negative for them. Obviously, if you have a teacher that you will not listen to, that won't help prevent you from pursuing bad deeds, or other counterproductive activities. However, the answer to not listening to your teacher is not leaving them and performing bad deeds in their absence, the answer is go find someone who can help guide you!

Similarly, there is a Gemara in Kiddushin 40a that states:

אמר רבי אלעאי הזקן אם רואה אדם שיצרו מתגבר עליו ילך למקום שאין מכירין אותו וילבש שחורים ויתכסה שחורים ויעשה כמו שלבו חפץ ואל יחלל שם שמים בפרהסיא
Rabbi Ilai the Elder says: If a person sees that his evil inclination is overcoming him, he should go to a place where he is not known, and wear black clothes, and he should cover himself in simple black garments, and he should do as his heart desires, but he should not desecrate the name of Heaven in public. 

This Gemara seems to agree with Rashi's explanation of our Gemara, if a person can't help it, then he or she can just go sin, as long as they leave the rest of us alone and don't embarrass us.

However, Tosfos on this Gemara explains:

ויעשה מה שלבו חפץ - פי' ר"ח ח"ו שהותר לו לעבור עבירה אלא כך אמר ר' אלעאי יגיעת דרכים והאכסנאות ולבישת שחורים משברים יצר הרע ומונעים אדם מן העבירה.:
And he should do what his heart desires: The Rach (I think Rabbeinu Chenanel) explains, Heaven forbid that [Rabbi Ilai] is permitting for him to transgress a sin, rather he is saying that the travails of traveling and staying at inns, combined with wearing black clothes, will break the evil inclination and prevent him from carrying out the sin.

This is a fundamentally different way of approaching the problem. We know that people are not perfect and have desires that cause sin. Instead of writing them off, we offer advice to help them overcome the difficulties. 

Now, these approaches can apply to help those who are sinning AND it can be applied to how we view the sinner. In a situation where a person is truly struggling and trying not to sin, this is advice for them. The sinner needs the extra steps they can take which may help prevent themselves from carrying out the misdeed. However, the situation where a person is defiant and does not want to follow their teacher needs to be told, not to stay away from their teacher, but to find a new one. This is how the person themselves should view these Gemaras. 

The community should view these people as people who need aid. The sinner who cannot control themselves and needs to go sin, should be surrounded with a loving teacher and friends. If this person lives near their Rabbi, then their Rabbi can help prevent them from going to sin. However, in the situation where one does not respect or listen to their Rabbi, the answer is not to just go away. The answer is this person needs to find a community and a teacher that can relate to that person, so the sinner will respect the Rabbi! That is why we have so many Rabbis! There are many different types of people out there with different needs and points of view. To just give up on someone is a problem.

Unfortunately, I think we see Rashi's attitude all too frequently today. In the Jewish community there are many examples, but one important problem is schools that will not deal with children that fall "out of the box." This is a mistake! There are many things children with different "issues" can add to a school. Telling parents that their child has some behavior issues or needs extra help in certain areas and therefore they would be better served somewhere else, is heartbreaking. Children that need to go to public schools or less religious schools because of these factors is a problem.

I am not advocating compromising on religious values. However, I am advocating for a diversity in leadership and teachers that can deal with the diversity of personalities and issues in the modern orthodox community. Honestly, this is not just a modern orthodox problem, but all levels of Judaism. 

 

Breaks In Tradition, Rabbinic Authority, and The Reasons For the Commandments

In Lawrence Schiffman's "Texts and Traditions: A Source Reader for the Study of Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism." He brings up an idea about biblical interpretation that made me think about the oral tradition and whether it was a truly unbroken chain, given down from teacher to student, from Moses until today. First, let us look at the verses in the Torah that deal with the holiday of Succos (Vayikra 23:40-43):

מ  וּלְקַחְתֶּם לָכֶם בַּיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן, פְּרִי עֵץ הָדָר כַּפֹּת תְּמָרִים, וַעֲנַף עֵץ-עָבֹת, וְעַרְבֵי-נָחַל; וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם, לִפְנֵי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם--שִׁבְעַת יָמִים.	40 And you shall take on the first day fruit of the beautiful tree, branches of palm-trees, and leaves of thick trees, and willows of the brook, and you shall rejoice before the LORD your God seven days.
מא  וְחַגֹּתֶם אֹתוֹ חַג לַיהוָה, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים בַּשָּׁנָה:  חֻקַּת עוֹלָם לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם, בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי תָּחֹגּוּ אֹתוֹ.	41 And you shall celebrate a celebration unto the LORD seven days of the year; it is a statute forever, for generations; In the seventh month you shall celebrate it.
מב  בַּסֻּכֹּת תֵּשְׁבוּ, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים; כָּל-הָאֶזְרָח, בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל, יֵשְׁבוּ, בַּסֻּכֹּת.	42 You shall dwell in booths seven days; all that are home-born in Israel shall dwell in booths;
מג  לְמַעַן, יֵדְעוּ דֹרֹתֵיכֶם, כִּי בַסֻּכּוֹת הוֹשַׁבְתִּי אֶת-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, בְּהוֹצִיאִי אוֹתָם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם:  אֲנִי, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם.	43 In order that your generations may know that I made the children of Israel dwell in booths when I brought them out of the land of Egypt: I am the LORD your God.

In the current tradition, we know that verse 40 is referring to the commandment of taking the Lulav

and Esrog. Therefore, we know these verses are teaching us that on Succos we have two main commandments, the taking of the Lulav with the Esrog and dwelling in booths. However, what if the interpretation of the verses was that the booths are to be made from the four species? What if these verses were all referring to only one commandment?

This is in fact what happened in the days of Ezra and Nechemia, at the beginning of the return of the exiles, according to Lawrence Schiffman. As it states in the book of Nechemia (8:14-17):

14And they found written in the Torah that the Lord had commanded, by the hand of Moses, that the Children of Israel dwell in booths on the festival in the seventh month.		ידוַיִּמְצְאוּ כָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהֹוָה בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה אֲשֶׁר יֵשְׁבוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בַּסֻּכּוֹת בֶּחָג בַּחֹדֶשׁ הַשְּׁבִיעִי:
15And that they should announce and proclaim in all their cities and in Jerusalem, saying, "Go out to the mountain and bring olive leaves and leaves of oil trees, myrtle leaves, date palm leaves, and leaves of plaited trees, to make booths, as it is written."		טווַאֲשֶׁר יַשְׁמִיעוּ וְיַעֲבִירוּ קוֹל בְּכָל עָרֵיהֶם וּבִירוּשָׁלִַם לֵאמֹר צְאוּ הָהָר וְהָבִיאוּ עֲלֵי זַיִת וַעֲלֵי עֵץ שֶׁמֶן וַעֲלֵי הֲדָס וַעֲלֵי תְמָרִים וַעֲלֵי עֵץ עָבֹת לַעֲשׂת סֻכֹּת כַּכָּתוּב:
16And the people went forth and brought [these items] and made booths for themselves, each one on his roof and in their courts and in the courts of the House of God, and in the square of the Water Gate, and in the square of the Gate of Ephraim.		טזוַיֵּצְאוּ הָעָם וַיָּבִיאוּ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם סֻכּוֹת אִישׁ עַל גַּגּוֹ וּבְחַצְרֹתֵיהֶם וּבְחַצְרוֹת בֵּית הָאֱלֹהִים וּבִרְחוֹב שַׁעַר הַמַּיִם וּבִרְחוֹב שַׁעַר אֶפְרָיִם:
17And all the congregation of the returnees from the captivity made booths and dwelt in the booths, for they had not done so from the days of Joshua the son of Nun until that day, and there was exceedingly great joy.		יזוַיַּעֲשׂוּ כָל הַקָּהָל הַשָּׁבִים מִן הַשְּׁבִי | סֻכּוֹת וַיֵּשְׁבוּ בַסֻּכּוֹת כִּי לֹא עָשׂוּ מִימֵי יֵשׁוּעַ בִּן נוּן כֵּן בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עַד הַיּוֹם הַהוּא וַתְּהִי שִׂמְחָה גְּדוֹלָה מְאֹד:

First, in this story there is no mention of the lulav and esrog, which one would expect to find if they are discussing how great the observance of the holiday was. Second, in verse 15 it seems like all the materials they are gathering is only for the building of the Sukkah, not the lulav. Lastly, verse 14 uses the language of "finding," which is used when something new is discovered. Had they possessed a tradition of how to celebrate the Succos holiday, the verse would not have used the language of "finding." Therefore, the Rabbis of the time interpreted the verse as they saw fit, and that is why this holiday was, seemingly, celebrated without the commandment of lulav and esrog.

But, perhaps Lawrence Schiffman is incorrect and his analysis is off base. Nevertheless, there are other examples in the bible that appear to say the traditions of Judaism do not proceed from Moses onward in an unbroken fashion. For example, in Kings II (22:8-14) it says:

8And Hilkiah the high priest said to Shaphan the scribe, "I have found the Scroll of the Law in the house of the Lord," and Hilkiah gave the scroll to Shaphan, and he read it.		חוַיֹּאמֶר חִלְקִיָּהוּ הַכֹּהֵן הַגָּדוֹל עַל שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה מָצָאתִי בְּבֵית יְהֹוָה וַיִּתֵּן חִלְקִיָּה אֶת הַסֵּפֶר אֶל שָׁפָן וַיִּקְרָאֵהוּ:
9And Shaphan the scribe came to the king and brought back word to the king, and said, "Your servants have melted the silver that was found in the Temple, and they have given it into the hands of the foremen of the work who were appointed over the house of the Lord.		טוַיָּבֹא שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר אֶל הַמֶּלֶךְ וַיָּשֶׁב אֶת הַמֶּלֶךְ דָּבָר וַיֹּאמֶר הִתִּיכוּ עֲבָדֶיךָ אֶת הַכֶּסֶף הַנִּמְצָא בַבַּיִת וַיִּתְּנֻהוּ עַל יַד עֹשֵֹי הַמְּלָאכָה הַמֻּפְקָדִים בֵּית יְהֹוָה:
10And Shaphan the scribe told the king, saying, "Hilkiah the priest gave me a scroll," And Shaphan read it before the king.		יוַיַּגֵּד שָׁפָן הַסֹּפֵר לַמֶּלֶךְ לֵאמֹר סֵפֶר נָתַן לִי חִלְקִיָּה הַכֹּהֵן וַיִּקְרָאֵהוּ שָׁפָן לִפְנֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ:
11And it was when the king heard the words of the scroll of the Law, that he rent his garments.		יאוַיְהִי כִּשְׁמֹעַ הַמֶּלֶךְ אֶת דִּבְרֵי סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה ויִּקְרַע אֶת בְּגָדָיו:

Here again we have the language of "finding" which implies that some new information was presented. However, with this source we do not need to rely upon our own interpretation. The Radak explains what happened. Radak (verse 8):

ספר התורה מצאתי בבית ה׳. דרשו כי אחז שרף את התור׳ והטמינו מפניו ספר תורה אחת והטמינוהו תחת הנדבך ועכשיו מצא חלק׳ ספר התורה הזח ורחוק הוא זה שחזקיהו שבא אחריו שרבצ תורה בישראל איך לא הוציאו וכמה ספרי תורה הניח חזקיהו במיתו אלא מנשה מלך זמן רב שהרי מלך נ״ה שנה ועשה הרע בעיני ה׳ כתועבות הגוים ובנה מזבחות לע״ג בבית ה׳ ודוא השכיח התור׳ מישראל ואין פונה אליה כי כלם היו פונים אל האלהים אחרים ואל תקית הגוים ובנ״ה שנה נשתכחה התור׳
I found a Torah scroll in the house of G-D. The [background] explanation is that Achaz burnt the Torah and one torah scroll was hidden from him, out of sight. It was hidden under stone wall (or idolatrous temple area) and now Chilkiah found this torah scroll. This incident is difficult to understand, because Chizkiyahu, who came after [Achaz] disseminated Torah throughout Israel, so how could they not find this Torah. Also, how many Torahs did Chizkiyahu leave [in the midst of Israel] when he died? Rather, Menashe ruled for a long time, he was king for 55 years, and he did such evil in the eyes of G-D, like the wicked deeds of the nations, and built alters for idol worship. He caused Israel to abandoned the Torah and they did not turn to G-D, because all of them were turning to idols and to the ways of the nations. So, after 55 years, the Torah was forgotten. 

Here, we can see the Radak claiming that the tradition from Moses had been lost. Clearly, any oral tradition or explanation of the plain meaning of the written text was not found in these days. Thus, showing a broken link in the chain of a tradition from Moses.

This break in the link of tradition is not unique to biblical sources. In the Gemara, while speaking of the tradition of which plant is the Aravos (willow-branch) it states (Sukkah 44a):

 א׳׳ל ר׳ זירא לר׳ אבהו מי א״ר יוחנן הכי והא״ר יוחנן משום ר׳ נחוניא איש בקעת בית חורתן עשר נטיעות ערבה וניסוך המים הלכה למשה מסיני אשתומם כשעה חדא ואמר שכחום וחזרו ויסדום
R. Zera to R. Abbahu, Did R. Johanan really say this? Did R. Johanan not say in the name of R. Nehunya of the Plain of Beth Hawartan that ‘the law of the ten plants, the willow-branch and the water libation were given to Moses on Mount Sinai’? [The other] was appalled for a moment and then he answered, They were forgotten and then they were re-instituted.

Rashi here states:

  שכחום. בגלות בבל שכחו את התורה והמצות במקצת וזו נשכחה לגמרי.
They were forgotten: During the exile in Babylonia they forgot part of the Torah and the commandments and this [teaching of what the Aravos were] was completely forgot.

This idea is stated in other places in the Gemara as well. The following example is a discussion of when to use the closed form vs the open form of a letter (like a mem sofit vs a regular mem) (Shabbos 104a):

לא הוה ידעין הי באמצע תיבה הי בסוף תיבה ואתו צופים תקנינהו ואכתי אלה המצות שאין הנביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה אלא שכחום וחזרו ויסדום
People did not know which form came in the middle of a word and which one at the end, and the Watchmen came and ordained that the open forms should be in the middle of a word and the closed forms at the end. Still, [the text states] ‘these are the commandments’, which implies that no prophet is permitted to introduce an innovation hereafter? Rather, [we must say] this law [was in fact from heaven, but] was forgotten and the Watchmen established them again.

The point of this is to show that there is no unbroken chain from Moses to us with regards to the oral Torah. In fact, there are very few laws that were given over to Moses from Sinai. That is why the Gemara only has certain laws that we say they were a Halacha L'Moshe Mi'Sinai (A law given to Moses at Sinai from G-D). The rest of the laws are derived from logical discourse of the Rabbis.

There is no better illustration of this than the story of the Oven of Aknai (Babba Metzeia 59b) where there was a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis:

וזה הוא תנור של עכנאי מאי עכנאי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל שהקיפו דברים כעכנא זו וטמאוהו תנא באותו היום השיב רבי אליעזר כל תשובות שבעולם ולא קיבלו הימנו אמר להם אם הלכה כמותי חרוב זה יוכיח נעקר חרוב ממקומו מאה אמה ואמרי לה ארבע מאות אמה אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מן החרוב חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי אמת המים יוכיחו חזרו אמת המים לאחוריהם אמרו לו אין מביאין ראיה מאמת המים חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי כותלי בית המדרש יוכיחו הטו כותלי בית המדרש ליפול גער בהם רבי יהושע אמר להם אם תלמידי חכמים מנצחים זה את זה בהלכה אתם מה טיבכם לא נפלו מפני כבודו של רבי יהושע ולא זקפו מפני כבודו של ר״א ועדיין מטין ועומדין חזר ואמר להם אם הלכה כמותי מן השמים יוכיחו יצאתה בת קול ואמרה מה לכם אצל ר״א שהלכה כמותו בכ״מ עמד רבי יהושע על רגליו ואמר לא בשמים היא מאי לא בשמים היא אמר רבי ירמיה שכבר נתנה תורה מהר סיני אין אנו משגיחין בבת קול שכבר כתבת בהר סיני בתורה אחרי רבים להטות
This was the oven of 'Aknai.  Why Aknai? Rav Yehuda said in Samuel's name: [It means] that they encompassed it with arguments as a snake, and proved it unclean. It has been taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but they did not accept them. He said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let this carob tree prove it!' Thereupon the carob tree was torn a hundred cubits out of its place. Others say, four hundred cubits. 'No proof can be brought from a carob tree,' they retorted. Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let the stream of water prove it!' Whereupon the stream of water flowed backwards. 'No proof can be brought from a stream of water,' they rejoined argued. Again he urged: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it,' whereupon the walls inclined to fall. But R. Joshua rebuked them, saying: 'When scholars are engaged in a halachic dispute, how can you interfere?' So they did not fall, in honor of R. Joshua, nor did they resume the upright, in honour of R. Eliezer; and they are still standing this way. Again he said to them: 'If the halachah agrees with me, let it be proved from Heaven!' Whereupon a Heavenly Voice cried out: 'Why do you dispute R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the halachah agrees with him?!' But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: 'It is not in heaven.' What did he mean by this? R. Jeremiah said: The Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because you have already written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline.

This story teaches us something incredible, that it doesn't matter what G-D originally intended for the Halacha to be, rather it only matters how the Rabbis interpret the Torah. The tradition that we have is not an unbroken chain of what G-D said to Moses, but of the leadership of the Rabbis telling us what they think the law should be based on the written word using their logic.

This idea is not new, in fact, it is stated straight out in the bible itself (Devarim 17:9-11):

9And you shall come to the Levitic kohanim and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they will tell you the words of judgment.		טוּבָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם וְאֶל הַשֹּׁפֵט אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ אֵת דְּבַר הַמִּשְׁפָּט:
10And you shall do according to the word they tell you, from the place the Lord will choose, and you shall observe to do according to all they instruct you.		יוְעָשִׂיתָ עַל פִּי הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר יְהֹוָה וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ:
11According to the law they instruct you and according to the judgment they say to you, you shall do; you shall not divert from the word they tell you, either right or left.		יאעַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ וְעַל הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ תַּעֲשֶׂה לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל:

Rashi on verse 11 here even tells us (from chabad.org):

either right or left,: Even if this judge tells you that right is left, and that left is right. How much more so, if he tells you that right is right, and left is left!- [Sifrei]

ימין ושמאל: אפילו אומר לך על ימין שהוא שמאל ועל שמאל שהוא ימין, וכל שכן שאומר לך על ימין ימין ועל שמאל שמאל:

To further drive home this point, I will bring in the Rambam in the Sefer HaMitzvos (312th negative commandment):

The 312th prohibition is that we are forbidden from disagreeing with the Sages who pass down the Oral Tradition (may they rest in peace), or from deviating from any of their instructions in Torah matters. The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement (exalted be He), "Do not stray from the word that they declare to you."

And the 174th positive commandment:

The 174th mitzvah is that we are commanded to obey the Beis Din HaGadol and act in accordance with all their instructions regarding what is prohibited and what is permitted. There is no difference whether it is something they received by Oral Tradition; derived using one of the principle of Torah extrapolation; decreed in order to correct some laxity or in response to some other situation where they found it appropriate and that it would strengthen Torah observance. We are required to obey all such directives and to act in accordance with their words, not to transgress them.The source of this commandment is G‑d's statement (exalted be He), "You must keep the Torah as they interpret it for you [and follow the laws that they legislate for you]."

The Rambam is telling us that the Rabbis are the keepers of the tradition and that, although there is no unbroken chain for all the laws, there is an unbroken tradition of following the great Rabbis of the generation. Those are our leaders and they are the ones we must follow.

Still, why would G-D set up our religion in this manner? Are we not looking for the truth? Don't we want to know what G-D actually said to Moses? This setup seems to be telling us that G-D's original intention when giving the commandments to Moses is irrelevant. So then, what is the purpose of giving the Jewish people the commandments?

There is an argument in Babba Metzeia (115a) that is based on whether the commandents have reasons behind them (like to make us better people) or if they are just for us to perform because G-D told us to perform them:

 אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה שנאמר לא תחבול  בגד אלמנה: גמ' ת״ר אלמנה בין שהיא ענייה בין שהיא עשירה אין ממשכנין אותה דברי ר׳ יהודה ר״ש אומר עשירה ממשכנין אותה ענייה אין ממשכנין אותה שאתה חייב להחזיר לה ואתה משיאה שם רע בשכנותיה למימרא דר׳ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ור״ש דריש טעמא דקרא והא איפכא שמעינן להו דתניא ולא ירבה לו נשים ר׳ יהודה אומר מרבה הוא ובלבד שלא יהו מסירות את לבו ר״ש אומר אפילו אחת והיא מסירה את לבו ה״ז לא ישאנה א״כ מה ת״ל ולא ירבה לו נשים אפילו כאביגיל לעולם ר׳ יהודה לא דריש טעמא דקרא ושאני הכא דמפרש קרא ולא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור מאי טעמא לא ירבה לו נשים משום דלא יסור ור״ש מכדי בעלמא דרשינן טעמא דקרא לכתוב רחמנא לא ירבה ולא בעינן לא יסור ואנא ידענא מאי טעמא לא ירבה משום דלא יסור לא יסור דכתב רחמנא למה לי אפילו אחת ומסירה את לבו הרי זה לא ישאנה:
MISHNAH. A MAN MAY NOT TAKE A PLEDGE FROM A WIDOW, WHETHER SHE BE RICH OR POOR, FOR IT IS WRITTEN, THOU SHALT NOT TAKE A WIDOW'S RAIMENT TO PLEDGE. GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: Whether a widow is rich or poor, no pledge may be taken from her: this is R. Judah's opinion. R. Simeon said: A wealthy widow we take pledges from, but not a poor one, for you are bound to return [the pledge] to her, and you bring her into disrepute among her neighbors. Now, shall we say that R. Judah does not interpret the reason of the Writ (reason for the commandments), while R. Simeon does? But we know their opinions to be the reverse. For we learned: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, [that his heart turn not away]; R. Judah said: He may multiply [wives], providing that they do not turn his heart away. R. Simeon said: He may not take to wife even a single one who is likely to turn his heart away; what then is taught by the verse, Neither shall he multiply wives to himself? Even such as Abigail! In truth, R. Judah does not Interpret the reason of Scripture; but here it is different, because Scripture itself states the reason: Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, and his heart shall not turn away. Thus, why ‘shall he not multiply wives to himself’? So ‘that his heart turn not away.’ And R. Simeon [argues thus]: Let us consider. As a general rule, we interpret the Scriptural reason: then Scripture should have written, ‘Neither shall he multiply [etc.].’ but ‘and his heart shall not turn away’ is superfluous, for I would know myself that the reason why he must not multiply is that his heart may not turn away. Why then is ‘shall not turn away’ [explicitly] stated? To teach that he must not marry even a single one who may turn his heart.

Here, the Gemara is introducing us to a fundamental argument, do the commandments have underlying LOGICAL reasons? Rebbe Shimon believes they do and Rebbe Yehuda does not. This leads to a statement made by Rambam (The Guide for The Perplexed in Part 3 Chapter 48):

When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b) those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase, "Thy mercy extendeth to young birds," it is the expression of the one of the two opinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts of the Law have no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the other opinion [that the Laws have reasons].

The Rambam is telling us that, as a general rule, we follow the commandments and interpret them with the idea that they have underlying reasons, not just that G-D told us to do them. This is further elucidated by the Rambam (Guide for the perplexed Part 3 Chapter 31 Friedlander translation):

 There are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the commandments, and consider it right to assume that the commandments and prohibitions have no rational basis whatever...  On the contrary, the sole object of the Law is to benefit us. Thus we explained the Scriptural passage, "for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, as it is this day" (Deut. vi. 24). Again, "which shall hear all those statutes (ḥuḳḳim), and say, surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people" (ibid. iv. 6). He thus says that even every one of these "statutes" convinces all nations of the wisdom and understanding it includes. But if no reason could be found for these statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no evil, why then should he who believes in them and follows them be wise, reasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of all nations? But the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that every one of the six hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcate some truth, to remove some erroneous opinion, to establish proper relations in society, to diminish evil, to train in good manners or to warn against bad habits. All this depends on three things: opinions, morals, and social conduct. We do not count words, because precepts, whether positive or negative, if they relate to speech, belong to those precepts which regulate our social conduct, or to those which spread truth, or to those which teach morals. Thus these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

 The commandments are there to make us morally, socially and emotionally better people. This is why the Rabbis are given such great power over the law, because they are supposed to guide us as to how best to understand the laws in a way that will improve us and update our morals and social constructs with an evolving society. The best example of the Rabbis doing this can be found in the Gemara in Babba Kamma (83b):

אמאי?  עין תחת עין אמר רחמנא אימא עין ממש לא סלקא דעתך דתניא יכול סימא את עינו מסמא את עינו קטע את ידו מקטע את ידו שיבר את רגלו משבר את רגלו ת״ל מכה אדם ומכה בהמה מה מכה בהמה לתשלומין אף מכה אדם לתשלומין ואם נפשך לומר הרי הוא אומר לא תקחו כופר לנפש רוצח אשר הוא רשע למות לנפש רוצח אי אתה לוקח כופר אבל אתה לוקח כופר לראשי אברים שאין חוזרין
Why [pay compensation]? Does the Divine Law not say ‘Eye for eye’? Why not take this literally to mean [putting out] the eye [of the offender]? — Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught: You might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put out, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken. [Not so; for the Torah] comes to teach , ‘He that smiteth any man. . .’ ‘And he that smiteth a beast . . .’ just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be paid. And should this [reason] not satisfy you, note that it is stated, ‘Moreover you shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death’, implying that it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take ‘satisfaction’, whereas you may take ‘satisfaction’ [even] for the principal limbs, though these cannot be restored.’

Here we see the Rabbis using one of the logical principles for biblical exegesis to teach that a barbaric act, taking an eye for an eye, should not be followed. They instead reinterpret the verse in a non-literal way in order to morally improve this law. This could only be done if we believe that there are reasons for the commandments, because then man can use his logic to try and figure out the reason. With the goal being moral, social and emotional improvement, that Rambam tells us, the Rabbis can then interpret the law following these guidelines.  (Also, other laws that point out this idea are multiple wives and slavery that are no longer acceptable in Judaism)

Lastly, I want to share the words of the Meiri in his Sefer Hamidos: 

Fulfilling the Mitzvos (Commandments) with the intent that they are being performed to serve the creator is sufficient for the masses and the nation. However, it is proper for individuals to try and understand all that is possible, according to their capabilities, [with regard to what are the reason for the Mitzvos]. As it says in Psalms (119:66), "Teach me good reason and knowledge; for I have believed in Your Mitzvos (commandments)." What [Psalms] means is that even though I believe in Your Mitzvos and I fulfill all of the Torah, I request to know the reason and wisdom [behind] them. This is not in order to doubt the witnesses that have testified that these Mitzvos are true, because I already believe in them. Also, my belief (emunah) does not rely on the study of these things to the extent that if I found a good connection I would believe or if I found something I considered a lie I would deny them, because this is Kefira (Heresy) and a removal of the religion completely.

The Meiri points out that the most learned of the people (aka the Rabbis) should try and understand the reasons behind the commandments. The reason for this is clear now, the Rabbis need to understand the reasons for the commandments in order for them to interpret the law appropriately. The oral tradition is based on the guiding principle that the Rabbis will lead us to a morally, socially and emotionally improved law. There is no unbroken tradition that teaches us what G-D actually said at Sinai, because it doesn't matter. Lo bashamayim hi, it is not in heaven. The Rabbis are here to guide us in the principles of Judaism through the laws that they interpret in a manner that is forever being tweaked based on our improved understanding of the reasons for the commandments. 

Past Suffering Versus Current Suffering and Rabbinic Leadership

On Tisha Bi'av we say many Kinot, but there is only one kina that anyone says (many do not say it) that has to do with recent suffering. The majority of kinot refer to suffering that happened hundreds if not thousands of years ago. And you can forget about any kina with regards to the suffering that occurs in the State of Israel. Is this appropriate? It seems like this is an incorrect approach based on the Gemara in Brachos 12b-13a where it says:

It has been taught: Ben Zoma said to the Sages: Will the Exodus from Egypt be
mentioned in the days of the Messiah? Was it not long ago said: Therefore behold the days come,
saith the Lord, that they shall no more say: As the Lord liveth that brought up the children of Israel
out of the land of Egypt; but, As the Lord liveth that brought up and that led the seed of the house of
Israel out of the north country and from all the countries whither I had driven them? They replied:
This does not mean that the mention of the exodus from Egypt shall be obliterated, but that the
[deliverance from] subjection to the other kingdoms shall take the first place and the exodus from
Egypt shall become secondary.....  A parable: To what is this like? To a man who was travelling on the road when he encountered a wolf and escaped from it, and he went along relating the affair of the wolf. He then encountered a lion and escaped from it, and went along relating the affair of the lion. He then encountered a snake and escaped from it, whereupon he forgot the two previous incidents and went along relating the affair of the snake. So with Israel: the later troubles make them forget the earlier ones.

Apparently, we no longer have the character traits of the children of Israel that the Gemara speaks. We are stuck on the destruction that occurred hundreds and thousands of years ago (excluding the loss of the Beis Hamikdash) in a, seemingly, inappropriate way. The Gemara is telling us that the tragedies that should be our focus are the more recent tragedies. The holocaust should definitely play a larger role on Tisha Bi'av. ONE KINA??? Are you kidding me? That is the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard. Why are we focusing on destruction of small communities in Europe? Who connects to that nowadays? Also, why is there nothing about the attacks on Israel? Surely all the attacks on Israel are just as important, or tragic, as the pogroms of the middle ages. However, the attacks in Israel are more recent and as the Gemara says, "the later troubles make them forget the earlier ones." 

This lack of commemorating anything in Israel or barely commemorating the Holocaust got me thinking, "What is the cause of this?" Then, someone mentioned to me that it is amazing that we have all these kinot for different communities and different suffering throughout Europe, but hardly anything for the Holocaust or anything bad that has happened to Israel. The Rabbis of previous generations clearly were much greater than any Rabbis alive today.

It is not just that the Rabbis were greater back in the day, it is that they commanded respect and people actually listened to them. They did not say what the community wanted to hear, but they said what the community NEEDED to hear.

This brings me to a Gemara that I was reading over Shabbos, Sanhedrin 97a. It says there that "The face of the generation [of the Moshiach] will be like the face of a dog." Now, there are several explanations, but Rav Elchonon Wasserman in Ikvasa DiMishicha cites a great explanation from Rabbi Yisroel Salanter. He says that "The face of the generation" refers to the leaders of the generation. The behavior of the leaders of the generation will resemble that of a dog. When a dog walks ahead of its master it gives the illusion that it is actually leading the master, but in reality it is being lead by its master. So too the leaders in the time of the Moshiach will appear to be leading, but in reality they will just be following the will of the masses.

This is what seems to be going on here by kinot, as well as in many other situations. The Rabbinic leaders may want to institute new Kinot that do commemorate the more recent suffering that is most appropriate for us to mention. However, the masses do not want it because it is not "FRUM," or whatever other reason they want to give. Why shouldn't the leaders of our generation get together and say, "You know what, we really should give a larger commemoration to the death of 6 million Jews and the suffering of many more millions. We should commemorate the constant struggle that the Jews in Israel go through and the suffering of those on the front lines." But no, that does not happen. Apparently, we are very close to the days of Moshiach, because our leaders are more of a "yes man" to the whims of the masses (or the kinayim) than they are actual leaders.

This is not speaking of all leaders, but it does seem to be very common nowadays.    

Why Shmuel Was Denied Semicha (Ordination)

I go to a Gemara Chaburah (group) on Shabbos and during one of the many discussions I found out something very interesting. Someone mentioned a very interesting point about Shmuel and why he was not given semicha. I asked for the source and the doctor who mentioned the idea was kind enough to share with me his sefer "Doros Ha'amoraim."

Translation:
Why was Shmuel not ordained?
This question has brought about different answers.
1) [Shmuel] was an expert in the calendar [for which months were full (30 days) and which months were not (29 days)]. Therefore, if he were ordained it is possible that the people of Bavel would follow after him with regards to when to bless the new month and when the holidays would fall and they would not rely on the institutions in Israel. Perhaps this is why they gave Shmuel the sharp nickname of Yarhinaah (referring to the moon).
2) Shmuel dealt with Mada (secular knowledge), outside knowledge, and foreign languages. He also attached himself to wise men from other nations. These things created a stumbling block in the road for him to get ordained. Even though he had good intentions this was a burden and pain to Rebbi [Yehuda Hanasi].

According to the first opinion I can understand why the Rabbis of Israel did not want to ordain Shmuel. They wanted to keep a center for Torah Judaism. If the Rabbis of Israel came up with one date for the holidays and Shmuel came up with another date, then there would be total chaos. Therefore, they needed to keep Shmuel from getting ordained in order to prevent this potential split within Rabbinical Judaism.

However, the second opinion sounds much more disturbing in my eyes. The reason they refused to give Shmuel ordination was because he was well versed in secular knowledge and associated with non-Jews? That is a reason not to ordain someone, because he knows everything in Torah and secular society? This seems like the Rabbis of Israel were making more of a power play than a just decision. They don't want people associating with non-Jews or learning secular knowledge so they refuse to ordain Shmuel. However, it seems like Shmuel would encourage these things and that is the sole reason they did't want to ordain him.

I prefer to believe the first opinion to be correct for the following inferences that we can draw. According to the first opinion the Rabbis did not ordain Shmuel because they realized Rabbinical Judaism must be united, whether in Israel or Bavel. There must be one law for everyone. Rosh Hashana, Yom Kippur, etc needs to be on the same day for all Jews no matter where they are in the world. If Jews in Israel kept Rosh Hashana on Sept. 1st and the Jews in Babel kept Rosh Hashana on Sept. 10th, that disparity would cause major problems. That is a unity issue that seems, to me, a very legitimate concern.

However, to disregard someone from the leadership because he is well versed in secular subjects and associates with non-Jews seems ridiculous. If anything it would seem, to me, that associating with non-Jews and having secular knowledge as well as Torah knowledge would make a person MORE capable of being a leader. Shmuel felt that way and so did many Rishonim after him (Rambam, Ralbag, etc).

This is why I believe the first opinion to be correct and the second opinion to be wrong. However, even if the second opinion were true, we clearly have a Mesorah that learning secular subjects and associating with non-Jews is definitely acceptable..   

Do you really feel qualified to make that kind of accusation against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Aron Leib Shteinman?

Over at Cross-Currents, Rabbi Dovid Landesman wrote an article on why he thought the supreme court's decision was dangerous for the religious people in Israel and how it could mean that a religious Jew can not be part of the government, aka the State of Israel. In all honesty, I think he makes some very valid points. However, the first paragraph really bothered me and it had NOTHING to do with his article. Rabbi Landesman said (bold part is the issue here),

Events in the last twenty-four hours have caused my inherent uncertainties about life in Israel to resurface. This afternoon I attended the mass demonstration [peaceful and orderly, thank God] in support of the parents from Emanuel who were sentenced to jail terms for contempt of court in refusing to re-enroll their daughters in the local Beis Yaakov as per the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court. My conflicts began as I made my way toward Rechov Yirmiyahu where the rally was to take place. I passed a young man wearing a knitted kippah, holding a placard that read “sinat chinam” (needless hatred). I asked him to whom he was referring and he answered, “the demonstrators.” The early afternoon sun was brutally hot, so it was critical that I try hard not to loose my cool. I calmly asked him, “Do you really feel qualified to make that kind of accusation against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Aron Leib Shteinman?” Noticing his perplexed demeanor, I walked away, wondering why he did not understand what I wanted from him.

So according to Rabbi Landesman, if you thought, or your Rabbi thought that this Immanuel issue highlighted the issue of discrimination, which Rabbi Landesman admits is rampant throughout the Charaidi world, you are going against Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman and how is that possible?!?! Apparently, Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman do not just know Torah better than anyone else, but they understands discrimination better than anyone else.

However, that is not what makes this comment so absurd in my mind. Yes, people can argue that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are the final authority on anything that come out of their mouths. This is, in fact, why the whole Rabbi Slifkin controversy took place. However, ignoring that and even admitting that the Gedolim are infallible, Rabbi Landesman has a problem. He asks this "young man" are you qualified to say the opinion of Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman is Sinaat Chinam. However, Rav Landesman says in the very next paragraph,

"Permit me to share my feelings and fears with you. As a caveat, I am convinced by evidence that I have personally witnessed through the years that there is a great deal of prejudice within the Ashkenazi Torah world against Sefaradim."

This itself goes against Rav Elyashiv, as conveyed by his Gabbai:

"After that Rav Elyashiv's gabbai spoke, followed by Rav David Batzri, a sephardi mekubel. In his speech he said that there has never been any discrimination against Sephardim amongst Torah Observant Jews. All Torah Observant Jews learn the Rambam together with Tosfos, the Beis Yosef with the Rema, the Arizal with Baal HaTanya, and the Mishnah Brurah together with the Ben Ish Chai. He said that discrimination against Sephardim was introduced by the Secular Zionists when they took the yaldei teheran and cut off their peyot and forced upon them the gods of secularism." (Found here)

However, maybe there is an excuse for Rabbi Landesman, he just didn't know Rav Elyashiv held this way and would be willing to change his mind and admit Sephardim have never been discriminated against had he only known this was the opinion of Rav Elyashiv. That is a possibility.

Getting back to the deeper point, the belief that a Rav understands matters that have nothing to do with Gemorah knowledge better than anyone else. I was not raised to think that a Rav's word is similar to the word of G-D. I have been raised to follow the traditions of Judaism. Regular Jews should not be making up halacha, but following the traditions that have withstood the ages. I am a big believer in this idea that, although everyone should be involved with asking questions, learning Torah and coming up with ideas, before coming to any conclusions a Rav should be consulted. For example, a regular Jew that decides to research the Aniskakis worm controversy should do so. This person should come up with their own insights and ideas. However, the psak halacha should always be consulted with that person's Rabbi. Does he need to just ask and receive an answer? No. However, he should enter into a conversation with the Rabbi and express his views and ask the Rabbi if they are valid or not and the Rabbi should be able to answer the questions. Ultimately, the Rabbi decides the halacha within the parameters of the tradition.

However, in matters of science, where the Rabbi knows much less than some others, why would anyone consult the Rabbi? For example, I want to understand how gravity works, should I consult my Rabbi? Doesn't that idea sound ridiculous? So, the Rabbi is the last word on halacha, but what about other things? Should a person having psychological issues go to his or her Rabbi for help or should they go to a psychologist who is trained to help people with these disorders? Here, in the case of Emanuel, who is equipped to understand the situation best? Is it Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman? It could be that a Charaidi person better understands the situation best merely for the fact that there are more Charaidim living in Emanuel than anyone else. Maybe this young man came from Eilat and just heard the Charaidim are protesting and he decided to counter protest. However, it is possible that this young man research the case and its intricacies much more than anyone else and came to the conclusion that this is based on the discrimination that Rabbi Landesman ADMITS TO EXISTING in the Charaidi world. Therefore, by Rabbi Landesman's own admission, this young man "is qualified" to disagree with Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman.

Also, I would not say that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are showing Sinaat Chinam (baseless hatred) here. I believe that Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinamn were not basing their views on the discrimination. I in no way think Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman are pro the discrimination that exists throughout Israel against Sephardim. However, I think they were told the situation by someone who wanted them to be pro the rally. In order to do that it was probably presented as religious Jews being persecuted by the non-religious state. Therefore, I think the question of Rabbi Landesman, that the young man was calling Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman haters, does not make sense.

However, let's just say Rav Elyashiv and Rav Shteinman, ch'v, were pro the discrimination against Sephardim. Is there any precedence for Rabbi's to err and make the wrong choices? Does anyone recall the burning of the Rambam's books? There were several great Rabbonim that took place in this horrific act. They were great scholars, but erred in how to deal with that situation. This is not my opinion, but many great Rabbis of that generation and subsequent generations admit to this mistake.

Nevertheless, I think that, as a religious Jew, it is an unfortunate thing that Israel is not governed by religious law. Do I think if the government was run by the Charaidim it would be better? No. I wish we had a righteous king that did not have any bias against fellow Jews and could govern, using the Torah, justly and fairly. Hopefully, the Moshiach will come soon and put an end to all this bickering.

Techailes From the Murex Trunculus and Psak Halacha

In high school I noticed that my Rebbe wore techailes on his Talis Gadol. This was peculiar to me since I was under the impression that techailes had been lost to us. I knew that there were people claiming to be wearing techailes again, but I had heard from so many people that those techailes, the Radziner techailes, were definitely not the real techailes. With my curiosity peaked I went up to my brand new Rebbe, this was the start of Junior year, who I knew was not a Radziner Chassid and asked him why he wore techailes on his Talis Gadol.

He answered, "Here, read this," and he handed me a pamphlet that he had written a few years before. This pamphlet can be found at this website: http://www.tekhelet.com/pdf/tw01.pdf.

I was intrigued by this 17 page pamphlet that my Rebbe, Rav Chaim Twerski, had written. It brought the history of Techailes, the history of the Radziner Rebbe's search for Techailes and several proofs as to why the Murex Trunculus is most likely the source of true techailes. I immediately desired to fulfill this great mitzvah that had been lost.

The most intriguing part about the whole article was the conclusion. It said,

"The argument for identifying chilazon as Murex trunculus has much merit. However, it cannot be said this identification can be 100% absolute, both with regard to the species or even with regard to the color. Nonetheless, the element of certainty would seem to surpass the threshold needed for identification l’halacha. Moreover, there is no issur in wearing a blue colored thread in the tzitzit, even if it turns out that this is not techelet,a point made poignantly by the Radziner Rebbe, in his sefer, Ptil Techelet.61 As with anything that is not definite,this matter is likely to be controversial for along time to come. It is likely that in future years there will be some rabbonim who will say that one is required to wear techelet made of Murex trunculus, others who will say that it is a mitzvah, but not an obligation, others who will say that it is a chumrah, or a mitzva min hamuvchar. Many, undoubtedly will say that there is no mitzvah whatsoever, and that it is a wasteof money and effort and still others who will find some issur to wear Murex trunculus techelet. Undoubtedly, Radziner chassidim will continue to maintain that sepia is the chilazon and techelet made of any other species is possul.62 If I may offer my own humble opinion it would seem that this identification ought to be accepted by many, if not the majority of poskim. But it will likely take much time for this to happen, for halacha is by its very nature conservative, and in general, a consensus is reached only after much debate and deliberation. For the meantime, until a consensus is reached, each rav should do according to the dictates of his own reasoning. If after careful study of all the material he is skeptical, there is no reason for him to wear techelet made from Murex trunculus or instruct others to do so. If, on the other hand, one is reasonably convinced that Murex trunculus is indeed the chilazon, he should wear them, and rule so for those who ask and rely upon his rulings.

NOTES:
61) As Rav Leiner states in his Sefer, Ayn HaTechelet, and in Ptil Techles, the curse meted out for those who use k’la ilan in their tzitzis and claim that they are wearing techelet, is meant for those who are intent upon deception, not those who are making a sincere attempt of fulfilling the mitzvah.


62) Chassidim are known for their emunas chachamim and it would be highly unlikely that
they would question the conclusion of their rebbe. It should be noted, however, that Rav Leiner
himself stated that he would accept any reasonable argument that would prove his identification
wrong and another identfication right. It is more than likely that were the Radziner rebbe to be alive today he would have abandoned his own thesis and adopted the present one."

I do not know about the rest of you, but this article taught me something very important about piskei halacha. Every competent Rav has the right, nay, the obligation to paskin halacha based on what he finds to be the correct psak. As Rav Twersky tells us, there will be a variety of differing opinions on this halacha and every single one of them is legitimate. He admits that every Rav will come to their own conclusion and that is THEIR OBLIGATION.

Power of The Rabbis

In a book that I read occasionally that comments on the weekly parsha I found a very intriguing idea. The book is called Foundations and in the end of the section on parshas Emor it says the following:

"The Gemorra (Pesachim 30b; Yoma 31a; Yevamos 11a; etc) propounds that any Rabbinic ruling (tikun) carries the weight of a d'Oraisah. The Rambam (Yad Hachazaka, Hilchos Mamarim 2:9) elaborates as follows: Bais Din is empowered to prohibit what was once permitted, and their ruling stands for all generations. Similarly, they can permit what the Torah has forbidden, all according to the needs of the times."

Now, this confuses and befuddles me more than any other statement I have ever read by anyone. The first idea of the Rambam is taught to everyone and easily accepted. Of course the Rabbis have the right to protect us from transgressing a commandment from the Torah. A lot of the forbidden things that exist nowadays are prohibitions that were enacted by the Rabbis to protect us from transgressing a commandment from the Torah. However, the other idea, that Rabbis can detract from the Torah as they see necessary seems like an idea out of the Conservative or Reformed movement.

I think we can explain the Rambam to make him sound more mainstream. The Rambam doesn't say that the Rabbis have the power to get rid of the prohibition, rather he says the Rabbis are able to get rid of the prohibition according to the needs of the times. This means that the Rabbis can only proclaim a temporary lenience that will not last forever. This can be compared to the idea that women used to never cover their hair. Everyone is always shocked that no one used to cover their hair and only recently did people start covering their hair. I don't know if there was ever a Rabbinic proclamation for this, but we can see the example where allowing this commandment to be transgressed brought a lot of people back to orthodox Judaism. However, after a little while it brought many people to keep the commandments and, eventually, many people even started to cover their hair again.

It seems like, in this situation, the ends justified the means. At least according to how the Rambam understands the Rabbinic authority. The Torah is not a rigid document, but rather a guideline that should always be followed. These guidelines can only be changed by the people that have been entrusted with that responsibility, the Rabbis. Only the Rabbis can decide when it is appropriate to bend the rules in order to save the greater whole of Judaism.

I am unsure if the Rambam means that any generation can change the rules or only a generation that has a Sanhedrin. It is hard to assume that the Rabbis of this day and age, a splintered group, would have the ability to do this since there are hardly any consensuses on any topic. However, this does reveal that the Torah is not the unchanging and rigid force that most of us assume that it is and has always been.

Link to this Rambam here.